



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
HORACE M. ✓ KALLEN

the Will of God

AN ESSAY IN THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF
DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION

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Preface

THIS BOOK IS a philosophic inquiry to which I was led by the somewhat surprising renovation of the conflict over the relations of church and state, the place of dogmatic religions in the curricula of the public schools, and the role of sacerdotal authority and private conscience in issues of faith and morals. The renovation of the conflict was surprising because it had seemed peacefully settled some generations ago. But after the war "to make the world safe for democracy," there came an insurgence of totalitarianism in Europe, with Communism, Nazism and Fascism sending missionaries of their faiths all over the world. Of the three, Communism attained the greatest power both of persuasion and coercion. The missionaries of the Cominform successfully diffused the Stalinite version of the Marxist gospel of salvation among the have-nots of the globe. Everywhere they challenged the sincerity and mined the power of imperial states that professed, even taught, liberty but practiced despotism.

Concurrently, the Roman Catholic establishment in the United States, having accumulated—under the favorable conditions resulting from the constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and the constitutional separation of church and state—wealth, power and numbers of adherents beyond those of any other denomination, began to use this might in order to secure for itself "the favor of the laws" and install privileges like those it exploits in lands where Romanism is the state religion. The papacy's spokesmen renewed the papal claim to exclusive religious sovereignty, to exclusive right to educate youth, and to the subordination of state to church in all issues of "faith and morals," since God had endowed the pope with infallibility in those domains of man's life.

Thus, Americans loyal to the ideals of freedom, which shaped the making of the Constitution and which gave their libertarian direction to American folkways and mores, find themselves confronted with a red authoritarianism of the left, and a black authoritarianism of the right. Each claims to be the one true gospel of salvation from the sins and sufferings inherent in free society for the support of whose principles the founding fathers had pledged to one another their lives, their properties and their sacred honor. Each insists that the other embodies the synthesis of all the evils. Each strives to convert the free mind to its own authoritarian rule as salvation from the other's and from itself.

This book is one more of the responses which minds loyal to freedom feel impelled to make to the pretension of totalitarian authority. In substance, it is a theologico-political tractate, answering to the anxieties of the age and composed as a philosophic gloss upon the basic assumptions of the Declaration of Independence, the assumptions intended by such phrases as "self-evident truths," "the laws of nature and of nature's God," "equal," "unalienable rights," "liberty," "consent of the governed" and the like. The inquiry proceeds by considering the meanings of these terms as forces in the nation's and the world's history, and their present import for the future of mankind.

Mr. Leo Pfeffer of the New York Bar who has specialized in the constitutional and other legal issues of church-state relations, Adelbert Ames, Jr., of the Institute of Advanced Research and Dr. Eleanor Berman of the American Humanist Association have been good enough to read the manuscript and to make many helpful suggestions. To them, this inadequate word of thanks and appreciation.

HORACE M. KALLEN

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“Reason has always ruled Necessity because Reason has succeeded in persuading Necessity to turn most things that come to be toward the better. And it is thus that the Cosmos is formed, by the action of Necessity acquiescing to the persuasion of Wisdom, according to principle.”

PLATO: *Timaeus* 48, a.

“As to religion, I hold it to be the indispensable duty of all governments to protect all conscientious professors thereof, and I know of no other business which government hath to do therewith.”

THOMAS PAINE

1 Of Secularism and the Secularist Idea of God

SECULARISM IS A development of religion. It comes into existence when the ideal of equal liberty for all faiths and special privileges for none becomes a working hypothesis verifying itself in all the institutions of a culture. Then believers in creeds which are different from each other commit themselves to living with each other, not as feuding families but as good neighbors. In one aspect, secularism is the recognition by all religions of the right to be different of each religion, to be different without penalty and without privilege, and to hold to its creed and code no less freely and safely than any and every other religion. This attitude of different religions to one another becomes itself a religion whenever a person, a church or any other society bets its survival and growth on this relationship with the diverse.

Thus, the religion of Secularism neither competes with any other religion nor displaces any other. On the contrary it is belief in a free and fruitful union of all which should supplement and strengthen each, as a communion of the diverse in equal liberty. Such a communion signalizes a replacement of the historic war of each against all whereby each one seeks to overrule its alternates and peers by persuasion, by coercion, or by both, and to liquidate difference in conformation. There are those who religiously believe that men cannot live except they fight; that they are born to fight as they are born to breathe or to eat; that the failure to satisfy the need would bring their manhood down to sickness and death; that only war is well-being and virtue is only fighting. There are others who believe that fighting may not be inborn need, but that it is an outer necessity; that existence is a struggle for survival in which man's inhuman-

ity to man has the foremost role. They point out that in nature nothing they need or want comes in such abundance as to satisfy everybody, deprive nobody. Nature's scarcities, they say, compel man's pugnacities, and all men's cultures, particularly their religions, are devised to conquer scarcity and to win the life more abundant for those alone whose cultures they are. Secularism does not reject these beliefs, but proposes an alternative method of winning abundance. It offers itself as a moral equivalent for the war of the faiths. And it offers itself as a religion because the peaceful parity of the different to which it aspires becomes only occasionally and arduously a fact of life, and is regularly an article of faith which the believer works and fights to establish as a fact of life. As an article of faith Secularism envisages the miscellany of mankind, in all their irreducible singularities of cult and code and culture and vocation in benevolent and untrammelled communion with one another, and as a free society of free men by means of such communion.

This vision is the Secularist's substance of things hoped-for, his evidence of things unseen. Committed to it, he may be, in and for himself, a monist or a pluralist, a monadist or a dualist, a naturalist or a supernaturalist; a deist or a theist, a monotheist, a polytheist, a pantheist or an atheist; an agnostic, a positivist or a humanist; a Roman, a Greek, an English, a Uniate or other Catholic; a marxian, trotskyite or stalinist Communist; a fascist, nazi, malanite, falangist or dixiecratic racist; a Bahai; a Lutheran, a Calvinist, a Wesleyan, a Quaker, a Universalist, a Unitarian or other Protestant; an Orthodox or Conservative or Reform or other Judaist; an adherent to one or another of the many sects and denominations of Moslems, Buddhists, Brahmanists, Taoists, Confucianists. But when his relations with any or all the others consist in acknowledging, understanding and respecting whatever they are, as they are, and in joining together with them in a reciprocal enhancement of life and liberty, he adds to his particular faith the common faith of Secularism. The last, being the union of all which should give

impartial protection to each, can be partial to none. The works which establish it as an effective common faith would consist in making sure that none should become dominant, none subordinate, none privileged, none penalized, but that all should progress as peers in status and rights by their own labors at their own risk.

The Secularist faith, thus, not only negates intolerance, it dispenses with tolerance. In the theologico-political history of religions, tolerance is but the passage from intolerance to Secularism. It is the attitude of *live and let live* developing into the attitude of *live and help live*. "Toleration," wrote deist Thomas Paine, "is not the *opposite* of Intolerance, but the counterfeit of it. Both are despotisms. The one assures to itself the right of withholding Liberty of Conscience, the other of granting it . . . Toleration . . . places itself not between man and man, nor between church and church, nor between one denomination of religion and another, but between God and man; between the being who worships and the being who is worshipped; and by the same act of assumed authority which it tolerates man to pay his worship, it presumptuously and blasphemously sets itself up to tolerate the Almighty to receive it . . . If every [denomination] is left to judge of its own religion, there is no such thing as a religion that is wrong; but if they are to judge of each other's religion, there is no such thing as a religion that is right; and therefore all the world is right, or all the world is wrong. But with respect to religion itself, without regard to names . . . it is man bringing to his Maker the fruits of his heart."

Secularism is equivalent to "religion itself"; not, however, "without regard to names," but on the contrary, with full recognition of, and impartial goodwill toward, each and every ineffable value and unique meaning which names signalize. Hence, for the Secularist, as for Goethe, "to tolerate is an insult. Tolerance must be only a sentiment which prepares for opening the way to mutual acceptance." That is, again, tolerance may not be a dwelling-place, it may be only a road which believers

tread toward the parity of the different which is the Secularist faith.

This parity pertains, of course, to the different meanings which the different religions give the word "God." Secularism accepts the God of every communion as that communion defines its God, but projects no definition of its own. Its concern is not with *what* God means to anyone, but with *how* that meaning affects that one's ways with his neighbor who gives God a different meaning. It appraises each communion as having come to its own theological doctrine first and foremost out of an experience of crisis, of danger and deficiency from which it could save itself by no means at its own command. *Ab origine*, its definition of God is its figuring of an ultimate power able and willing to save and to serve. However any individual directly experiences such a power, however any philosopher of any school or any theologian of any cult transposes such experience into discourse and argumentation, each becomes an experience or an idea which the word "God" stands for. The divinity pertains not to the *what* of the experience nor to the verbalization of such a *what* set forth by this or that school of theology. The divinity pertains, at least for the believers, not to what the saving power is, but to how it does, to its salvational dynamic. This may be accounted for in terms of "providence" or "grace," "miracle" or "dialectic materialism," "manifest destiny" or "historical necessity" or what else you will. But however accounted for, its value and existence are the same as the rescue it is believed to accomplish. Anything to which faith attributes such saving potency is thereby rendered divine. Even "atheism" receives, as an ideal, the power and function of divinity among those atheists who bet their lives on the proposition that denying the gods would be, above all other powers that save, the sure salvation of mankind. "The gods we stand by," William James says in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, "are the gods we need and can use, the gods whose demands on us are reinforcements of our demands on ourselves

and on one another," and denying the gods would thus work as a god against the gods. The divine operation must needs be singular, direct, an immediate experience. "So long as we deal with the cosmic and the general," James says elsewhere in the same book, "we deal only with symbols of reality, but as soon as we deal with private and personal phenomena as such, we deal with realities in the completest sense of the term." Not generalization, then, only association, can be loyal to the integrity of those realities, and whatever consensus or even unanimity spokesmen of salvation attain can never be a unison, nor bespeak a unity in which all diversity has been liquidated and consumed. It will at best be union, in *pluribus unum*. So whatever One God ensues as such a union of many divinities, ensues whenever as saving powers the latter compete without violence and cooperate without compulsion in manifesting the divine function. *Deus est mortali mortalem juvari*.

Moreover, the One God thus designated can be neither eternal nor universal, not a totality self-contained and self-containing, always and everywhere the same. Such divinity can not be the unmoved mover of Aristotle, beyond mobile existence yet inseparable from it; not the entirety of a total universe, but the most important part of it; nor can it be Spinoza's single unaltering substance, one *Natura Naturans* wherein nothing is possible because everything is eternally actual. God's being would consist rather in a changing configurational pattern of old existences passing out, new ones entering in, perhaps in the mode of Charles Peirce's agapastic tychism or a pluralistically interpreted Bergsonian *élan*. "Everlasting" would fit such being better than "eternal," "orchestral" than "organic" or "total." If designated as the "whole," it would needs be a concretely growing Whole, ever open to variation and new addition. "We do not yet know." William James wrote in *Pragmatism*, "what type of religion is going to work best in the long run. The various overbeliefs of men, their several faith-ventures, are in fact what is needed to bring the evidence in." Secularist One

God hence could be imaged neither as the apex of an autocratic hierarchy nor as the president of a federal republic. An analogy for its solitude and singularity might be found in the idea of a musical composition which the members of an orchestra without a conductor spontaneously produce when each player endeavors to bring his timbre, his theme and his tempo to harmony with those of his fellow-musicians. The god of gods which such a One God comes to is at once the end which they shape and their shaping acts with their multitudinous factual diversity and their united functional singularity; the teamwork of the processes of production with the product. Traditional believers who prefer to affirm God's saving function in personalist, or at least in psychological, terms, would, insofar as they also saw as the Secularist sees, use the word "God" in this secularist as well as in their customary sense. Moreover, they would intend by it something less than the ever-varying universe and more than mankind, something in nature and of nature but not the same with nature. But however divine total unity be imaged or argued, Secularism would be the will of such a sole God. Essentially as well as empirically God, however defined, signalizes a vision of hope whose substance is faith; an unseen Beyond, whose evidence is this vision. As we shall see later, another name for faith is love.

If the divine potency comes to birth as an event whose initiation and support seems so often the will-to-believe of some spirit in crisis, it appears also to have grown, with the growth of civilization, into the helper and nourisher of such wills. In the nature of things as different from the infinite diversity which its oneness orchestrates and in orchestrating embraces, as water is different from the hydrogen and oxygen that are its initiation, this One God must be a Different never revealed by any of its constituting multitude, nor *as* any. Job said it:

Behold, I go forward, but he is not there;
And backward, but I cannot perceive him;

On the left hand, when he doth work, but
I cannot behold him;
He hideth himself on the right hand,
that I cannot see him.

Other sufferers of other times in other crises speak of *Deus Absconditus*, not knowing that they aspire to the Secularist meaning of the word God.

The formation, growth and struggles of the Secularist attitude and action in religion is a historic movement which had its initiation in Europe, but happened to have become more meaningful and intense than elsewhere in the configuration of the American way under the shaping influence of what Theodore Parker was first to call the American Idea.

I have endeavored in this book to review and interpret certain aspects of the movement as a confrontation and struggle of political and theological ideas and of the interests they speak for and represent. The book is, indeed, a theologico-political tractate. I have written it as Secularist and pluralist.

2

"The Laws of Nature and of Nature's God" in the American Idea

THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION which began in America spread to Europe, and in a century and three quarters has become global, was formally launched on July 4, 1776 with the adoption of the Declaration of Independence. The members of the Continental Congress who mutually pledged each other their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor for the support of this Declaration, did so "with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence." There were among them Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Methodists, Anglicans, Quakers, Catholics, Unitarians, deists as well as theists, in a diversity of denominational orthodoxy and heresy. Some, in the eyes of colleagues, were religionless atheists; others adherents to priestly superstition and obscurantism. But they neither denounced each other for these differences nor challenged the equal right of each and all to deliberate and decide upon the common principles and act of revolution. Religious doctrine and discipline had long been for most of them matters of primary personal concern. Not the priest or minister, but the lay communicant appraised and voted upon theological rightness and ministerial competency. Even when the minister of religion was an acknowledged leader of opinion and judge of correct doctrine it was Congregation or Meeting which held and exercised the power of government and determined promulgation of rule. Even in the Anglican and Romanist dispensations the idea of the priesthood of all believers defined the climate of opinion. The priestly or ministerial vocation was widely regarded as an occupational specialty. Those engaged in it were judged for the skill with which they exercised it, and were rewarded or deplored, like the butcher,

the baker and the candlestickmaker, for the quality of service they were believed to render.

So far as practice went, the churches existed for the members, not the members for the churches, and the clergy were professional functionaries, hired to serve the members, ministering unto them, and paid for their services according to the value the laity set on them. This tended to be the case also in such of the colonies as prescribed creeds as conditions for insuring the safety, the freedom and civil status of their inhabitants, and variously penalized persons with other creeds. Such privilege of clergy as obtained was social and secular. Such special authority as a clergy might exercise they received, not from God, but from the congregation they served who received it from God. Such rights as the clergy held by virtue of their occupation, came to them not from divinity through ordination, but from their employers because of ordination. Ordination was the evidence that they could perform the tasks of manipulating the supernatural more competently than others not trained for this vocation. They stood as the leaders, not the masters, of the religious communities. There were no "Lords spiritual" any more than Lords medical or legal. Similar assumptions underlay the attitude of colonial and revolutionary Americans toward all the crafts and vocations which the growing division of labor was multiplying.

Historians proffer varied explanations for this situation. Whatever one is accepted does not affect the event that this was the religious condition of man in America at the time the Declaration of Independence was adopted. Consciously different from one another as they were in creed and kind, in person, occupation and possessions, they bet all they were and all they had on the terms of the Declaration, which they attributed to "the laws of Nature and of Nature's God." This bet constituted their covenant with one another. Its terms defined their principles of association as autonomous individuals and as members of societies—religious, occupational, cultural, political and the like. They established the ground on which men and groups

that are different from each other, in whatever way, can live together with each other as neighbors on equal terms.

This ground consists in certain "self-evident" truths: the truth that however, and in whatever traits, men may be different from one another, they are by "the laws of Nature and of Nature's God" created equal as well as different; the truth that intrinsic to each are certain "unalienable" rights; rights specifically of life, liberty and of the pursuit of happiness; the truth that each human being is thus unique and an end in himself; the truth that these rights of his are not a grant from without by some superior external power; the truth that they constitute the inward essence of his nature as a person.

By the laws of nature and the will of nature's God, then, man is natural and his rights are natural, his survival in freedom and his attainment of happiness are the ends of his existence from birth to death.

But the equal rights of the different, declared to be inalienable, were also known to be insecure. There was not one of the signers of the Declaration, nor of the people whose delegate he was, who had not experienced the sorrows of living and the fears of dying; he was aware of the hazards of nature and of the inhumanity of man to man. There was none who had not either suffered or benefited from invidious distinctions based on rank, birth, wealth, occupation and creed; none who was not aware of the bondage of Europeans indentured as servants and the slavery of Africans, like cattle bought and sold for chattels and treated as tools with life in them. There was none who was not aware of the oppressions and exactions of civil government, claiming to have received its power and authority from God on high, and demanding credence, obedience and service from the governed, as a divine right. There was none who was not aware of the "bloody tenet of persecution" implemented by religious establishments pretending to exclusive possession of infallible truth delivered at some unauthenticated past moment by revelation direct from God, and penalizing

every mode of dissent and non-conformity with the lash, the fagot, the bloody statute book. The more lettered among the declarants, reading history, reading theology, appraised them as the record of the cruel perversion of the laws of nature and of nature's God by priests and kings. Royal and sacerdotal principle and policy, creed and conduct, were to them a sacrilege of nature and a blasphemy against God, warranting themselves as the revelation of his will and the performance of his commandments. But both revelation and performance were sins that belied God's will and disobeyed his commandments. They treated human beings as tools and chattels, not as ends-in-themselves. They looked upon their fellow-men as but made for governments, priestly and kingly both. They penalized those who chose to avow a different revelation concerning the laws of nature and of nature's God by every conceivable device of alienating their equal and inalienable rights—from excommunication and interdict, to inquisition, torture and *auto-da-fe*.

This, the declarants had noted, was the human condition, not only as of their day, but throughout recorded time. To insure each human being's inalienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness against such cruel alienations by fellow human beings, men entered into covenants with one another, and with God. Such covenants were for many Christians as well as Judaists, that between Abraham and Jehovah, between Jehovah and Israel, and of the children of Israel with one another. Such a covenant had been the intent of the Puritan Revolution in England, especially of "covenanters" and levellers whose fighting faith achieved it. Such was the Mayflower Covenant whose subscribers declared that "we covenant and combine ourselves into a civil body politic," intending the collective assurance of individual freedom and security while alive and a safe and happy immortality when dead. It is true that many such societies began their careers by arrogating for their own doctrines the infallibility they denied to those of the Papal or Anglican establishments; and by demanding for their own

disciplines a totalitarian scope they rebelled against in others. That these pretensions had been motives of policy and practice is all the more significant in the light of the fact that they had been abandoned, tacitly at least, when the Declaration of Independence was adopted and the American people bet their lives on its "self-evident truths."

For concerning governments—be they churchly, civil, military, occupational, familial or what you will—the self-evident truth was that they are by men, of men, for men; that they are means and not ends, instituted not because they are good in themselves, but "in order to secure these rights." Their powers are neither self-grounded nor a grant from God; they are not his vicars on earth. Whatever just powers they exercise "derive from the consent of the governed." Their sanction is not dominion but service; like Jesus, they are on earth not to be ministered unto but to minister. Should any form of government falter or fail in its ministry to the equal and inalienable rights of the diversity of the governed; should it arrogate to itself either native authority or a sole and exclusive mandate from God to beat the governed into means and to establish itself as end, it is the right of the governed people to alter or abolish it, replacing it with whatever form is, in their belief, most likely to secure their equal and inalienable rights and defend them against alienation and inequity.

This conception of the relation of the governed and their governments had already been long the consensus of American religious societies. Most such societies, however diverse and even opposed their creeds, based themselves on the principle of the priesthood of all believers. Their members appraised the hierarchical orders of the Roman Catholic and Anglican establishments, with their infallible doctrines, their authoritarian disciplines and their privileged clergy as ministries inverting service into mastership, subordinating consent to authority, subverting the ends of religion for the greater glory of the means. They looked upon the Protestant Reformation as an institution of

new governments, loyal expression at last of the laws of nature and of nature's God. The basic form was to them ultimately the Congregation, with its members the seat of power and source of policy. This was the form they believed the most likely to secure and to defend their lives and their liberties in this world and their pursuit of eternal happiness in the next. It has been argued, by no means implausibly, that the Declaration but extended the application of that self-evident truth from the religious to all the cognate institutions of the human enterprise. That Americans, in vindication of the laws of nature and of nature's God, bet their lives on this extension, is of record. Appealing to "the supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of their intentions," they justified setting up "new government" by indicting the old for a long train of abuses and usurpations, all parts of a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, all making self-evident lies of the Declaration's self-evident truths.

Having, as an alliance formed to wage war for the purpose, established the unfree and dependent British colonies of their habitation as the Free and Independent States of their aspiration, the peoples of these states were confronted with the tasks of forming "new government" such that should impattern in works the fighting faith of the Declaration of Independence. As usual, this required bringing together diverse and apparently irreconcilable philosophies of government, jealous sovereignties of states and conflicting interests of persons, irreducible diversities of doctrine and discipline. The joining of issues was long, and on occasion, violent. Sectarians and cultists desired to impose creedal formulae on the proposed covenant, even establishment of religion. Authoritarians tried to detach government from the ground of consent of the governed; they feared that "great beast" the people, could do itself only harm by ruling itself. What Jefferson had observed in 1776 (in *Notes on Religion*) was evident to every responsible American in 1789: "From the dissensions among the sects arises necessarily a right

of chusing and necessity of deliberating, to which we will conform; but if we chuse for ourselves, we must allow others to chuse also; and so reciprocally this establishes religious liberty"—and all civil liberties.

The debate came to its term in what some describe as a configuration of compromises, others, as a consensus embodied in a covenant or contract which "we the people of the United States" made with one another to the end that they and their descendants might live well, and better, together as good neighbors, equally free and equally at peace, sure of justice at home and protection from enemies abroad.¹

This contract is known as the Constitution of the United States. As amended by the Bill of Rights, without which it would not have been entered into, it is a design of government which its designers believed to be, with reason, something new under the sun. It makes explicit that the source and seat of governmental power, whatever the office, are the people. It designates the method of changing the structure and distribution of their delegated power by amendment. "Every government," wrote Jefferson in his *Notes on Virginia*, "degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people alone. The people themselves are, therefore, its only safe depositaries. . . . If every individual which composes the mass participates in the ultimate authority, the government will be safe." Safe, not only for political societies but for all societies; and traditionally, for religious societies. The Constitution was intended, by the believing men who devised it, and by their constituents who voted it into being, entirely to shut out the extension of delegated power in matters of religion, communication, assembly, access to government "for the redress of grievances," the owning and bearing of arms; and all but one of the subsequent amendments

¹ This is what the Preamble to the Constitution means for the personal life of all people living in the United States.

strengthened and widened the limitations.² It affirmed, more than once, that rights not expressly granted by the people to the government remain reserved to the people. All are retained unmodified also when some are affirmed or assigned to government. The covenant "to secure those rights" thus abolishes religious tests, and makes no commitment of government to any creed or cult, it forbids such commitment and any limitation on the *free* exercise of religion. It establishes government as the guarantee of this freedom on equal terms to the entire diversity of believers.

This guarantee was in Thomas Paine's mind when that devout deist of the Society of Friends wrote: "As to religion, I hold it to be the indispensable duty of all governments to protect all conscientious professors thereof, and I know of no other business which government hath to do therewith . . . Certain I am that where opinions are free, either in matters of government or religion, truth will finally and powerfully prevail." His certainty drew upon a sympathetic observation as early as 1792, the year he published his *Rights of Man*. "If there is a country in the world," he declared, "where concord, according to common calculation would be least expected, it is America. Made up, as it is, of people from different nations, accustomed to different forms and habits of government, speaking different languages, *and more different in their modes of worship* (italics supplied) it would appear that the union of such a people would be impracticable; but by the simple operation of constructing government on the principle of society and the rights of man, every difficulty retires and all the parts are brought into cordial unison. . . . There government is not a private trade but a public trust; it of itself has no rights; they are only duties."

Not that Paine was unaware of the distances that still stretched between the principle of equal rights and the practice

² That was the rescinded prohibition amendment.

of unequal privilege. Like Jefferson, he abhorred property in human beings no less than proprietary claims on men's faith and reason. Already in 1775 he had denounced slavery as immoral "as murder, robbery, lewdness and barbarity," and had urged Americans to "discontinue and renounce it with grief and abhorrence." Since the Protestant Reformation, his essay on *African Slavery* declared, "all distinction of nations and privileges of one above others, are ceased. Christians are taught to account all men their neighbors and love their neighbors as themselves; and do to all men as they would be done by; to do good to all men; and man-stealing is ranked with enormous crime." Paine regarded the principles of the Declaration of Independence as his time's version of this teaching and the most adequate affirmation yet of the duty of government to protect the governed from every form of enslavement of man by man—whether as state, as church, as race, as sex, as business enterprise, as science, as culture—thus keeping "the laws of nature and of nature's God."

Basically Paine, Jefferson, and Madison were of the same mind, and bespoke the consensus of the American people. The gospel of equal liberty is the premise of Jefferson's *Statute of Religious Liberty*, of Madison's *Memorial and Remonstrance*, of Jefferson's *Bible*, and of the conviction that the American way erected and maintains a wall of separation between church and state. It constituted the fighting faith of the Abolitionists, of Abraham Lincoln, who read the Declaration as communicating "that sentiment . . . which gave liberty not alone to the people of this country, but hope to the world for all future time" and thus "a stumbling block to tyrants for all time to come." It was John Brown's substance of things hoped for and evidence of things not seen. On trial for his life as a traitor fomenting rebellion of slaves in the sovereign state of Virginia, charged with madness for undertaking his hopeless violence, Brown replied that his enemies might believe him mad and fanatical, but that as he saw "you people of the South," it was they,

not he, who were mad and fanatical. "Is it sane to keep five million men in slavery? Is it sane to think such a system can last? Is it sane to suppress all who would speak against this system and to murder all who would break with it? Is it sane to talk of war rather than give it up." Well, he had brought them war; he had tried moral suasion and had failed. Believing in the Bible, he held that the Golden Rule applies to slaves, too, and that slaveholders were guilty of a great wrong against God and humanity. The prompting of his own heart and of his Maker compelled him at last to organize force which might free the slaves.

Tried by due process of the laws of the state of Virginia, he was found guilty and condemned to be hanged. He addressed the judge who delivered the sentence: "Had I taken up arms on behalf of the rich, the powerful, the intelligent, the so-called great, or in behalf of any of their friends, or any of their class, every man in this court would have deemed it an act worthy of reward rather than punishment. But the court acknowledges the validity of the law of God. I see a book kissed, which is the Bible, and which teaches me that all things that I would have men do unto me I must do unto them. I endeavored to act up to that instruction. I fought for the poor; and I say it was right, for they are as good as any of you, and God is no respecter of persons. I believe that to have interfered on behalf of his despised poor, I did no wrong, but right. Now, if it be deemed necessary that I should forfeit my life for the furtherance of the ends of justice, and mingle my blood further with the blood of my children, and with the blood of millions in this slave country whose rights are disregarded by wicked, cruel, and unjust enactments, I say, let it be done."

Waiting the day of his execution, friends came to John Brown with a plan of rescue. He declined to let it be attempted. There was a destiny that shaped his ends: what had happened had been "decreed to happen ages before the world was made." He would be more useful to freedom dead than alive. By his

showing how unafraid he might die in freedom's cause, his spirit would haunt the living with questions about freedom and justice and God. Young men would remember him, when the time came that he had tried to avert, he said at the gallows' foot "that the crimes of this guilty land are purged away in blood." And the free men of the North fighting to preserve the Union and to free the slaves went to battle singing: *John Brown's body is mouldering in his grave. But his soul is marching on.*

John Brown's defiance of governmental law and governmental power, his refusal to evade the legal penalty of this defiance, brought to mind the trial and death of Socrates. As Lincoln advised pro-slavery men on the day John Brown was hanged: He had broken the law; the cause for which he broke it was the righteous cause, and the penalty imposed for breaking it was correct, though it could not be just. For those who treated the Federal Union as John Brown had treated the government of Virginia there would needs be a similar penalty. For Brown was invoking the principles of the Declaration, which gave faith its direction and works their pattern in the covenant of government agreed to as the Constitution. Brown was invoking inalienable ends as the measure of alienable means that had been made the rivals of those ends. Senator Jefferson Davis stripped the issue to the bone when he was examining Brown's friend, Joshua Giddings. The ends, Giddings explained, inhere in the laws of nature and of nature's God: they are all men's equal and unalienable rights—thus ineluctably "the higher law." But suppose, Davis replied, to pin-point the conflict, that this "higher law" confronted people with the necessity of choosing between it and "the laws of the country"? Giddings' answer made it clear that the latter could never rightly be a valid alternative to the former. "There can be no *law* which invades the right of any human being to life, liberty and happiness. The mandate of the enactment has none of the elements of law; it is a mere commandment to violate God's will or the laws of nature."

3

The Global Struggle for "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God"

THE STRUGGLE TO vindicate these terms of nature's laws and God's will remains perennial. The doctrine and discipline of their deniers perdure and the energies of their will to dominate regularly renew themselves. The deniers also present themselves as fulfillers of the laws of nature and the will of God. And they offer tradition and history for sanction. Moreover, among those who expose and reject their pretensions, achievement continues remote from aspiration, practice from profession, performance from promise. But the distance has been lessened—not greatly, it is true, and laboriously, bloodily and bravely, but lessened, notably among the peoples of the United States, and even more arduously, if less successfully, among peoples of the residual world. We might call their struggle a struggle for Americanization, marked by such crises as the formation of the Confederacy and the Civil War, the conjuration of the Dixicratocracy, the devices to nullify the intent of the report of President Truman's Commission on Civil Rights, with the spiritual descendants of Paine and Jefferson and Madison and John Brown and Lincoln and Robert E. Lee, confronting the descendants of Calhoun and Jefferson Davis and the first Ku Klux Klansmen. It continues a struggle in which, as President Lincoln noted in his Second Inaugural, "both read the same Bible and pray to the same God, and each invokes his aid against the other."

If, to the one, the will of God is that new dispensation—the American Idea of the parity of the different in the right of liberty, life and happiness, the will of God is to the other an ancient hierarchy of rights and duties with the rights re-

served for the man with the sword or the crozier or the pen empowered to govern as the vicar or trustee of the same God, and with the duties imposed on the man with the hoe or the shovel or the awl, created never to reason why, ever to serve and to die, whatever the blunder. When confronted by such irreconcilable conceptions of human nature, destiny and the relations by which these are best expressed and fulfilled, each person is under the necessity of choosing between them. As Jefferson noted regarding the origin and spring of religious liberty, if he chooses for himself, he must allow the same freedom of choice to others. But if he does allow this, he thereby surrenders his claim to exclusive election by his God, and admits the parity of the different under his God: in religion, the parity of all creeds, including such as doubt or deny that it can be known that God is, or what God is; in political economy, the equal freedom of all business enterprises; in the pursuit of knowledge, the equal freedom of inquiry, reason and experiment regarding all claims to truth; in the arts, equal freedom of expression and communication.

Whoever does this abandons hierarchy for equal liberty. Many among the Founding Fathers had made that ineluctable choice. Like the Abolitionists after them, they had, as Jefferson observed apropos of the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, made "the bold and doubtful election between submission and the sword." That is, they had bet their lives. Fifty years after, Jefferson envisioned the Declaration as soon or late "the signal of arousing men to burst the chains, under which Monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded them to bind themselves, and to assume the blessings and security of self-government. The form which we have substituted restores the free right to the unbounded exercise of reason and freedom of opinion. All eyes are opened or opening to the rights of men. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs,

nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately by the Grace of God."

Every reader of Abraham Lincoln knows that the Declaration had the same meaning for him. At home its intention included as basic unit not only the individual in his singularity but every form and degree of association of the singulars, from villages to cities and states, from small businesses to great corporations, from farm families to labor unions counting millions; from small spontaneous local cults to great traditional religious establishments. Each was acknowledged as an association of the different on equal terms. Its government was projected, on the smallest scale or on the greatest, as a federal structure whose function was to secure the equal rights of the unequal. In its report entitled *To Secure These Rights*, published in 1947, the President's Committee on Civil Rights repeats for these days the Declaration's insight into human nature and human relations:

The central theme in our American heritage is the importance of the individual person. From the earliest moment of our history we have believed that every human being has an essential dignity and integrity which must be respected and safe-guarded. Moreover we believe that the welfare of the individual is the final goal of group life. Our American heritage further teaches that to be secure in the rights he wishes for himself, each man must be willing to respect the rights of other men. This is the conscious recognition of a basic moral principle: all men are created equal as well as free. Stemming from this principle is the obligation to build social institutions that will guarantee equality of opportunity to all men. Without this equality freedom becomes an illusion. Thus the only aristocracy that is consistent with the free way of life is an aristocracy of talent and achievement. The grounds on which our society accords respect, influence or reward to each of its citizens must be limited to the quality of his personal character and of his social contribution.

This concept of equality which is so vital a part of the American heritage knows no kinship with notions of human uniformity or regimentation. We abhor the totalitarian arrogance which makes one man say that he will respect another man as his equal only if he has "*my race, my religion, my political views, my social position.*" In our land men are equal, but they are free to be different. From these very differences among our people has come the great human and national strength of America.

On the whole and in the long run this vision prevails also in the attitude of the United States toward other States the world over. With few deviations, such as the war with Mexico and the annexation of Texas (that were due to the ambition of the slave states to dominate the Federal Union), and an imperialist interlude whose passing voice was Theodore Roosevelt, the trend mounted, to apply to our foreign policy as well the principle of the equality of unequals in status and right, as the bond of union between sovereign states even as it binds into One the many states of the United States.

It is manifest in the history of the Monroe Doctrine. This definition of American policy toward imperialist intentions of the Holy Alliance regarding the political societies of the Western Hemisphere expresses a consensus reached by Monroe with Jefferson and Madison and John Quincy Adams. It set a *caveat* against every form of unlawful intrusion by any alien power upon the sovereignty and independence of any state in the Western Hemisphere. Because the Doctrine was a voluntary stand, taken in the national interest, because the war with Mexico was flagrant violation of it, Latin-Americans, not without considerable aid and comfort from Mediterranean and more western imperialists, came to identify it as "Yankee Imperialism," and to fear and suspect the United States. Even the attainment of independence and sovereign statehood by Cuba and the rehabilitation of the Philippines as a result of the war with Spain, little affected this attitude. Only as the Monroe Doctrine was

extended from an American into a Pan-American policy that all American states share responsibility for; only as it was realized as an instrument of collective security whereby all undertook to insure the sovereignty and independence of each on terms of equality were there signs that Jefferson's hope of "a cordial fraternalization among all American nations" might be realized. Realization is still remote and arduous, and the difficulties are by no means those due to the "Yanqui" alone, as the internal upheavals and external irresponsibilities of the ambiguously republican states of the unfree peoples of Latin America make all too evident. But the trend toward the mutuality of the "Good Neighbor" policy is there, and gathering strength. That it came to positive fruition in the Philippines is clear and unmistakable. And if, in our relations with China, the achievement is negative, and the purpose and practice are belied by aggressive communist hypocrisy, the record is clear for anyone who cares to examine it. Of all governments dealing with China in one hundred years, that of the United States alone refrained from invading the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire; it alone employed the Boxer indemnity for the benefit of the Chinese; it alone sought consistently to preserve the Chinese from subjugation to alien force. The phrase for the American attitude was the Open Door Policy—Woodrow Wilson defined it: "a door of friendship and mutual advantage." It underlay the Nine Power Treaty of 1922: "To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government." The United States was foremost in refusing to recognize the violation of this Treaty by Japan; and alone in calling upon the Japanese to keep the covenant regarding China to which they had bound themselves. Whereupon the Japanese made their sneak attack upon Pearl Harbor.

Since the cessation of the hot phase of World War II, the faith of America has been enacted by the works known as the Marshall Plan, by the proposals for genuine international control of atomic and other armaments, by the launchings of the program known as Point Four. This is a program for securing the parity of the different by sharing, with peoples who do not yet have them and desire to receive them, the knowledge and skills which brought to Americans the freedoms, the well-being and the power they now enjoy. The Monroe Doctrine has been supplemented by the Truman Doctrine, which is an undertaking to defend the frontiers of the free world in Europe and in Asia.

In international relations, the effort to convert advocacy of the Declaration into realizing action took the form, after the first World War, of the League of Nations, and after the second, of the United Nations Organization. As the principle of the parity of the different and the equality of the unequal in status and law, it becomes, as Woodrow Wilson said, the endeavor to assure "that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful." The League of Nations was the undertaking to put this principle into practice. Devised and established on the initiative of an American president, and abandoned by the United States because of an organized reaction, the heir of that which had unsuccessfully opposed Jefferson and Lincoln, the League might nevertheless have served as the bulwark of peace among the nations and the effective guarantee of the freedom and safety of each by all; while in the course of time the American people would formally have adhered to that Union of the Nations by law, as they belonged to it by faith. But one and another of the greater powers among the high contracting parties broke the covenant they had entered into like the States that formed the American Confederacy. They sought to subvert the League into a servant of their special privileges and cherished

inequities, to prostitute it into a sanction for aggression of the large against the small and the strong against the weak. The covenant became another scrap of paper in the struggle of nations for power and dominion. Its betrayal was a potent force in bringing on World War II. When the free nations and their unfree associated powers, of which Stalin's Russia was the pretentious and shiftY member, won the war that the racist totalitarians of Nazi Germany and their allies had launched against them, the victors undertook to replace the League of Nations with the United Nations Organization, "laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them seemed most likely to effect their safety and happiness." The international union they set up, with its Security Council (alone whose unanimous decisions could be enforceable), its assembly, its commissions, its rules of admission, were designed to correct deficiencies and remove the handicaps which had denied the League efficacy as the global instrument of international peace and freedom. As government, the United Nations was to be a covenanted means to ends which the ignored Preamble to its charter, corresponding to the Preamble of the Constitution of the United States, affirmed as follows:

We the people of the United Nations determined

to save succeeding generations from the *scourge of war*, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom

and for these ends

to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and

to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and

to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and

to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.

More specifically to establish the ends to which the United Nations Organization was the covenanted means, a Commission was appointed to draft a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This Declaration was adopted by the Assembly of the Organization on December 10, 1948, as "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society keeping this declaration constantly in mind shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms, and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of member states themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction."

Produced with all the inequities of human relations in mind, the Declaration joins the intent of the American Declaration of Independence, with that of its Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. It is considerably more detailed as well as extensive than all three, and its thirty articles reaffirm as diversely as may be the parity of the different by nature, and the equality of the unequal before the law. The articles express the consensus of the representatives of nearly all the independent and sovereign peoples upon the globe, many of them with unfree governments and authoritarian religions. The Assembly of the United Nations Organization proclaimed them as uttering "the highest aspirations of the

common people" for a world of freedom, "freedom of speech and belief, and from fear and want."

Six of the thirty refer to religion. Taking as their base the fundamental first article, that "everybody is born free and equal in dignity and rights," two of the six (Articles 2 and 16) declare that religion can impose no limitations on any person's title to all the freedoms, nor on his or her equal rights in marriage. A third (Article 18) affirms the equal rights of the world's different people to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom to change their religion, and solely or collectively to teach, preach, worship and observe their religions. A fourth (Article 26) declares that education, as an indefeasible right must seek "the full development of the human personality and the strengthening of the fundamental rights and freedoms by promoting tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups." A fifth (Article 29), forbids limitations upon any of the freedoms mentioned in the Declaration; national laws may restrict or control only for the purpose of securing "due recognition of the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society." Article 30 concludes the Declaration by forbidding any and every perversion of its terms for the purpose of justifying action by "any state, group or person" which is "aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein." The entire document may rightly be appraised as embodying the hope as well as the conscience of the miscellany of mankind; it is Everyman's declaration of his faith in an organization of ends and means in the human enterprise, on which human beings everywhere could bravely bet their lives.

Among the more active and concerned members of the Commission, which wrote, and presented to the Assembly for enactment, the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, were ministers of religion of various cults and churches. They could hardly have been willing to assent to a statement

they believed to be antagonistic to religion, or even indifferent. Unless they held that freedom of conscience and belief is the enemy of true religion, they must have labored to make as sure, as under God it was humanly possible, of a way of life and thought among free men in a free world that would, more than any competitor, serve justly, and with friendship, the equal safety, freedom and welfare of all religious beliefs and religious societies. Whatever else the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be, it is also the revelation to mankind of the best means to this end which these ministers of religion have discovered.

4 How Religion Becomes Secularism

WHATEVER ITS RANGE, local or global, mankind's essential concern has never been a form of government. Mankind's essential concern has been a way of life—a way men choose to bet their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honors on, because each believes it is the one way for him, the individual, to live with other individuals and enable each to work out a freer, better and braver existence than he could by going a lonely, unfriendly way on his own. Of the instruments of this communion of existences the form of government is but one configuration, subject like all other institutions to constant scrutiny, appraisal and change.

The critical point is change.

Only those human beings can be free in whom change is real and meaningful. Only those groups are free societies whose combined power is a self-sustaining, self-ordered mobility of all parts. Alone those governments are free governments whose constitutions, whether written or unwritten, direct the exercise of collective power not only, but so provide for its functional division and personal reassignment by the governed, as to set up a maximum insurance against usurpation by majorities, minorities, or individuals. Government is a democracy by virtue of this inward mobility, not its immobile "form." The latter could be monarchical or hierarchical, and the vital order still be democracy.

But "democracy" has long carried a deeper, wider, meaning. It has been used to denote the total way of life. This is what we mean when we say the American way of life is demo-

cratic, and that the United States is a democracy. The word then intends the reciprocal guarantees, which men give one another in every mode of faith and works composing the human enterprise, of peaceful change, free and unafraid. The history of freedom has been largely the story of its devotees' struggles toward such guarantees; of their labors to infuse with honest purpose and concrete performance the vague professions about "the infinite worth of the human person"; the story of men's battles to extend special privileges into equal rights; to abolish the invidious distinctions that degrade peoples because of their color, their sex, their occupations, their poverty, their religion, their caste or their class; to render the penalizing of the different for their being different as lawless as it is inhuman; to replace the cruel perfidy of rich and powerful believers to poor and weak dissenters with the loyalties and fair play of honorable sportsmanship; to effect in human relations the rule of *live and help live* rather than solely that of *live and let live*.

The devotees of freedom have striven to win the diverse communities of *genus humanum* away, from loving only their own like and fearing and hating the unlike, toward understanding and respecting, if not loving, the likes of all mankind. They worked and bled to put, in place of the perennial wars of all with all, the insurance of safety and freedom for each by all. Against the anarchies of isolationist nationalism and hierarchical imperialism, they have opposed the democratic cosmopolitanism, and the federated internationalism of the United Nations. By means of UNESCO, they have aspired to open up ways of free and sincere intercommunication between hitherto mutually incommunicado national cultures and imperialist cults. They have sought by interfaith and intercultural free trade to open to all the equalizing inward enrichment and outer liberation which only such mobility of the spirit can generate. Their aspiration looks to an uncoerced self-orchestration of the peoples

of the globe. True, action is still far from consummating advocacy, the event still lags a long, long way behind the vision; but they continue to hope and to work and fight, without illusion and without surrender, that they may close the gap and justify faith by fact.

For religions such a self-orchestration by means of their reciprocal guarantees, becomes Secularism.

5 Democracy, Despotism and Secularism

USAGE GIVES THE word "secularism," like the words "God," and "godless," many often contradictory meanings. Their conflicts are implicit in the traditional distinction between the "secular" and the "regular" clergy of the Roman Catholic establishment. The "regulars" live together in segregated groups under a rule to which they have vowed obedience, and maintain a discipline shutting them out and cutting them off from the common lives of men. The "seculars" are in the main the parish priests who live as neighbors among their parishioners but with the special privileges which accrue to them as specialists of "the cure of souls" trained to mediate between the souls and the supernatural. Although, of course, their superiors of the sacerdotal hierarchy hold an exclusive lien upon their loyalties, the secular clergy do develop a certain identification with the natural rights and liberties of their non-clerical neighbors, often to taking sides against the authoritarian *Sacerdotium*, as during the civil war and since in Spain, and the bloody struggle over the separation of church and state in Mexico. These are but current instances of the perennial struggle of People and Priests (which the Bible and so much subsequent literature tells of) regardless of sect or denomination. The prophets of Israel (including Jesus), Langland, Lilliburne, Charles Kingsley, Ignacio Silone, Carlo Levi, Albert Schweitzer—all repristinate an identical tale. Its continuing theme is the struggle in God's name to free the integrally human from the exploitations of the specially sacerdotal.

But it was long, before the conflict came to be recognized as a struggle for secularization. Not until it became a war of domination between the supreme medieval powerholders themselves, between the *Imperium* and *Sacerdotium*, emperor and

pope, did usage give the term something like its current meanings. One identified it with the sinful disobedience of the will of God, who had endowed the *Sacerdotium* with ultimate authority over the things of earth and heaven, by challenging and displacing this authority. The philosophic apologist for this meaning was Thomas Aquinas. Another saw it as the meritorious obedience to God's will, who had entrusted all the earthly authority to the *Imperium* that was fighting piously to defend it from the sinful usurpations of the *Sacerdotium*. Dante's *De Monarchia* construed the *Imperium* as an equal, independent, God-ordained power which the Papacy was usurping; William of Occam became the philosophic apologist for not only separation, but domination, of the *Imperium*, endowing secularism with whatever true holiness pertains to the Holy Roman Empire.

But as Marsiglio of Padua saw this struggle for mastery between *Sacerdotium* and *Imperium*, the claims of both Pope and Emperor to be God's viceroys on earth, with their authority and power coming directly from him, were false claims. God's power and authority goes directly and equally to every man; priests and princes, popes and emperors receive them at second hand, indirectly, from the people. Their powers and privileges are delegated, not original. They are servants and agents, not masters. The Church is the entire congregation of the believers, not solely the *Sacerdotium* who have only sacramental and administrative offices to discharge, and to discharge in harmony with the peace and good order of the community. Those are regulated by the law of nature which is the one reliable communication of the will of God.

Readers of Marsiglio's *Defensor Pacis* who are aware of the Stoic *jus naturale*, and the Stoic meanings of "God" and "Nature," sometimes read Stoic perceptions into Marsiglio's argument. Such inreading is uncalled for. Arguments like his or Occam's, recur with the human relations that evoke them. They are functions of the idea of relief from the perennial war

of all against all which is the historian's and the philosopher's basic material. Among later writers, such as Grotius, Hobbes or Montesquieu, the compenetration with Stoicism is conscious and purposeful. For Stoicism becomes a humanizing catalyst in Renaissance humanism. To see natural law as an equation of equally natural liberties and to appraise the equation as the will of God, needed no dialectic and no verbal transposition. Indeed, when a mind really chose to look, what could be more self-evident, or more reasonable? And where would it be most so, if not in those areas of the human enterprise where belief prevails over perception, as in the interpretation of the Word of God? If printing and Protestantism gave all men at last free and equal access to the Bible, they also tended to liberate and equalize all interpretations of the Bible. They thus liquidated the monopoly of the *Sacerdotium* into the free enterprise of "the priesthood of all believers." They disallowed pretensions to absolute authority for one infallible custodian of one invariant "deposit of faith," in favor of equal authority for many apostles of multiple variations upon that "deposit"—the Bible. As the authorities increased and multiplied, so did their quarrels and mutual intolerances. So did the wars of all with all.

What, in the nature of things, could they all agree to, if not, as Grotius suggested, the terms or rules of a covenant which might unite them in an ecumenical peace assuring equal rights and freedoms to all, special privileges to none? But such an understanding, neither serving any selected cult, not penalizing any, not identical with any, is Secularism. It may begin with toleration as an attitude of simply enduring what is disapproved and even hated; but its gradient, other things being equal, is toward a religious society of equal rights for different beliefs all fulfilling as different the will of God. John Locke's essay on *Toleration* is a voice of the trend.

That the trend should meet resistance, goes without saying. The larger the establishment, the greater its power, possessions and privileges, the more passionate the clinging to them. The

wars of religion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the bloodiest and most cruel until our time, bear witness. It was during these wars that the Papacy reorganized itself into a militant concentration of hierarchical power, a religious despotism, which more than ever set the clerical against the secular, priest over people. Since that counter-reformation, the Roman Catholic secular spirit has expressed itself in various ways from Jansenism to the many Modernisms, all moments of the laymen's struggle against priestly privilege and authoritarianism. In almost every endeavor of the common life, the peoples of countries where Catholicism dominated have divided into clerical and anti-clerical groups with the anti-clericals ineluctably seeking to exclude professional churchmen and their special interests from all non-religious concerns. This anti-clericalism is the secularism of believing Roman Catholics. It became notable in the century of the Enlightenment, which Kant, it will be remembered, described as "the liberation from self-caused . . . lack of will and courage to use their understanding without authority."—daring to think.

The Declaration of Independence was the distillation of the faith common to the true believers of all religions of the Enlightenment, which the Bill of Rights and the Constitution proposed to realize in works.

Travellers to the United States often brought back to their own countries appraisals of these works which more truly bespoke the preconceptions they had brought with them than the facts they observed or the faith they desired. This was especially true if they were Englishmen with the mood of Britain's post-revolutionary cold war against her former dependency in their hearts. Dickens or the Trollopes; Harriet Martineau or Matthew Arnold—they came more or less inhibited from inquiring and understanding, in their hearts set to dislike as they observed. The case was different with travellers from France. Visitors such as Crèvecoeur or Chastellux were able to look without prejudice and to appraise without prior aversion. But even these were

less conscious of the American Idea than of its consequences in the Americans' way of life. One trans-Atlantic visitor, however, was different from the rest in that the American Idea was his first concern and the way of life following from it his second. This was the French noble, Alexis de Tocqueville, who between 1835 and 1840 published in four volumes his observations of the American Way and appraisals of the American Idea. He called his study *De la Democratie en Amerique*. It became a best seller on both sides of the Atlantic and was crowned by the French Academy. Redundant, in many areas overstuffed, in others mistaken or doubtful or dated, it has survived the competition of more than a hundred years as an insight into the American Idea.

De Tocqueville was only thirty when he began his inquiry; he was scarcely forty when he completed the statement of his findings. By birth an aristocrat, by creed a Roman Catholic, born when Napoleon I was emperor of the French, seeking to make himself emperor of Europe, Tocqueville grew up under the Bourbon restoration and entered the public service under the citizen-king. As he read the record of his own brief time, democratization was Europe's destiny, and he conceived the idea of observing the process where it was a condition rather than an aspiration. He envisaged the condition as a levelling down, a movement toward "the providential fact of equality," and the United States as the one nation where the "providential fact" was the state of society. Aware that multitudes looked upon the American Republic as what Turgot had once called it, "the hope of the human race," while others saw it as the threat of blight to all that was superior or noble in the Christian world, he decided to confront feeling with fact and illusion with reality. Such a confrontation, he believed would be a service to the present and a help for the future. Accordingly he got himself sent on a penological mission which he used as an opportunity to study the impact of the American Idea on the conduct of life, to seek "the image of democracy itself, with its

inclinations, its character, its prejudices, and its passions, in order to learn what we have to hope from its progress." For that which is intrinsic to America, he declared, "concerns not a nation, but all mankind."

Tocqueville came to the United States in 1830. Jefferson had been dead four years and Andrew Jackson was in the beginning of his presidency. The struggle especially of the Southern States against Federal regulation of the tariff and for the institution of slavery seemed to indicate the eventual disruption of the Union and the reversion of the States to their several sovereignties and independence. In the atmosphere of this struggle, Tocqueville journeyed and looked and listened—mostly in the North and East, and among the "best" people, who directed him for authoritative views on law and politics to Mr. Justice Story's *Commentaries*. It is nothing against his perceptiveness that he could not take the long view, that only a civil war preserved the Union, or that the "tyranny of the majority" is nullified, as James Madison had shown it would be in the tenth paper of *The Federalist*, by the number and variety of minorities which make it up. Perhaps his judgment here followed even more from his aristocratic aversions and preferences than from his sensitiveness to the American scene. Withal, he saw the scene more clearly, and with a truer feeling for the American Idea than any transatlantic commentator before or since. And his appraisal of the relations between religion and democracy are not among the least sensitive and acute.

Those appraisals are substantially continuous with Thomas Paine's. A Roman Catholic, very favorably predisposed to the doctrine and discipline of that establishment, Tocqueville argued that its castelike distinction between the hierarchical priestcraft endowed with religious authority and the religiously equal laity commanded to religious obedience, was favorable to democratic equality in politics and other secular concerns, at least among the laity. For, in principle, the hierarchy must treat all sorts and conditions of true believers as on an identical religious level.

This was why he held the million Irish Catholics to "constitute the most republican and the most democratic citizens which exist in the United States." Moreover, they were a minority of the population, and poor, hence with a vital stake in equal rights and in adopting "political doctrines which they would perhaps support with less zeal if they were rich and preponderant." Outstanding among these doctrines was, of course, the separation of church and state. Tocqueville found a general agreement, that this separation assured to the miscellany of denominations equal safety and equal liberty and made of religion in the United States "a democratic and republican religion" suffusing family life, and as an especially feminine interest. The many priests whom, as a Catholic, he came to know well, confirmed him in his conclusion of the benefit which accrues to religion by its uniquely American separation from the state; they "mainly attributed the peaceful dominion of religion in this country to the separation of church and state."

Conversely, an Americanization of religion goes on. For democracy, postulated on "the providential fact of equality," tends to be anti-dogmatic; it intends like treatment of the unlike, making them equal before the law. Thus, other forms of government retain the traditional invidious distinctions between divinities and worships; they insist on exclusive privilege for "as many deities as there are nations, castes, classes, or families." In the United States, this contentious diversity tends to fuse in a divine unity which corresponds with the unity of man implied by the equality of men. This unifying propensity tends to minimize rite and rote and to exalt right and righteousness; to shift the religious interest from its pursuit of otherworldly bliss to the establishment of thisworldly welfare. The "love of well-being" rather than the hatred of sin becomes the expression of the fear of the lord, so that the churchly do not readily "run counter" as elsewhere to the prevailing secular opinion or the people's "permanent interest." Hence although the people of the United States are diversely Christian, there is "no coun-

try in which Christianity is clothed with fewer forms, figures and observances than in the United States; or where it presents more distinct, more simple, or more general notions to the mind. Although the Christians of America are divided into a multitude of sects, they all look upon their religion in the same light. This applies to Roman Catholicism as well as to other forms of belief. There are no Romish priests who show less taste for the minute individual observances, for extraordinary or peculiar means of salvation, or who cling more to the spirit, and less to the letter of the law, than the Roman Catholic priests of the United States."

Such, then, in the eyes of this open-eyed, open-minded and clear-thinking Roman Catholic, was the impact of religion on American democracy and of the American Idea on religion, in the third decade of the nineteenth century. It was the formation of a secular communion of the faiths on equal terms. Naturally, those whose paramount stake was the dogma that domination and privilege are divine right found abhorrent this American faith that equal right and equal freedoms are the laws of nature and accomplish the will of God. These authoritarians were first and last not the British of whom Americans had fought themselves independent. First and last they were the priestly and princely powerholders of the continent of Europe, whom the French Revolution had shaken, Bonaparte conquered, and British policy, more than anything else, restored. They called themselves legitimists and with papal blessings formed an alliance that they proclaimed Holy. The purpose of their Alliance was to vindicate the sacred right which they pretended to have directly from God, to exact submission and obedience where they had power, to impose it by force or win it by fraud where they had not.

The last was the Americas, north and south. There, as in Europe, Great Britain opposed the extension of their interests. If her government was not the initiator, it was certainly the supporter, of the Monroe Doctrine in whose formulations Jef-

ferson and Madison shared with the younger Adams. This Doctrine is a declaration "that the American continents, by the free and independent position which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered subjects for future colonization by any European power" . . . that the American people "could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

Since the major powers of the Holy Alliance were Roman Catholic, deeply committed to union of state and church, the feeling was widespread that the Catholicisms, and especially Roman Catholicism, were instruments of aggressive despotism seeking rule over the minds as well as the persons and possessions of the freed peoples of both continents. American travelers abroad were deeply impressed with the continuous war which the legitimists, led by Metternich, were waging against the rights of man and citizen in the German-speaking countries, in France, in Spain, in Italy.

One of these travellers was the painter-inventor Samuel Finley Breeze Morse. While Tocqueville was making his observations of the United States, Morse was making his of the nations of Europe. By inheritance and training a devout Presbyterian—his father was the Rev. Jedediah Morse (better remembered for his non-creedal geographies than for his creed and preachments), to whom the civil liberties of the American Idea were of paramount value—Samuel spent many years in England and on the Continent, learning the painter's art. He was a younger contemporary of Monroe's and Metternich's, being thirty-two years old when the Doctrine was communicated to the Holy Alliance. Travelling widely, in France and Austria and Italy, he was an eyewitness of the uses of religion in the interest of despotism. In France a friend and neighbor of Lafayette's, whose portrait he painted, he declared that Lafayette had said

to him, in a final interview, "American liberty can be destroyed by the popish clergy" (the statement was denied years later but has not yet been disproved). In any case Lafayette was an influence in Morse's becoming convinced that though the Holy Alliance appeared to have mollified, it had not abandoned, its plans of aggression against the United States—the polity which, in the eyes of all Europe was the avatar of the religion of equal liberty for all men everywhere. What he had seen and heard, Morse wrote (*The New York Observer*, May 27, 1838), led him to appreciate his own country all the more: "The result of all my observations comes to this one point, that the soul of freedom is true religion exerting its moral power on an educated population. The patriot of our country to act in character must promote religion and education. These two principles acting together are a salutary check upon each other. Religion (for it may exist exclusive of education) is in danger of degenerating into superstition which is tyranny. And education without religion is in danger of substituting the wild theories and speculations of the ingenious, for the simple, commonsense rules of Christianity, and so endangering those thousand secret moral restraints . . . which religion alone can bestow; which all human legislation with the concentrated wisdom of the ages can never supply. . . . There are two ways of governing mankind, viz., by physical and moral power: The first is despotic, the last republican."

Morse's sentiment here illustrates Tocqueville's findings. He concluded, also from his observation, that Metternich was only proposing to replace force of arms as a means of conquest by the force of superstition. He gathered what was to him compelling evidence that Metternich's armament was to be Roman Catholicism, his army Catholic laity, its officers, the Jesuits. He communicated all of this in a series of articles to the *New York Observer*, and later assembled them in a book, "Foreign Conspiracy Against the Liberties of the United States." In 1828 Morse had heard one of the leaders of German romantic nation-

alism, Friedrich Schlegel, who had become an agent of Metternich's, expound the oneness of authoritarian monarchism and Roman Catholicism, and their sharp antithesis to the republicanism of the United States, which Schlegel stigmatized as the source of subversion in Europe, the revolutionary school for Europe. Morse had become aware the following year, of the establishment of the Leopold Foundation—overtly, on the petition of a Romanist bishop from America—to provide funds for the express purpose of making America Catholic. The Foundation's protector, Morse wrote, was Ferdinand II, Emperor of Austria; its curator, Rodolph Cardinal of Olmutz; its manager, Metternich; its program and principles had been approved by Pope Leo XII. It was blessed by his successor, Gregory XVII, God's sole vice-regent on earth, "supreme over all mortals," "divinely appointed dispenser of spiritual and temporal punishments," "armed with power to depose emperors and kings and absolve subjects from their oaths of allegiance"; from him there is no appeal; "he is responsible to no one but God." The pope grants to workers and supporters of the Leopold Foundation who have done their religious duties, *via* letters of "perpetual efficacy," full indulgence and remission of all their sins providing they have offered up "pious prayers to God for the harmony of Christian princes, the extirpation of heresies, and the glory of the Holy Mother Church."

What Morse had read, seen, and heard convinced him that the Roman Catholic hierarchy was willingly conspiring with representatives of the "Union of Christian Princes" to undermine the Republic of the United States, and that politicians eager for office, and enterprisers greedy for profits were endangering America's free institutions. The issue, he argued, was not religion, but an attitude of the psyche, a will and way of believing that favored despotism. When Catholics become loyal republicans it is in spite, not because of, priestly authority. To counter the menace he urged restricting immigration, stiffening the requirements for naturalization, requiring full publicity on

church finance. He feared the construction of a Roman Catholic majority by immigration, the consequent manipulation of public policy in the sacerdotal interest, and finally, the imposition of the Roman Catholic Church as the State Church by majority vote. Americanism, Morse urged, holds in repugnance the devices of policing which European despotism uses freely. Hence, the latter's threat to the American way was intrinsic to the American Idea. He wrote: "Defend yourselves!" cries the Austrian Papist, "you cannot defend yourselves: your government, in its very nature, is not strong enough to protect you against foreign or domestic conspiracies. You say you have a body of conspirators against your liberties, a body of foreigners who are spreading their pernicious heresies through your land and endangering the state. The weakness of republicanism is now manifest. What constitutional or legal provision meets the difficulty? Where are your laws prohibiting Catholics from preaching and teaching their doctrine and erecting their chapels, churches and schools? Where is your passport system, to enable you to know the movements of every man of them in the land? Where is your *gens d'armes*, your armed police, those useful agents, whose *domiciliary* visits could ferret out every Catholic, seize and examine his papers, and keep him from further *mischief* in the dungeons of the State?" And where is the Republic's censor, its Index of Forbidden Books? Its spy system? Its post office inspection of communications and its secret inquisitorial court? All these are forbidden by republican principles, but regularly used by despots; and the papacy is a despotism: "Popery is a political system, despotic in its organization, anti-democratic and anti-republican, and cannot, therefore, coexist with American republicanism."¹

¹ What is known as McCarthyism is the modification of "republican principles in order to institute the practices and programs they exclude as against Communism only. It has been called a descendant of Knownothingism.

Morse's book had many printings, so did his restatements and amplifications in the essays, published six years later, under the title "Our Liberties Defended." His fears were contagious. His xenophobia found ready reenforcement in the chronic anxiety over Catholic power which was traditional in many parts of the country. These, rationalized by observation and argument, took form in the political know-nothingism with its attendant blind bigotries.² But the latter made only temporary disturbances. The requirements of the expanding economy for cheap manpower, of the political boss for complaisant voters and of the believing liberal for undeviating loyalty to the American Idea,³ soon restored the traditional chronicity. Until he died,

² "A still more formidable cabal, the Know Nothing, or American Party, sprang up in the current opposition to foreigners, the papacy, infidelity and socialism. Combining the functions of a party and a fraternal order, it nominated candidates for office and adopted secret rites, dark mysteries, grips and passwords which gave it an atmosphere of uncertain vitality. Members were admitted by solemn ceremony into full fellowship with "The Supreme Order of the Star-Spangled Banner" whose "daily horror and nightly specter was the pope." When asked about their principles, they replied mysteriously: "I know nothing." Appealing to deep-seated emotions, this movement showed strength in many localities and was only dissolved by the smashing energy of more momentous issues." Charles and Mary Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization*, II, p. 21.

³ The American Idea envisions mankind as made up ultimately of individuals, each a unique person different from all the others but equal to the others in rights and standing before the laws. This Idea was degraded into knownothingism by the fear that certain communions of mankind were committed to ways of life and belief that would nullify that equality by exploiting the sanction of the law of equal liberty. Thus the Knownothings undertook, for the defense of equal liberty, the very practices they desired to defend it against. Anent their crusade Abraham Lincoln wrote to his friend, Joshua Speed: "Our progress in degeneracy seems to me to be pretty rapid. As a nation we began by declaring that *all men*

Morse kept explaining to the liberals, as in 1855 he had to the editor of the *Courier* of Louisville, Kentucky: "I have brought against the absolute governments of Europe a charge of conspiracy against the liberties of the United States. I support the charge by facts, and by reasonings from those facts, which produce conviction in those who examine the matter. But those that dissent invariably say, 'I don't think there is a conspiracy, yet give no reason for dissent.'" As to the Catholics, they are silent. "No Catholic journal has attempted any refutation of the charge. It cannot be refuted, for it is true. . . . And be assured, my dear Sir, it is no extravagant prediction when I say that the question of Papacy and Protestantism, or Absolutism and Republicanism, which in these two opposite categories are convertible terms, is fast becoming and will shortly be, the *great absorbing* question not only of this country but of the whole civilized world. I speak not at random; I speak from long and diligent observation in Europe and from comparison of the state of affairs in this country with that of public opinion in Europe."

Somewhat as de Tocqueville anticipated, during the interval between the religio-political legitimist despotism of the Holy Alliance and politico-religious illegitimate Communist, Fascist,

are created equal. We now practically read it 'all men are created equal except *Negroes*.' When the Knownothings get control, it will read 'all men are created equal except *Negroes and foreigners and Catholics*.' When it comes to this, I should prefer emigrating to some country where they make no pretense of loving liberty—to Russia, for instance, where depotism can be taken pure and without the base alloy of hypocrisy." Writing today, Lincoln might rephrase his observation thus: "When the Catholic clericals get control, it will read 'all men are created equal except non-Catholics.'" Morse, reading the clericalist record, was alarmed at the prospect of just this eventuality. He however, cannot justly be called a bigot, for he did not refuse to others the freedom he claimed for himself, but only endeavored to prevent such as do so refuse from gaining preponderant power.

Nazi and Falangist and Communazi despotisms, personal government had been generally recessive in Europe, and representative government ascendent. Nor Pius the Ninth, nor Napoleon the Third, nor Leo the Thirteenth, nor Wilhelm the Second, could hold back the advancing democratic religion of equal freedom and equal rights for all men everywhere. In the United States, which was the vital centre of this secular faith, its communicants of all denominations affirmed it not only with the War of the States which abolished slavery; they affirmed it also by their defense of the equal rights of the hierarchical Catholic doctrine and discipline to exactly that expansion which Morse anticipated and feared.

In many instances, the mark of the liberal became the defense of this equality; the mark of the bigot, criticism of its actuality, fears of its consequences. A self-respecting, consistent Secularism had to render equal respect and reverence to the entire diversity of cults, whatever they were; to penalize any, even such as penalized others, for its difference, would be to betray the American idea of equal liberty for all, special privileges for none. Social progress could well consist in advancing this free union of the different on equal terms as a means to life, liberty and happiness more abundant of each. Secularism would then be the name for the ethics of this progress. Its credo could become an object of religious regard added to, and supervening upon, the multitude of creeds and cults whose security and freedom it serves, be they unitarian or trinitarian, naturalistic or supernaturalistic, theistic or atheistic. As the insurance of each by all, Secularism would acknowledge all as religions but neither affirm nor deny the validity of any, nor would it concede special privileges to any priestcraft, or deny the priesthood of any believer.

In England, during the 1840's, certain democrats and humanitarians formed a Secularist Society, the ultimate logic of whose credo these propositions could embody. Their leader was George Jacob Holyoake. Born in 1817, son of a Birming-

ham factory operative, Holyoake worked for his living from his ninth year on. He got his book learning as he could, on his own. He became a figure in the bitter struggles of the laborious multitudes of his time for their rights as producers, as consumers and as citizens. Trade unionist, Owenite, Chartist, Rochdaler, he integrated these interests in his "secularism." He went before his generation as this Secularism's "social missionary" expounding his creed not only in his lectures, but in *The Reasoner*, which he edited. In 1859 he summed up his faith in the *Principles of Secularism*, and in 1896 again in *The Origins and Nature of Secularism*.

Although Secularism, as Holyoake intended it, did affirm the care for the entire *genus humanum* without distinction of creed or kind, it was still not inclusive enough. His society but added to the competing multitudes of religious societies one more with differentiae of its own, and a certain aspiration to displace those multitudes. But in its ultimate denotation, Secularism does not mean displacement, it means free voluntary association, union, orchestration. It is a term of relation, the ultimate entities which it relates are individual persons; the proximate ones are the endlessly diverse societies that the persons group themselves in. Secularism is the name for a way of being together of the religiously different, such that equal rights and liberties are assured to all, special privileges to none. In order to protect this equality from impairment by government, the covenant creating the latter forbids it to pass any law that might so result. In order to protect this equality from impairment by others, the covenant endows governments with police powers.

As the guarantor of each church, government must be committed to none; if it were not absolutely separate, it would subvert its task and betray its ends. Thus, further, Secularism is Democracy and Democracy is Secularism, both as a way of life and as a form of government. Secularism is the effort to assure, so far as may be, through the separation of church and state and the liberty of thought and belief, to each and every

individual and to each and every group of individuals, be they "religious," occupational, cultural, recreational, etc., etc., equal freedom and equal safety in the struggle to live and to grow. Secularism names the kind of Oneness which is maintained when an irreducible Many form a union by means of which they can jointly assure their several survivals and developments; it comprehends their common means to their separate ends. It begins in an anarchic embattled plurality, each struggling to beat down and overmaster its neighbors; it evolves as a peaceful, well-ordered plurality, each insuring its own freedom and safety by covenanting equal freedom and safety to his neighbors. Thereby Secularism becomes also the religion of religions, the credo consisting of self-evident truths which express the laws of nature and the will of God.

To call this "monolithic" as do Jesuit spokesmen for Roman Catholic pretensions, is to subvert the meaning of words as Loyola prescribed; to say white is black, when the hierarchical church commands it.

6

"We Hold These Truths to Be Self-Evident"

HOW DID IT come about that prudent, well-to-do, sober men keenly aware of the facts of life, could underwrite the propositions of the Declaration of Independence as self-evident truths and bet their survival on them? How could that be self-evident and true which gave the lie to the ways of all the world around? What but a substance of something hoped for, an evidence of a thing not seen, could it ever be? Philosophic expertise has long deprecated self-evidence as proof of anything, and its judgments concerning the truth about truth are as irreconcilable as usual. The values here at stake are, however, not any dialectician's theological or metaphysical finalities. They are the ongoing intentions of men's hearts, the steadily-repeated decisions of their reason. And they coincide with each and every individual's sense that, first and last, his existence is for himself, mattering to himself. The expression "struggle for self-preservation" signalizes this awareness. It denotes the fact that every life is its own end, of which the living is the means; that in a personal history ends and means are but alternate views of an identical existence, related as a day and its hours, the means inward to the end as the hours to the day, the means the very substance of the end, and the end an ongoing activity of alteration, which struggles to preserve itself as ongoing, and feels the struggles' inwardness as its freedom. This, philosophers early recognized, is man's condition, what he is by nature and what, therefore, in nature, he has the natural right to be. As Thomas Hobbes remarked: "The Right of Nature . . . *Jus Naturale* is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will for himself, for the preservation of his own nature, that is to say, his own life: and consequently of doing anything,

which in his own Judgment and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto." What else can the means amount to if not all a man's initiatives and conformations, his doings and sufferings—his goings-on which come together as an inclusive on-going, until he is stopped at last in the stoppage whence movement never resumes. He resists being stopped in every way he can command, against every odds, in every circumstance. He persists in going on in every place, at all times, with any company.

Nor does he concede anyone else's measure of the good of it, only the singularity of his own awareness, as his action and passion beat from phase to phase and find no bound. It is this quality, unique in each individual's experience, which the cant phrase current—"the infinite worth of the human person," signalizes. These infinitudes are incommensurables. Being the stuff of both dream and reality that they are for consciousness, measurement can never appraise the good they are in themselves, for themselves, to themselves; measurement can only squeeze it with some containing gauge, degrade it from an end-in-itself into a means to alien ends. Always, in his heart, every person is as good as his betters, and since each feels so about all, *I am as good as you* becomes reciprocally *You are as good as I*. Inwardly, all humans feel themselves unique and equal. It is self-evident to each and every consciousness; from which the uniqueness is never alienated, and which resents and rejects alienation of equality. By the proposition *All men are created equal*, men are declaring together what each is maintaining separately, uniquely and ineluctably, throughout his personal history—that he is an end in himself, for himself, the peer of all not himself, and with no lesser title to go on being himself.

The propositions of the Declaration of Independence that follow, also follow from this fundamental generalization regarding each man's intuition of himself, and attest themselves with the same self-evidence: that certain rights are intrinsic, and inalienable from the person; that governments are tools and

servants and not ends to be served; that their powers and authority are derivative and not original; that they can be and should be changed on the record of their performance; that they are not changed until the performance has become unendurable.

But the self-evident, however manifest, may be unreliable; it may be false as well as true. Seeing may be believing, and the thing seen may persist, clear and distinct, all one's life; but this persistence is by itself not the same as truth, nor a ground for truth. However inconceivable an opposite may be, self-evidence is not enough. Nothing could be seen more clearly, or recur more regularly, than the movement of the sun round the earth; nothing keeps itself more evident, and it still can point in addition, to the support of unrescinded infallible papal authority that the judgment regarding the motion of the earth and the stationariness of the sun is false. Nevertheless, what priest, what commissar, what pope, would assert today that the sun moves round the earth and not the earth round the sun? That is both self-evident and false.

In the field of human relations, necessary connection of self-evidence and truth can be even more contingent. Thus, to the agonists of institutions whose powers and privileges the Declaration of Independence repudiated, its self-evident truths were self-evident lies. They saw as self-evident truth that men are created unequal, that their unalienable rights are alienable grants of privilege, that they are made to obey and serve governments and not conversely, that governments hold their powers not by the consent of the governed, but directly by delegation from God, the omnipotent governor. In their eyes, to deny or challenge those self-evident truths is to sin against the will of the King of the Universe and to rebel against his legitimate lieutenants; to be guilty of the heresies which God's princely and priestly representatives have the duty to extirpate.

7 Then What Is Truth?

THEN, WHAT IS truth?

Not theologians, not philosophers, not mathematicians, not soldiers, not men of affairs have thus far agreed upon an answer to this enduring question. Usage presents the inquirer with a continual variation of meanings. Some declare truth to be a thing possessed; others a thing forever sought and never possessed; still others say it is both. Some assert truth is that which God, because he loves man, reveals to him as his gracious will; others, that truth is that which is always and everywhere the same; that which must be eternally universally so, and not otherwise; still others, agreeing that truth is that which must be so and not otherwise, say that whatever is so must also be sole, and if truth pertains to multitudes of existences, these multitudes must compose a whole in which they so cohere that none can exist without all the others; that each must be like Tennyson's flower in the crannied wall:

Flower in the crannied wall
I pluck you out of your crannies
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand
Little flower—but *if* I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all
I should know what God and man is.

You have truth when, and only when, in knowing anything, you know everything; when all are One and One is All, and more and less are meaningless. By itself, every Each in the All is not quite so; it is error; only as cohering with every other can it be entirely so, and true. That, on this reckoning, truth is the synthesis of all the errors, causes no discomfort to *aficionados* of this truth about truth. They subdue the varying multi-

tudes of persons and events and things and thoughts with the magic invariancy of their dialectic rule; and if they cannot conform their daily lives to its intentions, they still, like Angelus Silesius or Bertrand Russell, F. H. Bradley or Karl Marx, find the intentions consolation for the contingencies, the conflicts and the confusions of that actual living.

Among many, truth pertains not to what is so, but to an image, an idea of what is so. They distinguish utterly between thoughts and things. They hold thoughts to be representations of things. They hold truth to be an indefeasible attribute of those representations which so reproduce their originals that the two correspond, part with part and whole with whole. Appearance and reality, image and object, portrait and subject must, of course both be seen together, compared and their correspondence experienced and conceded. And could this be done unless the correspondence itself be self-evident? But then, the self-evidence is subject to doubt or denial and how is the correspondence to be made convincing to the doubter or denier? Moreover, if these troubles beset truth as correspondence when an original can be had to compare its image with, what is truth when no original can be had, when originals, if any, are utterly beyond reach, and the appearance or thought or image, unless compared with another appearance or thought or image, can be compared with nothing at all? What is the verity of truths which by definition are shut out and cut off from all verification by the object they are true of?

Our culture divides such truths into two groups.

Into one it gathers all those images, representations, signs and symbols that correspond to such objects as past events, a man's own brain, the earth's center or poles, the inside of an electron or proton, the other side of the moon, a star billions upon billions of light-years away, light-years themselves. Objects of this kind, men believe, have either been directly experienced by some one whose reports are trusted or else belong together with other objects that do come into some trustworthy person's

direct experience. A man may take them for real as he takes himself, his friends and his neighbors for real, or his image in the mirror as image and not original. He is or he becomes acquainted with them, and as acquaintances, they are to him what he knows them as. His images, ideas, symbols are then his knowledge about them, soon or late to evince that they are true or false by directly corresponding or failing to correspond with the objects they tell about. Their verification is a passage from knowledge-about to knowledge-of-acquaintance, a compounding of indirect and circumstantial evidence in self-evidence.

Until this event, the images, ideas, symbols, however embodied, are all meanings—that is, trends or tendencies or overt movements in an experienced and specific direction, toward an unspecific and unexperienced goal which the experience as idea or sign somehow guesses and intends. This goal is what the *mean-ing* means. It is the *meant*. Mostly, the *meant* is already there, in some form or other. Sometimes, the process of meaning generates it, brings it into existence as we bring children and roses and houses into existence. Culture as meanings, creates its own objects as meant, in just this way. We realize our goals as meanings becoming *meants*. When trend and tendency and movement bring our minds to rest, we feel satisfied. Our ideas have been verified, their claims to truth are made good. We declare ideas to be reliable knowledge.

More frequently than not, we do this long before the very last meaning has been realized in its ultimate object; it happens with objects which by their tangency to the actual and their remoteness in time and space are precluded from ever becoming knowledge-of-acquaintance, from ever becoming tests of the correspondence claimed for their images and symbols. This is because we feel that the meaning, however different it may be from the meant, either merges into the meant or emerges from it, so that the events become manifest as a process of diversification whose diversities occur as beats and

pulses in the flow of conflicts, concords, orders and contingencies we call Nature. At least, we join them as we can into a continuous universe of discourse where our reasonings can attribute necessities and effect identifications, and we arrange them in satisfactory sequences.

Realizing, in this way, the relationships between knowledge-about and knowledge-of-acquaintance, enables us to take the bulk of knowledge-about on credit, much as we take personal statements of intention, coins, paper-money, bills-of-lading, promissory notes and the like; and these symbols enable us to win for ourselves infinite wealth of tokens and finite masteries of things. In the world of such tokens the spirit of man mostly lives and moves and has its being. It is a world of covenants for a future wherein pledges are to be exchanged for values of a different dimension of existence, with which we believe the pledges, nevertheless, to have dynamic relations. Since no symbol can be or work as the thing it symbolizes; since neither promises, coin nor paper can be eaten or drunken or worn; since they can neither heal the sick nor keep the healthy in health; since they can neither make grass grow nor water run; since they are not the same as any of the thoughts and things for which we take them as equivalents and that together make up the living of life, it is our believing in them that must supply the dynamic of their relations with the substances of actual living. But the latter are the goods and services for which the former are to be exchanged, the *meant* to which the former are the *mean-ings*; their first measure, and their last.

Of course, symbols can mislead, promises can be deceptions, coins can be debased, paper money counterfeited, cheques and other instruments of exchange forged, ideas known to be false intentionally presented as true. Of course, the verification of the verity of counterfeits and forgeries and lies involves again the comparing and bringing satisfactorily to self-evidence the correspondence or lack of it, between the denied or doubted and the genuine and authentic. Of course, this in its turn

requires that the genuine and authentic shall of itself evoke such a certainty that challenging it would be but reconfirming it. Of course, the reconfirmation could only be the conversion of a doubtful and unsatisfactory present into a more certain and satisfactory future—a process of verification by consequences.

Doubting and denying are sometimes responses to qualities noted in the symbols or objects themselves, sometimes to the attitudes of the apostles or missionaries of those symbols or objects. Both are suspicion, mistrust. In the first case, we speak of mistakes or errors; in the second case we speak of lies, deceptions, swindles. The latter are social events. They are communications from one mind to another employing objects, symbols and images for the purposes of misleading the other, of gaining some advantage over him. They are weapons in the war of all against all, fraud supplementing force, or substituting it, for whatever reason.

Errors and mistakes, on the other hand, are not intrinsically social. They are reappraisals of the meaning in which an image or a symbol or an object is first taken in view of the events consequent on so taking it. Sometimes they are purely soliloquies, sometimes they are soliloquies that have become communications, sometimes they are from the beginning communications. Most of them pass back and forth in all three relationships, as every man of science knows.

The sciences, however, in contrast to the arts, are collective knowings; and the history of each of them, in contrast to the history of the arts, is a history of images and ideas first taken for truths, then appraised in the light of their workings, or in the light of the better working of an alternative idea, as errors, and dropped. Thus, the history of the sciences is the account of past truths discarded as present mistakes and errors, while for the arts, history is a sequence of images and symbols whose meanings are what they are in themselves, not what they say about other things. They are knowledge-of-acquaintance, and as such neither true nor false. If any is dropped or dis-

regarded and interest fixes on another, it is not because the first misleads, and the second does not. It has changed in importance, not validity. We often are keenly aware that certain images, ideas, symbols are fictions, that certain histories, biographies, legends, are fantasies and we still find them endlessly more important than truth, and prize them far more highly than truths. We care for them for what they are, not for what they lead to. They are the genuinely self-evident; except as they mean themselves they are meaningless, except as they represent themselves they represent nothing: they are presences which in so far forth endure, and this is all; there isn't anything else.

But one mood of our cultural tradition insists that this is not all and cannot be all. It insists that there are certain fictions and fantasies which are not fictions and fantasies. It urges that they are representations of realities whereto they correspond; that they emerge from those realities even though they cannot lead us to them and merge into them; that they are true or false, consequently, in a higher, deeper sense than the sciences of man and nature; that in them validity is the same as importance, importance as validity; that they manifest an absoluteness, a sovereignty and independence which experience can not affect nor consequences transvalue. That which they signify is by its nature ineffable, their validity is too different for doubt to investigate or denial to challenge. There are no alternatives to pit against it; no rivals to compare with it for value or valor. An invincible *certainty* pertains to it.

8

Truth of Faith and Truth of Fact

THE TRADITIONAL WORD for certainty thus experienced is Faith, the peculiar treasure of the Christian cults whose theologians and apologists provide the amplest, practically the only, discourse of it. These elaborate upon certain intentions that the Apostle Paul voices in various of his epistles. Writing, presumably, in Hellenistic Greek, he uses terms that have currency in the climate of opinion of his age and scene, with no clear and distinct denotation. His word for this faith is *pistis*; he writes to his Galatians of *akoe pistis*, or "the hearing of faith"; he advises his Romans that "faith cometh by hearing." He warns other correspondents against alternatives to this faith; such as "philosophy and vain deceit," "the wisdom of the world" which is but "foolishness," learning, that only "puffeth up." He contrasts philosophy, wisdom and learning as ways of knowing with love which "edifies." Sometimes he seems to use *pistis* in the sense of "love"—singularly, love of God. He writes to his Ephesians about the mystery of being one with God in love, as *henotes tes pisteos*; to Timothy, that the mystery is outside of "controversy." In sum, faith's object is an object out of reach of experience; the knowledge which is faith is of quite another character than learning or worldly wisdom. It has the quality of loyalty, so that a faithful man is a loyal man, one to be relied on regardless of circumstances. Faith knows as love knows, heedless of all evidence; in fact faith is our sole experience of *self*-evidence that like a lover's love, stays impervious to the arguments of reason and the conclusions of inquiry. It originates in grace, as revelation, not discovery. It is transmitted on authority, not study.

Finally, the Apostle writes his Hebrews that faith is "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." And the things hoped for, the things not seen, are above all the miracle of being alive when dead, and the power that can both nullify the laws of nature whereby death is destiny and accomplish the miracle where life is eternal even though death is ineluctable. Tradition names the power "God"; the miracle immortality. It exhibits both in a drama of salvation whose first act is a doubt or denial of this power at its own seat, and whose final act is its victorious punishment of the doubters and deniers at a last judgment. Between this *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem* the plot moves from the creation of nature to the fall of man, from man's fall to Christ's death in man's redemption. The consequent separation of the redeemed from the damned is a march of history to its predestinate climax—eternal bliss for the believers and eternal torture for the deniers.

The substance of the action and evidence of its truth, is the attitude that affirms both, the believer's act of faith. He recognizes that in the nature of things, actors and action are impossible, the sequence is absurd. But it is this miraculousness, this irrationality, which provide him with certainty. Tertullian makes a definite statement of the position when he says concerning the death and resurrection of his Savior: "*And the Son of God died': this is credible because it is absurd. 'And he rose again from the tomb': this is certain because it is impossible.*"

Faith thus signalized is the affirmation of things hoped for and invisible, but absurd and impossible. It is their sole witness, their only supporting evidence, the substance of their sure actuality, thus calling the un-natural into Nature and the arbitrary into God. Their actuality and truth are not, and cannot be, commensurable and consubstantial with the actuality and truth of things experienced rather than only hoped for, seen rather than ever invisible. They cannot be appraised on

the same standards, nor verified by the same processes of verification. "It is impossible," says Thomas Aquinas, whom the notorious pope John XXII canonized for cause (Sum. Theol. I A 5.3), "for one and the same thing to be an object of science and an object of belief for the same person." Science is a knowing—it excludes believing—Aristotle, the unique *Philosophus*, the arch-scientist, therefore does not, because he cannot, treat of the things which are of faith absolutely—those things "uttered by God and confirmed by miracles." Since, however, God's utterance is his Revelation, is the source only of the truths of faith, that it should reach mankind it must have channels to flow in. Scripture and the tradition of the Holy Roman Catholic Church are the channels. God provides no others. In them believing mankind has the visible, tangible substance of things hoped for, and evidence of things not seen.

Scripture and the Church, it would follow, are and stay veridical only as men believe in them. For that which their doctrines are declared to define and their disciplines to adjust Man to touches the lives of living men only as those doctrines and disciplines. Their object by definition remains, as long as any man lives, utterly unconnected with any event whatsoever he can live through in any cosmos he can naturally know. So, the faith negates nature and degrades the man alive in nature into the original stuff of sin. That its doctrines are true or false, that its disciplines—its hierarchical command, its sacraments, its rites, its songs, its offices and "duties," all that the priest practices as his vocation—accomplish the results claimed for them, cannot, by definition, be verified by living men. The ends sought are ineffably "out of this world." Only those who have died can verify the veracity of any doctrine by the facts it is presumed to reveal. Only when a man is no longer alive can he appraise the efficacy imputed to any discipline by experience of its consequences. No one, while alive, can reach the originals and check if and how faith's doctrines and disciplines emerge from them, correspond to them, or merge

into them. Those "objective" realities are, to the living, forever unknowable. This is why they remain forever terms of faith; why their unknowability underlies the creeds and canons that purport to reveal them; why it enables religious establishments to ordain the conduct of life as a means only to the state of death.

The paramount aim is to insure the dead against the everlasting suffering and torture which the living fear; and for the enduring safety and delight which the living hope for. To this end doctrines are defined, disciplines are instituted, priests are trained, and cults and churches launched on careers of expansion and power. The end is, in practice, held to justify any means—notably, making people's existence on earth while they are alive a hell of sufferings as their insurance of an existence of heavenly delight when they are dead, after an immeasurable sojourn in Purgatory. What any layman's lot may be while he is alive receives consideration from churchmen only as they can frighten or persuade him into agreeing that it contributes to his lot when he is dead; that is, when he has willy-nilly entered upon a life eternal (only the dead can have such life, since only the dead are immortal) which no living person can study and verify as fact. The churchmen's much bruited "infinite value of the human person," is first and last the person's value as dead. The importance they attribute to "faith and morals" is the consequence of those for the life of the dead, not their character in the life of the living. That is never an end and always to be given over to the subjection and servility of the menial. The end is the life of the dead, which consists, and can consist, of nothing else than imaginal present statements concerning an unverifiable future life-to-come that never can come to any man alive.

The statements are dogmas in creeds infallibly defining man, nature and God and their relations to one another, the human condition and its history, man and nature's origin and ultimate destiny, and what man can or cannot do about it.

The Roman Catholic establishment employs four creeds which overlap. They are the Apostles' and the Athanasian, which are parts of the Canonical Prayers that every priest must every day recite; the Nicene creed which forms part of the Mass; the revisions called the Creed of Pope Pius IV, which was a work of the Counter-Reformation effected through the Council of Trent, which declares the Nicene Creed to be "the creed which the holy Roman Church uses." It has received additions under Pius IX and Pius XII. Pius IX added as dogmas the assertions that popes are infallible, and that the Virgin Mary was "preserved immune from all stain of original sin and immaculately conceived." Pius XII declared as dogma that the Virgin was transported to heaven in the flesh. The Tridentine creed begins: "I—with a firm faith, believe and profess all and each of those things contained in the Creed (the Nicene) which the holy Roman Church uses." It concludes: "This true Catholic faith, out of which no one can be saved, which I now freely profess and sincerely hold, I, the same—promise, vow and swear with God's help most constantly to retain and confess entire and unstained to the end of my life. So may God help me and these his holy Gospels." Above all, the creeds commit the believer also to "condemn, reject and anathematize all things contrary and all heresies which the Church has condemned, rejected and anathematized."

Believers, then, are not merely required "to promise, vow and swear" to cleave to the dogmas of their faith "entire and unstained" until they die. They are also required to hate and curse, to cut off and shut out beliefs that are "contrary" or other. This condition follows from the fact that the articles of the faith have no different ground and can get no different verification than the act of faith itself. The validity of the belief is the same as the act of believing. The act is the belief's substance and testimony both. Whatever it attests is by the act of attestation, self-evident; witnessing constitutes the truth of that which is witnessed to. Its nature excludes all others.

This is what establishes religious belief—more specifically Christian belief—as *sui generis*. For there is no body of knowledge, no discipline of the human mind which does not live in the active faith of those whose knowledge and know-how it is. There is none which does not arise among different ideas and beliefs, and that is not chosen as an alternative to those others. Let the presence preferred be what it may—something seen, heard, touched, tasted, smelled, felt; something remembered, imagined, conceived, invented, constructed. Let it be fact, let it be fiction, whether of the cults, the sciences, the arts or the sports. Whatever it be, we first know it by acquaintance, and if the world were timeless and motionless, our acquaintances would all be everywhere and always the same; seeing would be believing; believing, seeing; fact would be truth and truth fact. These pairs would be one infallible intuition of what is so, because without change, fallibility is impossible.

But the lapsing of time and the eventuation of experience which are the life of living are also the fallibility of knowing. Time and motion diversify all unity and add to and subtract from every totality. They confront certainties with alternatives and thus call forth doubt. They separate seeing from believing and generate the functions of both that we call truth and error. They establish events as a fact or fiction, appearance or reality. They render knowledge-of-acquaintance dependent on knowledge-about. They suffuse safety with hazards and demote sure things into long shots. They render it impossible for any race in life, however fixed, long to stay fixed. They beset every necessity with chances, every foregone conclusion with contingency. Although each mode of knowing starts and ends as belief, it becomes a true belief via a process of trials and testings, of proving itself better than its rivals on a free field, without fear or favor; and it stays a true belief, which the believer trusts, only so long as the equal competition continues. In the course of that rivalry, the believer may turn from his initial *I see* to *Maybe I see*; from *Maybe*, to *Maybe not*; from

these alternatives to *I had just as lief*; from this to *I had liefer*; from *I had liefer* to *I believe*; This belief will have begun as unweighted acknowledgment of alternatives present. It will have concluded as a weighted preference between them, as a consequence of one or another making good its rival claims to better cognitive performance. The inquirer's belief has now become *be-lief*—an act of faith which so trusts the idea it asserts as to bet on its superiority. The act endows the idea with truth. The bet can pay off only if the verifying consequences can be measured and appraised and found satisfactory.

Mathematics, the sciences of nature and of man and all the acts based on them are, every one of them, thus true. They are the mind's free enterprises, their beliefs ever open to doubt, inquiry and verification by consequences on equal terms of analysis, experimentation and application. They are the ways of testing the trustworthiness of trusted doctrines and disciplines. Their measure is, as Francis Bacon advised his generation, the quality and the amplitude of the "Power and Empire of Mankind over the Universe"; and, as Descartes recognized, and said it in his Discourse on Method, the "speculative philosophies of the schools" are alien to these modes of verification. As knowledge, the latter are indeed, *know how*, "similar to that of the artizan." Those who perfect this become "masters and possessors of nature" and benefactors of humanity. Their knowledge about "fire, air, water, the stars, the heavens and all bodies which surround us" becomes the trustworthy instrument of human well-being, a collective endeavor envisaging past performance as well as present undertaking, so that "we may all advance together much further than anyone could go by himself."

9

Will to Believe Is Will to Live

TRUTH IN THE sciences and arts, then, is the trust we put in ideas to lead us to rational insight and prosperous adjustments *re* the things and thoughts they are ideas about. Truth is a present act of faith which consolidates successful knowings of the past, and employs them, according to the level and range of their ongoing verification, as assumptions or hypotheses or theories or laws to serve for guides and rules of procedure in the future. Wherever the verification be worked out—in a laboratory, a field, a factory, a church, a legislature, or a hospital—it comes through as a semantic or operational event, usually as a configuration of both. Its achievement is never a working over of persons, always a modification in thoughts and things which persons remain as free as ever to assent to, dissent from, or confront with alternatives they claim will do the same job better.

The truth of the churchman, on the other hand, can never be tested and verified as such a modification of thoughts and things. By definition its verification is an operation by persons on persons. It is accomplished by preaching and indoctrination, not by doubt, inquiry and experimentation. It is not open to demonstration, like mathematics, or to the tests of the laboratory and of the applications to the sky, the field, the mine, the factory, the waters, like astronomy, physics, chemistry and the like. It is declared by a teacher in "the teaching church" to a listener in "the believing church," as a premise which is its own conclusion; either as unarguable dogma, or an argument whose conclusion is foregone. A catechism—not a laboratory experiment-book—is its characteristic vehicle. The mark of its success is the "conviction of faith." The Apostle Paul urges

“the hearing of faith” upon his Galatians, and declares to his Romans that “faith cometh by hearing.” Of the truth of what is heard, no other evidence can be, save the act of faith that declares, and the act of faith that repeats it. For the reality of that which the truth affirms may have no other substance, than the act of faith itself. If faith be not its own verification then nothing else can be; if it be not its own evidence, it is without evidence. As defined and appraised by its proponents, its truth must be intrinsically absolute truth, self-evident, and infallible, as self-evident and infallible as a man’s own right to live is to the man struggling to go on living. The faith he holds in this way defines the terms of his wager that he will survive and not perish in the struggle. It is the energies of his will-to-live impatterning themselves in the dogmas and rites he has come to believe in. His change-resisting will-to-believe is a function of his struggling will-to-live: to subdue ill, to attain good and render it more abundant; to escape death or defeat forever and to last long and surely in an unsure and unlasting world.

The record—even in church histories—is that this sort of ineffable assurance comes to no individual, to say nothing of any association of individuals. With the changes of which living consists, go changes in believing as well. Whether in a personal history or a social institution, the self-evident and the infallible can remain such but briefly. Ongoing time diversifies them from within, the demands and pressures of believers, from without. Divine revelations remain oracles only so long as they convey different meanings to different organizations of interest. Not only is the text of Holy Writ changed; its many meanings are translated into the always more manifold and often discontinuous intentions of tradition. The latest authority may find insuperable the task of establishing an identity for antithetical but equally self-evident and infallible articles of faith. The practice is to declare the identity a divine mystery which to doubt is heresy; to deny, deserving of eternal death.

Concurrently, alternative mysteries of faith, to *their* faithful not less self-evidently infallible, keep challenging belief, heightening the assaults of argument and disputation into physical assaults, endeavoring to alter conviction.

Since each believer's criterion of validity can be only his act of faith itself, the issues between believers soon becomes a war of all with all. Articles of faith, each infallibly true, each irreconcilable with others, increase and multiply. True believers bind themselves to one another into companies of "defenders of the faith." What they are against becomes their dominant, what they are for, their recessive, concern. Aggression becomes the mark of all their tribe. By contrast, believers whose faith can evince its objectivity in terms of method, can rely on something more than the believing itself, and are able to compete peacefully with one another. Who gets violent about the multiplication table, or the inside of the atom, or the size or distance of a heavenly body, unless it be implicated in the validity of a faith? Who otherwise makes the multiplication table a bloody issue or a literally burning question? The multiplication table is trusted to vindicate its own validity against any attempt to disregard or abuse it. Should it fail the trust, another arithmetic would replace it. As the world goes, it continues to be as sure a thing as anybody could bet on, anywhere, anytime. To disregard it where it is relevant, is still to court trouble and disaster. The multiplication table is what it does, and its identity is self-maintaining; no alien force can either enhance or diminish it. It survives on its own power by its own merit.

10

The War of All Faiths against All

BUT THE POSTULANTS of what is traditionally Faith do not in fact exhibit the confidence in their Faith that they repose in the multiplication table. They insist that the religious duty, the reverence and piety they owe toward their own objects of belief requires them to blacken, balk and destroy alternatives always, everywhere, and anyhow. This attitude toward alternative faiths is peculiarly a trait of Judeo-Christian cults. "Pagan" believers were relatively free of it, and disposed to practice toward each others' diverse faiths a courteous respect, reverence and free exchange of worship, like today's community churches. The Athenians even had an altar for the "unknown God" that the Apostle Paul made the most of. The spirit and tone of classical antiquity have their own symbolic concretion in the multitude of temples erected in the Imperial City to the multitude of divinities worshipped by the people of the Roman Empire. As the Christians grew in numbers, power and diversities of belief, the spirit and tone changed, however. Not only were the temples either expropriated or destroyed. The variants of the faith waged war upon each other. Until the Emperor Constantine commanded them all to gather at Nicaea and agree, their reciprocal aggressions were bitter, bloody, and cruel. The imperial decree brought 2,048 representatives of the teaching church with 318 of their bishops to Nicaea. The compromises they unwillingly arranged are known as the Nicene Creed.

However, the record shows that neither this creed nor any other could replace the creedal warfare with creedal peace. For in the eyes of any believer, faith in a different doctrine and discipline making equal claims to infallibility and self-evidence meant the liquidation of both self-evidence and infallibility.

The different, the heretic, the infidel, was a competitor not amenable in and of himself to faith by hearing. He could not be persuaded, only coerced. Of necessity he must be commanded, contained, terrorized or else destroyed. What else, since faith is the substance and evidence of its own truth, since the object of its truth is mystery inaccessible to all human inquiry and experience? What else can the authenticity of the faith rest on but the authority of the believer? And what else can be the authority of the believer, if not the energy of his belief and its strength and skill in overcoming the disbelief or the diverse beliefs of others? To doubt, to deny, his belief becomes in the believer's eyes the unpardonable sin: to war upon and destroy doubt and denial by whatever means becomes the virtuous end-of-ends, the insurance of survival in eternity. Hence each Faith tends in its beginnings to claim from all acknowledgement of its exclusive universal and total validity. While these claims continue authoritarian, each claimant endeavors to vindicate the superiority of his own by force where he can, by fraud where he cannot (as such forgeries as the Donations of Constantine and the like testify).

Were the dogmas of his faith in fact infallible, they could lose nothing of their absoluteness and power if the fallible alternatives had every opportunity to survive or perish on their merits in the open market of belief and judgment. In fact, the aggression against alternatives is sure sign of the aggressor's deficient faith in the infallibility of his infallibles, in its power to generate conviction by its intrinsic nature. The infallible should be able to emerge with flying colors from the challenge of inquiry and the tests of experiment. It should be able to undergo them on its own, without extraneous help. Doubt of it, when free and competent, should serve only to confirm its certainty. Loyal and honest believers should cherish and welcome doubters, not suppress, persecute and destroy them. They would make the most of rival doctrines and disciplines, instead of endeavoring to eliminate them. For it is only in the setting of

doubt that certainty can reliably establish itself; in the free, honorable competition with alternatives that faith demonstrates its superior validity. But the authoritarians must needs be also totalitarians. Like gamblers who bet on a race they have themselves fixed, these defenders of the faith would bet on a creed whose competitors they have crippled or removed. E. M. Forster in *Two Cheers for Democracy* observed that "to ignore evidence is one of the characteristics of faith." The record shows that others are to deny, to forge, and destroy evidence. Thus their faith can be rendered certain, unique and sole. By robbing competing faiths of their freedom, they can make sure of having their own continue in unrivalled safety as infallible truth. But truth, as the arts and sciences intend it, as wisdom accounts for it, is a value derived from winning consent, not from commanding assent; truth is the trustworthiness, the reliability of ideas. It is never a creed by decree, always a belief deliberated and had liefer; always the trust we put in a belief as it manifests superior operational worth in a competitive field among rivals as freely and safely attempting on equal terms to do a better cognitive job.¹ The operation is the *how*, the performance the *what* of the belief's truth. One eventuates from the other. Both are tentatives. For no belief can ever hold the trust we give it absolutely, since none is ever sole, unique and

¹ This is the pragmatist finding regarding truth. Every so often, of course, one comes upon assertions that the pragmatist conception of truth is not this, but the churchly one which is its opposite. Thus, in some recent lectures about the impact of science on society, Lord Bertrand Russell asserts: "You can confer pragmatic 'truth' on the proposition 'the sun is cold' if you can insure that everybody who denies it is liquidated." Of course his lordship knows better. He knows that pragmatic truth is a consequence, not of the liquidation of believers, but of the free and equal competition to establish their rival beliefs as reliable knowledge with truth as the value of the most reliable. But the noble lord is an apostle of a non-pragmatic faith regarding truth and is obviously not above employing the familiar devices of jesuitry as a defender of his faith.

exempt from the spontaneities of time and the ambiguities of place, since all its ascertained yesterdays have still the tests of an uncertain tomorrow, converging upon it from the multitudinous energies of all-unbounded Nature. This is why brave and sober spirits speak not of the possession but of the pursuit of truth and know pursuit as faith. The pursuit, George Santayana says somewhere, "is a form of courage, and a philosopher may well love truth for its own sake in that he is disposed to confront destiny, whatever it may be, with zest when possible, with resignation when necessary, and not seldom with amusement." Since the pursuit has no guaranteed goal, destiny no ascertainable essence if that be not the pursuit itself, the courage which sustains it is faith, and pursued and pursuit merge; they are experienced as an enduring vital action, a means which is its own end, an end which is its own means, and thereby self-evident in the only way any experience can be self-evident.

11

God, the Godless, and Secularism

THE SIGNERS OF the Declaration of Independence, affirming the equal and unalienable rights of the unending miscellany of mankind to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, were, as we have seen, invoking truths self-evident in this way. The invocation signalized the Founding Fathers' recognition that survival is faith, faith is survival. But they did not rest their affirmation of equality and unalienability alone on the self-maintaining acts of faith of the multitudinous believers. They derived them from and referred them to "the laws of Nature and of Nature's God."

We are aware, of course, that concerning the "laws of Nature" there obtained an enduring consensus, and that where there was disagreement, the arts of scientific inquiry were employed to elicit from Nature, by experiment and calculation, a decision between rival hypotheses and theories, and that whatever the personal stake, it was a matter of scientific honor to accept the impersonal consequence, until another and better should replace it. In so far as the laws of nature were held to reveal the inalterable will and providence of God, the consensus knew God, the divine will was no mystery, the divine revelation called for no priest to unveil its hidden meaning, God's purpose was clear, distinct and unmistakable. The equality and unalienability of the rights of all were endowments of the creature from the Creator, integral to the laws of Nature and of Nature's God. True, the moral equation of human relations had somehow come to false solutions of the mathematical equation of the relations of all things in nature. But there the equation is—the laws of nature and of Nature's God, which a rendering of the human equation shall exemplify.

The idea that God is a mathematician looks back to Pythagoras. Plato said that God geometrizes, and the divine mathesis changes as the mathematicians of history alter their doctrines and modify their disciplines. God now is imaged in accord with the mathematics of Einstein, Eddington or Jeans. But the mathematic technique of equation persists as its employments pass into one another, and so does the disposition to define human relations in the equational terms of the laws of nature. There is an ancient idea of justice as an equation securing to each one his right, and of right as the integer of each one's struggle to live, to keep free, to seek happiness. Embodied in social action this equation becomes the institution of government as a contract of equity between the governed, maintaining them as peers in diversity, and hence, working to eliminate bigotry, privilege and monopoly wherever these exist among them, and to prevent their arising where they do not. Justice is government guarding all ways of the common life in such wise that they stay equally open, free and safe for everyone.

This is what each believer spontaneously feels to be the self-evident truth regarding the will of God for his own person. How, then, could any doubt or deny the identical faith of another believer concerning his, whatever its words and works? We recall James Madison's arguing in his famous *Memorial and Remonstrance*: "Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not yielded to the evidence which has convinced us. If this freedom be abused it is an offense against God, not against man. To God, therefore, and not to man, must an account of it be rendered." We recall Jefferson's observing that the existence of diversities of belief carries with it "a right of chusing and necessity of deliberating" for believers, and that this "reciprocally establishes liberty." Each believer must needs count his own freedom of conscience into the insurance of the equal freedom of all by all. Counting in the diversities, building the

One in Many, makes history. History so made is the steps by which the equation of divine justice solves itself in human relations. Faith posits God as its ground in nature, and His providence as nature's unalterable, self-confirming laws.

But this God is not a God that guarantees survival and voids extinction. These laws of his are laws of life which is a course of nature from birth to death. They affirm, they do not deny death; and in so far as faith is the substance and evidence of the denial of death, they falsify faith. Thus, it is not enough for the personality struggling for self-preservation that God shall be the self-revealing immanent power of the nature which the arts image and the sciences analyze, measure and define in clear and distinct ideas. It is needful that God shall guarantee that which nature voids, that he shall therefore be utterly mystery, incommensurable with all things natural, inscrutable to all natural scrutiny, able to unloose contingency in necessity and to harness chance in providence. He must be *Deus Absconditus* whose Grace brings faith, and whose will works by singular means his wonders to perform: the means detailed in the Christian scheme of salvation: as John the apostle summed it up: "If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater: for the witness of God is this, that he hath borne witness concerning his Son. He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in him: he that believeth not God hath made him a liar; because he hath not believed in the witness that God hath borne concerning his Son. And the witness is this, that God gave unto us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. He that hath the Son hath the life; he that hath not the Son of God hath not the life. These things have I written unto you, that ye may know that ye have eternal life, even unto you that believe on the name of the Son of God." Or better, as the Apostle Paul advised his Ephesians: "By grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves; it is a gift of God, not of works, lest any man should boast."

Of course, there were, and there always will be, myriads believing that they are immortal whose faith does not employ

the Christian means to the nullification of death; others who had learned those dogmas and had discarded them. Among the latter we may count Voltaire, Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine and most deists. Indeed, Paine's *Age of Reason*, still denounced by those who have not read it as "the atheist's Bible," begins with the declaration, "I believe in one God and no more, and I hope for happiness beyond this life." On the record, as any history of religions attests, immortality-guaranteeing divinities are legion; their images and icons, their places of worship and the forms of their worship are as varied as the purposes and passions of their worshippers. And with each goes a creed, a theology, a body of doctrine and a code of discipline as diverse as the organizations, the ambitions, the powers and the sophistication of their priesthods. The one thing they truly share and use in common is the word "God," their one common term of condemnation is the word "atheism" or "godlessness." A recent Roman Catholic count demonstrates triumphantly that practically everybody in America "believes in God" but "God" undefined, "God" with none of the word's multitude of meanings specified. Specification, if candid, would cause theological pollsters instantly to charge that "atheists" and "godless" have falsely been declaring belief in "God."

But the clergy, whatever their cult, do not bother to specify that objectively "God" must mean what their creed says it means, and only this; or that their theologians produce glosses which in fact add other meanings to the creedal ones. The meant which their diverse meanings intend is not one that they can merge and coincide in, like a cross or a book or a relational order like $2 + 2 = 4$. Psychologically the word "God" serves rather as a point of departure than a point of arrival. What it starts from is an attitude or mood reciprocally communicated by the tone of voice in which the word "God" is spoken, the posture of the speaker when it is spoken, the special forms of speech that accompany it. If it stands for any objective presence, this presence has no determination save as the posture and

speech of the speaker, and the images, the edibles and potables, the vessels, vestments, scents and symbols and the places of their utterance and employment. These, the *sacra* and *sancta* of the "religious" intention, are as objective to eyes and ears, to nostrils and hands, as the pictures, the dishes, the dinners, the drinks, the clothing and the languages of the secular struggle for a living and a life. But when acted upon in a certain mood and attitude, they fall into a configuration with the psychosomatic posture that generates an atmosphere. The atmosphere is an actual presence. The traditional conditions of the attitude—the priest, the sacerdotal scene with *sacra*, *sancta*, sacraments and rites—are only its conventional but not its best occasions: nor its most poignant or consequential ones. The attitude is known to arise spontaneously in the most untoward circumstances: as the theologians might say, Grace is gratuitous: like the wind, it bloweth where it listeth.

For most people, however, habit is prepotent here as in the other regions of experience. Hence the *sacra* and *sancta* and worship of an alien cult figure as so many more *secular* objects and behaviors, and are appraised as superstitions of the alien congregation. The dogmas, rites and rituals of that different faith indeed are apt to cause disquiet and anxiety as well as to arouse scorn. Since these are the present substance of the divinity and the only actual evidence of his providence and are so different from one's own, they cannot be true witnesses of *Deus Absconditus*. Their faithful say "God, God" and mean nothing that God must be. In honor and in truth their God must needs be a false God, no God at all. They are godless, they are atheists.

Their atheism does not consist of believing in no God, it consists of believing in a different God, in having another God before one's own. To the faithful of Jehovah the faithful of different worships were atheists. Protagoras was condemned for denying the gods, Socrates for blaspheming them. Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Zeno, Philo, Plotinus and their followers devised each diverse philosophic meanings for the word "God,"

and each saw some other deviser and was seen by some other as "godless." Plato propounded in his dialogue "*The Laws*" an inquisition and ultimate execution of impenitent doubters of his theos. The Christians were long atheists to the faithful of non-Christian cults in imperial Rome, and they, in their turn denounced those others as "atheistic polytheists." When they finally were brought to power by imperial favor, they undertook to confirm, entrench and extend that power by improving on Plato's counsel. The Roman church, once established and consolidated, fought to make itself "catholic," that is, totalitarian regarding creed and conduct. Organized as a hierarchy, it launched a despotic religious imperialism which suffers differentiation of doctrine or discipline where it must, penalizes, persecutes and destroys them where it can. Being different, they are "godless" or "atheist." The papal hierarchy reserves the category "Christian" to its own communion and acquiesces in the use of it by different ones with grudging reserve. Infallibly what is not Roman Catholic is atheist and not Christian.¹

Whereto heretic and dissident retorted that what is Roman Catholic is a superstitious idolatry which is anything but Christian. The Protestant Reformation and Roman Counter-Reformation at first only intensified the war of all denominations against all.

Nevertheless, there recurred now and again a faith which postulated survival not on war against the different but on a covenant of peace and equal freedom of belief among the different. This covenant of the faiths could be given effect through the surrender by the churches of all powers against each other, and the absorption of those powers into a united force separate from all and charged with assuring the equal

¹ And of course, the same criterion has been applied to Catholicism. See, for example, Harold E. Helfman *The Cincinnati Bible War* in Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly, October 1951.

freedom and safety of each. In 1644 Roger Williams published in his *Bloudy Tenent of Persecution*, a dialogue between Truth and Peace which argued against Calvin, Beza, Cotton and other exponents of the religious war of all against all that "it is the will and command of God, that (since the coming of his Son the Lord Jesus) a permission of the most Paganish, Jewish, Turkish or Antichristian consciences and worships, be granted to all men in all Nations and Countries: and they are only to be fought against with that Sword which is only (in Soul matters) able to conquer, to wit, the Sword of God's Spirit, the Word of God." Again, Williams wrote that "God requireth not an uniformity of Religion to be inacted and inforced in any civil state; which inforced uniformity (sooner or later) is the greatest occasion of civil war, ravishing of conscience, persecution of Christ Jesus in his servants, and of the hypocrisy and destruction of millions of souls." The Anabaptists became a communion with this faith. The Society of Friends became such a communion. Declared the Friends, in 1675, "Since God hath assumed himself the power and dominion of conscience, who alone can rightly instruct and govern it, therefore it is not lawful for any whatsoever, by virtue of any authority or principality they bear in government of this world, to force the conscience of others; and therefore all killing, banishing, imprisoning and other such things, which men are afflicted with, for the alone exercise of their conscience, or difference in worship or opinion, proceedeth from the spirit of Cain, the murderer, and is contrary to the truth; provided always that no man, under the pretence of conscience, prejudice his neighbor in his life or estate, or do anything destructive to, or inconsistent with, human society; in which case the law is for the transgressor, and justice to be administered upon all, without respect of persons."

John Locke had said it: "no man by nature is bound unto any particular church or sect"—and in view of the conception of faith held by those who do bind men, how could binding insure the grace of faith?

Spinoza, to later generations a "God-intoxicated man," but to his own, and to his own people an atheist excommunicated from their community for his faith, had written somewhat earlier: "What shall be accepted as true or rejected as false, or what opinions should actuate men in their worship of God, are questions falling within a man's natural right, which he cannot abdicate even with his own consent. Government which attempts to control minds is tyrannical. What greater misfortune for a state can be conceived than that honorable men should be sent like criminals into exile because they hold diverse opinions which they cannot disguise? When people try to take away liberty of thought, and bring to trial the opinions of mankind, they only succeed in surrounding their victims with an appearance of martyrdom and raise the feelings of pity and revenge rather than of terror. He that knows himself to be upright shrinks from no punishment; he holds that death in a good cause is an honor, and that death for freedom is glory. The ultimate aim of government is not to rule by fear, but to free every man from fear, that he may live in all possible security; in other words, to strengthen his natural right to exist and work without injury to himself or others. The object of government is not to change men into puppets, but to enable them to develop their minds and bodies in security, and to employ their reason unshackled. In fact, the true aim of government is liberty."

The modern mind is formed by the arduous and unremitting labor to embody this faith in the total economy of society—its political economy, its cultural establishments, its schools, its religions. Achievement turned on recognizing and on implementing what Roger Williams had pointed out: that religious societies are voluntary associations, like a College of Physicians, or "company of east Indie" or "Turkie-Merchants," that they are separate, distinct and self-governing; that so long as they mind their own business and keep peace with one another, they can freely communicate with, even convert, one another's

members; but if they wage war, then "the Civil Magistrate . . . is bound to suffer no man to break the Civil Peace, by laying hands of violence upon any, though as vile as the Samaritans for not receiving of the Lord Jesus Christ." As to a decision on the "so much controversy in the World, where the name of Christ is taken up, concerning the True Church, the Ministry and Worship . . . Who shall judge?" No cult may rightly be a judge of its own case against its rivals, and the civil magistrate is without jurisdiction on creed: if he insures the equal peace and freedom of all believers, he has done all he has a right to do or can.

In a word, only the secular arm possesses the qualifications that can ensure equal liberty for each communion and can enforce a just peace between all communions. Secularism is the collective security of a nation's or of the world's distributive faiths. Since, in the teaching of each communion, this security is God's will for itself, Secularism, or the equal security of all, is what the teaching of all would lead to. Secularism is the Will of God, then. The substance and evidence of this truth is also faith, but not faith by itself, and in contraversion of nature and nature's laws; faith substantiated by the laws of nature and validated by nature's God.

12 From Infallibilist War to Secularist Peace

TO ANY SACERDOTAL interest claiming exclusive custody and dispensation of the true faith, this thesis is mortal sin. It is giving error the same right as truth; it is giving permission to teach "untruth," truth being always, everywhere and solely the dogmas, the prescriptions and the practices of this communion and no other; untruth, being the truth of every different communion. Since Secularism is the equal insurance of all communions in their right to believe, to worship and to teach, Secularism gives error the same right as truth and makes religion the same as atheism. Indeed, Secularism is atheism, for the true God cannot be other than his infallible church says he is, and to render accounts of his divinity different from his Church's is to defy God's will and to put immortal souls in jeopardy. God requires that persons guilty of such falsehoods should be silenced, by any and every means. God requires, therefore, the extirpation of Secularism, which is the most false and most blasphemous, because it is the parity, of all the heresies.

What this jesuit dialectic turns on is not, of course, any denial that "God" exists. Its "godless" communions are at best as positive in their faith in God as its exclusive true believers. The issue is not whether "God" exists but whether one sacerdotal establishment, employing one definition of the God and of his commandments to create a monopoly in faith for its special interests, shall do so without let or hindrance at the cost of the liberty and safety of its rivals and by force of the "civil magistracy" as well as its own. Until the Democratic Revolution there was no communion, save the few noted, which did not indulge in its moment of this totalitarian pretension. Each claimed to be the one and only true faith, each claimed in-

fallibility for itself and attributed innocent error or malicious deception to its rivals. The pretension of each to infallibility inevitably expressed itself in the war of all against all. For infallibility is totalitarian. It permits of no alternatives and no liberty. At first the pretenders to it engage in a battle royal with the victory going to one. The victor has either extirpated his rivals or reduced them to slavery in thought, faith and person. Or else the battle drags out in a stalemate; none is able to extirpate or enslave any other; they come to a truce in which although continuing to condemn and hate one another, they agree to suffer each other to live. This agreement is a covenant of containment of infallibility by infallibility. The enforcement of the covenant becomes the obligation of government. Secularism begins. The traditional name for it is toleration. As this peace continues, the rigidities of mutual exclusion and theological cold war are mollified by a certain trading in ideas: blind condemnation gives way to endeavor at understanding. Infallibility tones down to probability. Hatred fades slowly away. Toleration now changes into a new attitude: *live and let live*. As the peace and parity of secularization spread, the free and secure interchange of doctrines and disciplines tends entirely to dissipate the pretensions to infallibility. Toleration becomes an attitude of mutual respect and understanding between the faiths, a reciprocal recognition of the equal and unalienable right of each believer to the singularity of his own belief. This attitude is expressed by the maxim *live and help live*. Then, as the secular spirit continues to heighten the sense of freedom and security of each communion in the presence of the others, many find occasion for doing in company what they had in the past done in isolation; many find that their own faith and works are stronger and more alive because of their association with others. A trend toward confederation becomes manifest. Community churches appear. Inter-faith and intercultural associations are formed. The effect of Secularism is a tendency to make toleration the same as cooperation, to extend

live and let live into live and help live; at last to bring some spontaneous fulfilment of the divine commandment so consistently preached, and so consistently disobeyed in the perennial war of all cults against all. It occurs in the seventeenth and eighteenth verses of the nineteenth chapter of Leviticus; Moffat renders it: "You shall not cherish hate against your fellow-countrymen; what you must do is to warn him of his fault, lest you incur guilt yourself. You shall not avenge yourself, you shall not bear a grudge, against your fellow-citizens, but love your neighbour as you love yourself: I am the Eternal." This is Secularism, and the will of God.

But the reciprocity of understanding, respect and cooperation, the reciprocal guarantees of equal liberty which are the substance of love of neighbor and the evidence of obedience to God, involve a religious conversion tantamount to surrendering the privileges and power resting on monopolist practices based on pretensions to infallibility. The Roman Catholic hierarchy has persistently repudiated such a surrender. The record shows it compensating for moments of greatest actual diminution of prerogatives with most unbounded totalitarian claims of having received from God the monopoly of religious truth and of earthly authority. The record shows it in a perennial war upon different faiths without, and upon deviants and variations within, the church. From Benedict VIII's Bull *Unam Sanctam* to Pius XII's Radio Address to the Peoples of the World at Christmas, 1944, no basic revision, no honest modification of claims and pretension appears. On the contrary, the Democratic Revolution was connected with an intensification of these demands upon mankind which Pius IX's Encyclical *Quanta Cura* and *Syllabus of Modern Errors* embodies. This is the Syllabus that outlawed the ideals of liberalism and the idea of progress as mortal sin; that pronounces anathema on the democratic rule that "every one is free to adopt and profess that religion which, guided by the light of reason, he holds to be true." It was only a fresh declaration, in his turn, of the papal

war upon freedom for Leo XIII to assert, as in the Encyclical *Immortale Dei*, that "to hold . . . that there is no difference in matters of religion is the same as atheism"; or that "the church . . . deems it unlawful to place various forms of Divine Worship on the same footing as the true religion." Dogmatic authoritarian in his sacerdotal definition of government and its "rights," this avatar of the infallibilist succession found it expedient to concede, during the eighties of the last century that "it is not forbidden (*nota bene*) to prefer mild governments within the framework of the Catholic doctrine on the origin and use of public power. . . . The Church does not condemn them if they secure the good of the citizens." —that is, the Church tolerates but does not approve. Half a century and more later, Pius XII in that Christmas Radio Address, reiterated these assertions of Leo XIII's Encyclical *Libertas*, and added that the Democratic Idea must recognize the truth of inequality and the primacy of authority. "Men" he said, "would undermine the foundation of their dignity and freedom if, taking advantage of personal liberty, they denied all dependence on a higher authority endowed with the right of coercion." And what could be this coercive higher authority if not God's sole, unique, vehicle of salvation to men, the Church whose Supreme Pontiff he is, sole representative of God on earth, infallible definer of "the order of beings and ends established by God which is the ruling norm of all democracy." Papal definitions, of course, exclude all different non-papal doctrine or discipline. God forbids any "official recognition of the same rights to truth and error, to good and evil, and the refusal to respect the exclusive rights of the Catholic Church." Truth and error, good and evil being what the Papacy says they are, and only what the Papacy says they are, men are free to think, speak and act in accordance with the laws of God and man alone as these laws are promulgated and interpreted by God's Roman church. It is the unfortunate case that people in some lands arrogate to themselves unlimited use of critical judgment and an untrammelled choos-

ing between alternatives. The church endures their practices as "suggested or imposed by the intricacy of events." But only as *modus vivendi*. The hierarchy's upkeep of its own "principles" remains immaculate. It maintains them "with inflexible firmness and vigor."

Briefly, although the papacy is compelled to compromise its infallible authority and totalitarian pretensions in fact, it retains them undefiled and absolute in faith. This is the will of God. Secularism, with its "fatal theory" as Leo XIII called it, of the separation of Church and State, is atheism, say the rationalizing apologists for this hate and aggression against equal freedom for all religions. Secularism is not merely freedom *of* religion, it is freedom *from* religion, and thus freedom from God, which is impossible. How can anybody have freedom as against God?

But if freedom from God is impossible, Secularism cannot be freedom *from* religion; it must be freedom from coercion and exploitation by a particular religion. Secularism is freedom *of* religion to be different. Thus, again, Secularism is the Will of God.

13 God as Many and God as One

"GOD" AND "ATHEISM" as here used, bring back the question of the relationships, if any, between "God" as a *meaning* and "God" as a *meant*. What are these, when the term intends something more than a word in the mouth of a speaker endeavoring to frighten foes, win friends and influence people? So far, the trend of the present discussion has been toward the conclusion that "God," the *meant*, is the same as "God," the *meaning*. For the *meant*, as the knowable and known substance that faith is, consists of the ideo-motor dispositions, and the words, the images, the works, the ways and their consequent atmosphere whereby a communion of believers maintain and advance their faith; "God" as *meant* is the configuration of those diversities into a single presence; "God" as *meaning* is the diversities pointing to and sustaining the configurational wholeness; "God" as *meant* is, then, the collective ideal, the personality-image which the group as a whole purport to work toward; "God" as *meaning* is the behavior-pattern of each member of the group while seeking, in relation to his brethren, to realize the collective image. Thus, the idea and reality of a group's "God" are functions of its structure, of the interrelations of its members, of its body of knowledge, its artistic proficiency, its industrial craftsmanship, and of the projection of these into the *sacra* and *sancta* attached to work and worship.

Since the groups are indefeasibly many, each with its own configurational singularity, "God" both as *meant* and *meaning* must be a plural term, denoting a multitude of diverse divinities, with their relations to their worshippers as diversely imaged, and with the images overlapping. As every one knows who is aware of the world's religions and their histories, Gods are fathers,

sons, kings, kings of kings, princes, lords of war or love; supreme craftsmen; they are also mothers and virgin mothers; daughters, wives; they are also the sun, the moon, the planets, the soil, the sea, the fields and the forests, or all that live and grow therein. Some figure as absolute despots, others as constitutional monarchs. Some are endowed with supreme over-all powers, beneficent and malevolent; some with specific limited competencies; still others with no competencies and no concerns whatsoever. Some are divine *ab origine*; others, such as Egyptian cattle, Roman emperors and Roman Catholic saints, have divinity conferred on them. All play specific roles in man's life when he is alive which affect his life when he is dead. The worshippers of all envisage their Gods' relations to one another in harmony with their own social structures. Inasmuch as these, prior to the Democratic Revolution, had been predominantly monarchical, hierarchical, feudal, bureaucratic, the diverse pantheons also have their ranks and orders, their classes and castes, their "thrones, dominations and principalities," together with the warring passions, the emulative rivalries, the struggle for independence, the lust for power, and the regulations of good and evil, true and false, right and wrong, which the record shows to be consequences and configurations of these structures—their "conservation of values" or else proposals to alter them. Each divine conservator has his sacred day and rite, and his believers' year is a calendar of such days. Some cults, of course, do not image their lesser divinities as free and struggling to be equal with their greater ones, especially with their "Supreme Being." They envision the lesser as but angels or agents of their monarch Almighty, each with his special vocation doing the Lord's bidding in superintendence over forms and functions of nature, the well-being of nations, the credits and debits of individual behavior, or on the destruction and death of anything, as the Lord commands.

However, although the churches and cults are many, and their definitions of God legion, God need not be more than one.

Freedom from God would indeed be impossible if "God" is used to name that which is instantly, always and solely everywhere, and wherever and whenever it be, stays the same—One either as the ineffable out-of-Nature with its things hoped for and things not seen whose grace our faiths envision and assume by means of rote and rite to win to our support and salvation; or again, One as the Nature whose energies and laws we come to know by the methods of science and win to our service by our industrial and liberal arts.

But Deity, One in this wise, is rarely, perhaps never, the One God of most monotheistic religions. Their God is one as their country or king or emperor is One—one by isolation from others, by denial of divinity to others, by the assimilation of the attributes and functions of other Gods or by their nullification or extirpation via destruction and death to their worshippers. Readers of the Bible may follow this dual process of nullification and assimilation among the people of the Old Testament, until as idea, it is consummated in the famous verse in the forty-fourth chapter of Isaiah: "Thus saith Jehovah, the King of Israel, and his deliverer, Jehovah of Hosts; I am first, I am last, and beside me there is no God." Readers may follow its modifications by Paul the Apostle, a man changed by a vision that added God the Son to God the Father, and then by the later centuries-long debate, stopped for a time with a formal creed which multiplied the One by three and asserts it nevertheless to be One. Then they may follow it from controversial creed to creed, heresy after heresy, dissent upon dissent, redefinition upon redefinition, to the monotheism of one denomination of modern Unitarians, with their faith in the freedom of conscience also against God as they envision God. For in their faith the honest denial of all-knowing, all-sustaining divinity is also an act of that divinity and equal in right and status with all its other acts.

All in all, although each communion of believers believes in one God and only one, all together believe in many Gods. By

themselves, their monotheisms are particularist, singular; together they are theological pluralists and practical polytheists; their Ones add up to a Many. The jesuit contention that the secularist faith in equal freedom for all religions is the same as faith in an impossible "freedom against God" is simply one jesuit way of requiring that believers shall believe in the jesuit God and that there is no other, and hence to charge disbelievers in the jesuit God and believers in other Gods with atheism and idolatry. The same charges are, of course, made by certain Protestants against all Catholics, not Jesuits alone but all Roman, by Judaists against Christians, by Christians against the religions of India, China and all other lands.

These deficiencies in the secularist spirit of live and let live, do not resolve, they only aggravate and perpetuate the warfare over the One and the Many in religion. The word "Unity" means an enduring human ideal. It designates a program far more evidently than a fact, and mankind's labors of unification, in every form of their cultural economy, together with the cruelties they practice and the abominations they commit and support for unity's sake, make a large part of the record of civilizations, West and East.

14 Reasoned Oneness or Mystic Oneness

TO COMPENSATE FOR failures to effect unity in fact, communions will assert its reality in idea, making the idea the theological or metaphysical or scientific ground of the ungroundable diverse multiplicity of manifest existence; they will degrade multiplicity and diversity to appearance, and exalt unity as reality, and they will be forever at pains to prove that the unity which they do not and cannot experience is nevertheless a more reliable trait of experience than the diversities they do experience.

The records note two modes of this proof.

One is dialectical. Its vehicle is discourse, its criterion coherence, and consistency even as contradiction. It has its own varieties which we distinguish from Parmenides to Philo, from Philo to Plotinos, from Zeno the Stoic to Spinoza, from Heraclitos to Hegel and the neo-Hegelians of the right and left, including Karl Marx.

The other is mystical. Its vehicle is some discipline of mind and body whose successive steps should consummate in a knowing of the Unknowable more certain and self-evident than the completest knowing of the Knowable. This certainty is the mystic experience—a total apprehension of that thing-in-itself, that absolute, whereof faith is the substance and the evidence, the disclosure of the *Deus Absconditus* climaxing the translation of faith into knowledge.

The dialectic of the One appears either to start in paradoxes or to end in paradoxes, as Parmenides' conclusion, in a dialogue of Plato's by that name, is first to make manifest: "The One is and is not, and both itself and others, in relation to themselves and one another, are and are not, and appear to be and appear not to be." The Stoic faith is somewhat more

sensory; it identifies the One as Divine Nature, and describes Nature as an eternal recurrence of self-transformations of an unchanging stuff in the eternal sequence: fire, air, water, earth, fire-air-water-earth-commingled, fire. The sequence is invariable; its pattern expresses its law. But the relation between Nature as One and its diversification as Many, is affirmed, not explained, and the Stoicisms can all be reduced to Parmenides' paradox. So can Spinoza's *Deus sive Natura*, which is One as *Natura Naturans* and Many as *Natura Naturata*.

Yet the one and the many are one, for none of the many, by itself, exists unaffected by an environment made up of others; none of the many but has had a beginning, is bound to an end, none but is an effect of a cause not itself. Only when we take these Many together as they come, by a necessary equation of cause and effect, out of one another, none first, none last, can we speak of a One which has no environment because it is the Totality of all environments, of an Effect which has no Cause because it is its own Cause, a Cause which has no Effect because it is its own Effect. This One is a One which is self-contained, self-containing, self-maintaining, forever. This One—the infinite totality of the infinite Many has no beginning, no end, no environment. This One we can know and do know, whenever we know any of the Many that come to One in it, scientifically, in the nexus of their causal order. We then envision them under the aspect of eternity. Achieving this vision is building faith into knowledge. It is seeing God when seeing and loving are one. Spinoza calls this seeing “the intellectual love of God” and the experience of it, blessedness. The idea of death has no part in it. Whoever achieves it has made himself free as God is free, and “the free man thinks of nothing less than death. His wisdom consists in meditating, not on death, but on life.”

Einstein signalizes his own translation of this reasoned faith in a total One which is an infinite Many as the expression of a “cosmic religious sense” that “feels the individual destiny as an

imprisonment and seeks to experience the totality of existence as a unity full of significance." Non-anthropomorphic, free from all dogmatism, this "cosmic religious experience is the strongest and noblest driving force behind scientific research," behind its faith in rationality, its loyalty to the pursuit of truth in the face of failure to find it. Men of science everywhere bear similar witness to this aspiration to envision the One in the many, some as eloquently as Bertrand Russell telling of "a free man's worship," others with speech more faltering.

Hegel's One is in no way as clear and distinct. Its ground in faith as against experience is far greater. It is far more "anthropomorphic." Hegel established it as the identity of the different by making it the same as self-contradiction—or—as some say: polarity. His One is "negativity," everlasting process in which everything becomes its own opposite and those contradictories compound. The dialectic beats *thesis*, *antithesis*, *synthesis*, while its unending "negation of the negation" stays self-identical, unnegatable, Absolute. It is Absolute Reason, Absolute Idea, Absolute One, which the Many but represent in terms of time and place and circumstance. The orders of nature and of the mind and history of man are alike Dialectic Many appearing as moments of that One Dialectic. In his "Introduction to the Philosophy of History," Hegel calls his One, "Eternal Wisdom." "We can understand" he declares, "that Eternal Wisdom realizes its goal in the field of the real and active Spirit, as of Nature. In this degree (of understanding it) our meditation is a theodicy, a justification of God, such as Leibnitz sought in his own metaphysical way in categories still inconceivably abstract. Evil is now understood, and reflective spirit reconciled to it. In fact, nothing impels more toward such reconciling knowledge than global history."

Substituting the word *Matter* for the word *Spirit* turns this One into the orthodox Marxian One. If we replace "Eternal Wisdom" with Dialectical Materialism, "the real and active Spirit," with classes of men devising ideologies as rationaliza-

tions of their economic interests, then the Marxist creed is a justification of the Dialectic of Matter even as a theodicy is a justification of the Providence of God. Evil is understood as that which the revolutionary class is revolting against in the class war. The knowledge of history, as it moves toward its foreordained consummation—the classless society which is both the thesis and synthesis of Dialectical Materialism immanent in the course of human events—reconciles the believing Marxist to the constitutive evils of that course as the believing naturalist is reconciled to the laws of nature and the believing supernaturalist to the will of God.

However the One be argued from the Many—whether by a dialectic of illation or a dialectic of contradiction—however its substance be imagined, whether as Spirit or as Matter,—its significance as an ideal shaping the fluid diversities of the human enterprise is unaffected; its role as a value, as the alone Real, True, Good, Universal and Eternal, is unaffected. Nor does this situation modify the fact that all actual dialectic is never acquaintance with the One; ever knowledge-about the One, that the One as such Absolute, Existent or Value remains thus an object of faith substantiated by the works of dialectic. It is because of this, because the processes and forms of reasoning are again the substance of things hoped for and the evidence of things not seen that one line of the tradition identifies the One as *Logos* or Reason, and Reason as either an impersonal mathematic or as “the laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.”

The mystic line of the tradition is the line of the rebels against all denominations of knowledge-about the One, whatever their logic. Mysticism’s agonists seek, and assert that they attain, knowledge-of-acquaintance. Their report is that of Job who did truly affirm his “freedom as against God” and was justified.

Only by hearsay had I known thee,
But now mine eye seeth thee.
And I recant my challenge and am comforted
Amid dust and ashes.

Mystic seeing must, of course, be somehow substantially discontinuous and dynamically continuous with the seeings of common sense, the arts, the sciences and the cults. It appears as a cognition of presence which is incommensurable with all accepted and standard modes of cognition. The theories of knowledge endeavor to give it a different name, "intuition" being the commonest. It is the psyche's apprehension when it has not only used the senses and the intellect, but used them up, disrupted their action, and come to an awareness of which they are neither organs nor activities. Traditionally the disruption is a consequence of ascetic disciplines, Eastern or Western, and the new awareness consummates the disruption. Students know, however, that the new awareness also occurs suddenly, under all sorts of circumstances, without any disciplinary preparation whatsoever; that it supervenes on the taking of anaesthetic drugs such as led William James's pluralistic mystic, Benjamin Paul Blood, to announce this awareness as "the anaesthetic revelation." However induced, it figures much more consequentially in the religions of the East than the religions of the West. But both are, as must needs be, far more articulate regarding the *how* of the revelation than its *what*.

For the *What* is ineffable and unutterable. It is the One, the unknown and unknowable Subject for which all the knowledge, that the multitudinous religions and sciences of mankind attain and discard, provides the predicates. The tenth or cosmogonic hymn of the Rig-Veda speaks of "the nameless One," "that One" beside which nothing else is, creating worlds and Gods who do not truly know why and how they are created, with the One, itself being absolute, perhaps likewise unknowing why and how it creates the Many which affirm it.

Men call it Indra, Mitra, Agni, Varuna.
Or Garutman of heaven, with radiant pinions;
By many names men name the solely One,
They name it Agni, Yama, Matarishvan.

The Upanishads—that is, sittings to hear the Vedic Scriptures unveiled—repeat and develop this idea. The One is envisioned as the identity of all the differences of the universe, its ineffable Cause, its Atman or Self which Man's Self echoes, and which universal Karma deploys as consequence. Conventionally, Karma is understood as the ethical principle of reward and punishment governing the reincarnation of souls. But this is only appearance and untrue. In truth Karma manifests the mysterious Causality of the universe. Says Yajnavalkya: "Even as a man acts and conducts himself, so is he born; the doer of good is born a good man, the evildoer is born a bad man; working holy works, a man is holy; working wicked ones, wicked. Therefore it is said, man is entirely made up of desire, and as his desire, so his insight is; as his insight, so are his karman (actions) and as his actions, so is his destiny." Thus, "the law of Karma" is the principle of the Oneness of the Many, of One Cause with the untotizable infinitude of effects. Another way of affirming the same monistic "insight" is the Sanyassin's commonplace *Tat tvam asi*—I am that.¹ When a consciousness has made itself One

¹ Compare with this Carl Jung's observation in Victor Gollancz' collection: *Men and God*:

The acceptance of oneself is the essence of the moral problem and the epitome of a whole outlook upon life. That I feed the hungry, that I forgive an insult, that I love my enemy in the name of Christ—all these are undoubtedly great virtues. What I do unto the least of my brethren, that I do unto Christ. But what if I should discover that the least amongst them all, the poorest of all the beggars, the most impudent of all the offenders, the very enemy himself—that these are within me, and that I myself stand in need of the alms of my own kindness—that I myself am the enemy who must be loved—what then? As a rule, the Christian's attitude is

with all that, it has nullified Karma; reabsorbed sequent Multitude into instant Solitude. A certain school of mystics, without parallel in the West, assert that Solitude pluralistically. They are the Samkhayan fellowship, each of whom saves himself by attaining an isolate awareness that the dynamic relations which bind the Many into a One of action (Prakriti) in no way alter the indefeasible individualities of the Many.

By withdrawing from those relations into the passivity, the all contemplating self-containment of the onlooking bystander, each of the Many saves himself from the illusions of Unity, the powers of the Devas and the sequences of Karma. He attains immobile awareness. The Jains also preach salvation from the universal Karma of gods and men. But their withdrawal is an action in which the Vedas and priests are no help; the Jain way for the soul so channels faith, doctrine and discipline as to extinguish Karma in Nirvana.

Buddhism, now among the most widely held of the Oriental faiths, is a more efficacious, if not so radical, protestation against the Brahmin orthodoxies. Since experience, Gautama taught, is a flux of wanting, getting, losing, striving and failing, and the flux is through and through a karman of suffering, mankind ever crave an end to it. The end is Nirvana, that quietude without any Other wherein all diversities are stilled into Identity and the Many have been released into Unity. Then Gautama found a way, different from the orthodox ways, to end suffering. Those deceive. The Vedas cannot save. To have insight into what can and what cannot is enlightenment. By virtue of it Gautama became Buddha. He taught the sure way of release from suf-

then reversed; there is no longer any question of love or long-suffering; we . . . condemn and rage against ourselves. We hide it from the world; we refuse to admit ever having met this least lowly in ourselves. Had it been God himself who drew near to us in this despicable form, we should have denied Him a thousand times before a single cock had crowed.

fering. To his disciples it is the Enlightened One's Eightfold Path on which a man may walk by taking refuge "in the Buddha, the Doctrine, and the Order," travelling from his initiatory act of faith to his final absorption in the nirvanic One. Such as have faithfully trod all the eightfold way become *Arhats* or free men.

Where the pavements end, desire has also ended, hate and the confusions of Maya have ended. The Arhats, says Sariputta, are "exempt from evil desire, disciplined in the doctrines of Gautama . . . Their old Karma is exhausted, no new is being produced. Their hearts are free from the longings for a life to come (when they are dead). Since the cause of their existence is destroyed, and since no new longing springs up in them, they, the wise, are extinguished like the lamp." Their striving, demanding diversities are now at One in the unstriving, undesiring ineffability of Nirvana.

This designation of the mystic One as the non-discursive immediacy which consummates a discourse and discipline aiming to exclude or consume the Many, also qualifies the Taoism of the Chinese. That is a metaphysic of immediacy. Tao, it appears from the *Tao-teh-king*—of which the reported author is Lao-tse—is, according to context, *way, method, pattern, norm, process*. *Tao* names a One whose being is becoming, and existence change. *Tao* names the Unknowable that in logic and fact is the secret ground of both logic and fact, the ineffable parent, yet neither the father nor the mother of Shangti, the Most High Lord (his Western equivalent is God). All that exists is at once processional and recessional to Tao; emerging, and submerging as it emerges, a passing event of the One ongoing process of eventuation, *Tao*. Events are the Many, wellings forth and subsidings of the self-diversifying yet undiversified Tao. They come and pass as action without effort, survival without struggle, creation without appropriation. When men can attain to effortlessness, can cease to struggle and simply live, when they can produce without isolating the product, they

have apprehended Tao in their own living, and have achieved *Teh*, virtue. *Teh* is *Tao* in mankind; the letting be, the letting live, the having by not desiring, finding by not seeking, winning by not warring, ruling by not commanding. The *Tao Teh King* signalizes this success of *laissez-faire*, by *laissez-faire*, for *laissez-faire*, as *Wu-wei*, which is the Many of knowledge-about dissolved into the unknowable One and immediately present at last to awareness.

15 One Impersonal and One Personalized

IF WE TAKE these ineffable Ones of India and China and Ceylon in the singularities of the historic nexus of the rites, the rites and the dialectic of their faithful, we recognize that they are diverse, individual, specific, and that to bring them to an indistinguishable, indivisible identity requires that discourse proceed upon a dialectic conversion which should consummate in a One of Ones. In such a conversion, certain traits and attributes would need to be discarded or cast off, be in their turn demoted from "reality" to "appearance," "truth" to Maya. Devotees of one or another of the diverse Ones—Buddhist, Taoist, Vedantist, Samkhayan, with their denominational variations, might and do dispute as to which One is to be taken for the reliable One of Ones; and the new One becomes the One of but another set of Monists, struggling for precedence and power with its rivals.

A characteristic trait of the Ones of the Eastern cults is their deficient anthropomorphy and anthropopathy. Even when the mystic experience is identified as ecstasy, and its total quality is signalized as *satchitanana* (that is, total knowledge—power—bliss), the Absolute Object of this awareness is not to be taken for its subject also, but retains a reserve of aseity that psychological terms can neither denote nor connote. The hierarchies of divinities who are its relational projections by contrast, consist in every imaginable configuration of human form, human function, human feeling and human willing. But the One is not their *ne plus ultra*, not their perfection, not their consummation. This One is their negation, and no attribute that signifies them can signify it. As it is, they are not; when it is known, they cannot be. As it is light, they are darkness, as it is fullness, they

are void. As it is sole, undivided, indivisible Being, they are non-being, division, illusion.

The mysticisms occurring in the religions of the West bear similar witness to a similar One but rarely. The One which the Western mystic grasps as immediate apprehension, however supersensory, superrational, impenetrable to all other ways knowing as it may be, is yet consubstantial with some irreducible stuff of our human essence, and if it be not our deliberation and logic, then it must be our push and passion. For the West, to say, *God is*, is not enough. The West's rarely self-denying propensity has been to say *God is Will*, *God is Love*, to conceive these psychological predicates as subjects, and impute to them unlimited heightening without qualitative alteration. Western cults of a mystic One are therefore apt to regard their Eastern parallels as not theisms, not deisms, not even pantheisms. The Ones of the Eastern faiths are appraised by Western believers as impersonal Monisms and are often deprecated if not denounced as atheistic. The Orientals' God of Gods is not divine. Although all the he's and she's of every pantheon are the One's creations, the One is not a he, nor a she, but an it. Being author and ruler of each it must be impartial, which is the same as equally partial, to all. A consequence of this standpoint is a solicitude regarding each and every living thing as living, which has shaped the way of life, in Brahmin and Buddhist communions into patterns that strangers from the West seem unable, even when willing, to consent to.

Western mysticism is predominantly Christian mysticism. There are mystics among the Judaists and the Mohammedans, but they do not signify for the conduct of life in their communions like the Christian; it is upon the Christian mystics that Bergson draws for testimony and illustration in his argument on behalf of what he calls Open Society and Open Religion against the Closed Societies and the Closed Churches of our civilization. The ratiocination of those mystics descends perhaps from Philo Judaeus, and no doubt owes a great deal to Plotinos, but

their orthodox avatars for experience, if not for logic, were the Apostles Paul and John. Plotinos, however, employing a dialectic he had studied from Plato and Aristotle and Ammonias Saccas, had carried the pilgrimage of man's strayed soul craving the right road, out of Plato's snug harbor of beauty or goodness absolute, to that Beyond which both must have in common, the One whereof all things are diversifications, and whence all things are decline and fall. To seek the One is to seek salvation. As Plotinos writes in the Sixth Ennead, bringing to the reader's mind Parmenides' definition of Being, "he who enters on this quest must leave the objects of sense, and freed from all evil, ascend to the first principle of his own nature, in order that, by becoming one, instead of many, he may behold the beginning of the One. Therefore, he must become Reason. He must trust his soul to Reason for guidance and support, that she may wakefully receive what it sees, and with this he must behold the One, not admitting any element of sense, but gazing on the Most Pure with pure Reason and with that which in Reason is first . . . This is neither Reason nor anything that is; for whatever is has the form of existence, whereas this has none, not even an ideal form. For the One, whose nature is to generate all things, cannot be any of those things itself. Therefore it is not substance, nor quality, nor reason, nor soul; neither moving nor at rest, not in place, not in time, but unique of its kind—or rather kindless, being before all kind, before motion and before rest, for these belong to being, and are that to which multiplicity is due. Why, then, if it does not move, is it not at rest? Because, while one or both of these must be attributed to being, the very act of attribution involves a distinction between subject and predicate, which is impossible in the case of the absolutely simple." Thus, Plotinos explains in the third Ennead, the seer reaches to "that which is not our Reason but something truer and superior to our Reason. He who thus sees does not properly see, does not distinguish or imagine two things. He changes, he ceases to be himself, perceives nothing of himself. Absorbed in

the One God, he makes but one with him, like the center of a circle coinciding with another."

Thus the One is the Unknowable, to be known, not as we know what we do know, but by the mystic ecstasy. Plotinos achieved this ecstasy four times in his life, and could recount the steps of his progression, as a Platonic lover, to be a gradation of the way for other men. But Plotinos never in fact assimilated the Ineffable Object to the ardent subject or the unstriving goal to the arduous going. His One remains the utterly utter Unknowable, known at last. The winner of this knowledge is Love, using understanding not only, but consuming it utterly—love that passeth understanding.

Dionysus the Areopagite suffused this Plotinian conspectus with the Christian intention and atmosphere. The seventeenth chapter of Acts calls an Athenian auditor of Paul's by this name. However, the writings which bear it were composed, according to the consensus of the cognoscenti, in the eighties or nineties of the fifth century. Their author, like Origen, sets God beyond substance, reflection, reason. These terms express separately and together, qualities less than the limitless amplitude that God must be. As such, he is beyond all terms, all categories, beyond even the Trinity, so that the Trinity is an eternal effulgence of that dark Ineffable Oneness which is God, "the abstraction of all that is," "nothing in anything that is." His effulgence, however, fans out in the familiar hierarchies of thrones, dominations and principalities; cherubim and seraphim, powers and authorities, archangels and angels, whose primary models were the bureaucratic order of imperial Rome, and whose current earthly descendants are the sacerdotal hierarchies of the teaching church. Through this gradation as a reasoned sequence, Love impels the yearning soul into "a gloom veritably mystic" where all normal knowledge becomes null and only He is present "who is beyond all and none, neither himself nor other." The soul is then "united in its better part to the wholly Unknown, and by knowing nothing, knows the knowing that

reason cannot know." The mystic has passed through *agnosia* into *theosis*: he is deified, and his deification is a working of love.

But there is a point in the noetic passage from manhood to divinity, where the *agnosia* is utter. Such believers as Tauler dilate upon "the nameless, formless Nothing" which is the "God-head beyond God"; Meister Eckhardt has occasion to declare that "Godhead is as void as if it were not," Angelus Silesius' "Gott ist ein lauter Nichts" has already been cited. These, to Westerners, crises of *agnosia*, would seem to be in Eastern mysticism the resolution of all crises, the secure stillness of Nirvana, of Tao, of other ineffable Ones, and the sequel to the experience would seem to be a cheerful serenity imaged in the smiling Buddha or as the easy mirth limned on the faces of so many Taoist sages. The sequel among Westerners seems rather the traditional "fear of the Lord," "religious awe" or the contemporary Kierkegaardian "dread" and "anguish," which only an unyielding faith compensates for, faith now on a new level "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen."

On this level the energy of believing and the ardor of loving are more clearly, distinctly than ever experienced as a single impulsion of our singularity, a unique expression of our will-to-live. Consequently, among Christians, love at first the Seeking, becomes also the Sought; Seeking and Sought cease to be Two and become the One: *Deus est Amor*. "I know," says agapastic Angelus Silesius, "that without me God cannot live a moment; if I am destroyed, God must give up the ghost." This is the leap from the mystical "pure nothing" to its ineffable Everything. This is what the flower in the crannied wall would know if it could become aware that neither Creator nor Created could be what and as they are if its own identity were extinguished, or even altered, or its singularity diminished. *Deus est Fides, Fides est Amor*.

16 God as Love, Believing as Loving, and Secularism

THESE EQUATIONS POINT the new turn which Christian mysticism gave to its pagan progenitors. Plato, Plotinus, the Brahmanas, Gautama, Lao-tse, envisioned the lover as Meaning, the beloved as Meant; love as Seeking, Beauty, Goodness, Truth, the One, as the Sought. The more representative Christian mystics apprehend these *termini ad quem* to be only paths and way stations, second-class goals, and take love for their goal of goals. Love is the sole and final end of the arduous travail that is human existence; God is Love, Love is God: *praevenit, sustinet, implet; ipse fecit ut desires, ipse est quod desideras*: so St. Bernard, who urges that man can seek God only because he has already found Him, that he is to God, found, like a drop of water in a cask of wine.

Faith and love, then, are but different words for the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. Being such, the love of love must consist either in each man's self-love become reciprocal with every other's which is Secularism, or it must be God's self-love, which cannot be reciprocal, because he is the One beside whom there is no Other. Else, though God be love, love must be blind, unable to behold any Other. But so, the Unknown God remains the Unknowable God, while the known God continues, as ever, to be King of Kings and commander-in-chief of one or another of the hierarchic pantheons whose cults it is the vocation of the world's priests to exploit and advance. Only those reasoned faiths which naturalize gods and men, practicing the pursuit of truth by the methods of science, succeed in absorbing the Unknowable into the Unknown and bringing the Unknown to knowledge-of-acquaintance and

knowledge-about. Spinoza's was such a reasoned faith, that identified the scientific understanding of Nature or God as *amor intellectus dei*; and the spirit of it has sustained the generations of men of science ever since,—the faith justified not only by its character as faith, but also by its works, vindicating the equal liberty of the different as the law of nature and of nature's God.

A pluralistic version of this mystique in which reason, however, is again derivative and not original may be read in the expressions of the American, Benjamin Paul Blood. Men, he finds, are self-deluded when they attempt as philosophers or otherwise to uncover an essence or a principle or a presence different in nature from that which science apprehends or the daily life encounters. The anaesthetic revelation of naked substance—Blood's word is Being—comes at the moment of awakening from anaesthetic sleep. The "stare of being at itself" which then occurs sees that the *What* it looks upon is commonplace and secular, yet recognizes the seeing as "the initiation of man into the immemorial mystery of the open secret of being, revealed as the inevitable vortex of continuity." Inevitable, says Blood, is the word. Being's "motive is inherent;" like Spinoza's *causa sui* "it is what has to be." No terms of feeling, no terms of value apply—"end, beginning or purpose this knows not of." It presents "the primordial Adamic surprise of life," and the awareness is "clearest of the clear, surest of the sure, weirdest of the weirdest." The anaesthetic revelation renders "the historical secret which philosophy has coveted, empirically accessible." And it makes him who has received it "clear and confident in that religion of courage and content which cherishes neither regrets nor anticipations."

Another instance of the mystique of this religious realizing the certainties of faith in the act of faith itself, and not in its object or goal, is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's remembrance of those of his comrades in the Civil War who, having come to doubt its ends and means, nevertheless stood firm in honoring their covenanted duties and freely gave their lives in the cause

they no longer believed in. "I do not know," the Justice said in that deeply humble, deeply moving speech of Memorial Day, 1895, "I do not know what is true. I do not know the meaning of the universe. But, in the midst of doubt, in the collapse of creeds, there is one thing I do not doubt, that no man who lives in the same world with most of us can doubt, and that is that the faith is true and adorable which leads a soldier to throw away his life in obedience to a blindly accepted duty, in a cause which he little understands, in a plan of campaign of which he has no notion, under tactics of which he does not see the use."¹

¹ For contrast compare Goethe's "Elegy" in his *Trilogie der Leidenschaft*:

In unser's Busen Reine wogt ein streben
 Sich einem Hoheren, Reinern, Unbekannten
 Aus Dankbarkeit freiwillig hinzugeben,
 Entrazelnd sich den ewig Ungennantent;
 Wir heissen's, fromm sein:—Solcher seligen Hohe
 Fuhl ich mich teilhaft, wenn ich vor ihr stehe.

THERE EXISTS A line of men of ardent faith who see and appreciate the import of Holmes's and Spinoza's and Blood's assimilation of the unknown to the known and thus their absorption of the hidden God in unconcealed Nature or liquidation of nature's invisibilities in God rendered manifest. This line of believers appreciate the powers and function of reason but despair over its inadequacies in the struggle to establish in life and not in death the Kingdom of God as the equal right of the unlike and unequal to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Their lineage is ancient. It counts Abelard and Francis of Assisi as well as Marsiglio of Padua and John Fox and Roger Williams and Thomas Paine. The more vocal of its present witnesses appear agitated with the agonies exploited by Kierkegaard and Karl Barth and Konstantin Brunner. But the onlooker may note them among princes and prelates of Established Churches as well as among sheer evangelicals, among the most observant Judaists as well as among the least. However, the most dramatic and dialectical prophets of this faith through agony are the agonists of the current neo-Orthodox theology. For whatever reason, these are powerless to acquiesce in the naturalization of man and God, helpless to envision the One as a knowable interaction of the Many, a configuration or entelechy effected, sustained and kept potent by the singular energies intrinsic to the unending diversifications of diversifying individualities. Nor are they able to acknowledge the experience that Western mysticism most celebrates—the believing lover's face-to-face encounter with that Hidden One, that God who is both Unknown and Love itself. Their hearts appear to require that their One remain forever *Deus Absconditus*, that his love of man

returned by man be never natural reciprocity, always supernatural grace.

These agonized believers form diverse communions, drawing upon diverse contexts, existentialist and other. But whatever their denomination, they will not yield their imageless image of an Unknown and Unknowable Power, that is nevertheless substantial with the love we do know or at least can define; they insist that this Love Divine is so utterly Other that faith can postulate but never perceive it, that nothing in the world—not reason, not science, not philosophy can ever come near it. It stays the “unknown” God that the Gospels mean but do not reveal, the transcendent One of which any and all the sciences are centrifugal negations, yet the Love that our hearts crave and the miracles and mysteries of grace confirm. Love is love and logic is logic, and never the twain shall meet—neither by reducing reason to the role of rationalizer of faith, nor by subjecting faith to the tests of reason. Nevertheless, there they both are, in the human enterprise. There is man, in his singularity making his personal and his racial history by choices that either succeed or fail in conforming human practice to divine precept. Man’s strivings and God’s will are both forces of his history—history would be only science not history, lacking either—and reason, as the principle of scientific enlightenment, cannot harmonize them. Reason can only point to God’s “suffering mercy,” the divine *caritas* utterly without any rational ground supplying from its abundance reason’s own deficiency. Reason can make sense of the human record only as it points beyond itself and grounds enlightenment in mystery, logic in faith, and necessary causation in miraculous love. People having the conviction that thus envisions man and destiny are safe in the everlasting arms of *Deus Absconditus*, of Him who is the Absolute One, negating all the relativisms of the Many whereby inequities are inequities, survival is aggression and existence is sin and suffering. The One God is the transcendent Eternal *Meant* that faith means, not the given temporal, changing *Meanings*, that creeds embody.

Yet this Unknown and Unknowable One is also the Acme Beyond any acme of Love we ever can know, Love whose providence makes history a rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's who anyhow keeps his own. Herein lives the Fatherhood of God which, by commanding the Many to righteousness and equal liberty, shapes history toward the perfect brotherhood of man.

18

The Traditionalists' Fear and Appropriation of Secularism

SOME APOSTLES OF these faiths can, and do, commit themselves to the patient and heavy labor which alone may build out this brotherhood of man from a vision of faith into a fact of life. They can, and do, struggle to bring to event that equality of the unlike and parity of the unequal which Secularism best implements, advances and defends. But "Secularism" is to them a terrifying term. They repel and shut it out, at the same time that they take in and embrace all that it means, installing the meanings in the contexts of their own creeds. By so doing, they are able to preserve the patristic "two truths" and other comforting duplexities they hold over from the tradition of the churches; they can form federal unions with members of diverse, even oppugnant, communions in the democratic teamwork of so maintaining and advancing the equal rights of the different in their jointures and severalties, that each might believe and live more freely, more safely, than he could if he carried on by himself alone. Hearken to Dr. Geoffrey Fisher, Archbishop of Canterbury, speaking about a World Council of Churches at the 57th Convention of Episcopalians in Boston: "In many lands," he said, "I have had the pleasure of addressing a great meeting such as this of members of all churches. Fifty years ago such a thing would have been quite impossible. Churches then knew little of each other and cared less. They came in contact chiefly for the purpose of controversy and in fifty years that has been completely changed. Christians of all denominations, except by their own choice Roman Catholics, can meet as we meet together in the fellowship of our common Lord Jesus Christ. The World Council has no creed of its own. A church has its creed,

its liturgy, its sacrament, its ministry and so on. The World Council is not a church and has none of the marks of the church. . . . It is a fellowship of churches meeting together. . . . Each church brings its own questions . . . and these are the material with which we work, seeking through them to find agreement. . . . Any one . . . has a place—minority churches as well as majority, so long as they are loyal to one another. The minority is often wrong as is also the majority. They must scrutinize themselves. Free discussion is the very life blood of the fullness of the church. Free discussion means the right to be in a minority. . . . It is essential that every honest Christian's views should be freely expressed, so that they may have mutual understanding, and the differences when they arise may not be differences of prejudice or partial information, but real differences humbly held by common disciples of the truth revealed by Christ. . . . Your church does not surrender any of its tradition or principles or compromise its position, but all, together bring one common loyalty . . . as the ground of cooperation. . . . The World Council provides a meeting place and that ground of mutual interest and understanding without which all talk of reunion is a waste of time."

In a sermon during the same 57th Convention, the head of the Established Church of England said, "If God be rejected, civilized conceptions of liberty, of freedom of conscience, of personal worth, and of truth as objective and absolute, claiming man's search and man's obedience, disappear, too. . . . Democracy can reduce all individuals to an equality of insignificance as effectively as Totalitarianism. Freedom can be shifted by the pressure of power groups and parties: spontaneity can be crushed by the dead weight of mass organization which the complexity of our crowded society makes almost inevitable. Education in its many forms can become standardized to produce standardized minds and souls. The exaggeration of corporate institutional authority, social, civil or ideological, can expel lib-

erty. The essentially Christian virtues of moderation and toleration are assailed by extremisms and fanaticism all over the world: by doctrines of 'apartheid,' by demands that 'what we want is therefore our right and we must have it and have it all all without regard to the interests of others.' Truth, the first casualty in time of war, is still perverted for the sake of propaganda; and even more seriously, while truth is hard to find and must be sought for patiently, fewer and fewer people make the effort to find it." This deeply religious head of his church concluded by urging that the evils he recited could be corrected, the diverse singularities of mankind be brought to equal liberty and equal worth, the pursuit of truth freed and spread, only in so far as men stand in "silence before the majesty of God and the mystery of His Love," having faith that His providence gives unity to history, and that His Love gives mankind its significance and history its goal.

Here is a great churchman's unknowing vindication of the religious meaning and function of Secularism. For as compared with its member churches the World Council is secular and designed to assure peace and equal liberty to each and all. Join to the churches all the globe's other diverse organizations of interest—religious, economic, scientific, esthetic, educational, military and so on to no end—join to these the organization of these organizations, and you come to their confederation as sovereign states like the United Kingdom, or the member states of our United States, then to federations of confederations, like the British Commonwealth of Nations and our United States of America, up to the global United Nations Organization. On each level, the function of the more comprehensive organization is to replace the war of all against all with the peace intrinsic to the assurance of equal rights and freedoms by all to each.

On the record, the faiths of which this preachment of the Archbishop of Canterbury is an example, serve their commu-

nicants as catalysts of the psyche. Like a lover's image of his beloved, so normally the evidence and substance of his loving rather than a likeness of his lady, these faiths release powers and animate performances that without them might have been locked up till the day the believers died.

19 Secularism Is God's Love, Reordering Evils into Goods

WE MAY NOW look a little at the constitutive paradox common to the Judeo-Christian creeds, which is conveyed in such phrases as Canterbury's "the mystery of His love."

The context here is a sentiment which pervades all cultures, and is communicated by all "Books of Common Prayer" and all ordinations of ritual. The expressions "God-fearing man," "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom," the idea that fear made the gods, that the Lord is a jealous Lord, all project this sentiment. It is manifest in the forms of worship, praise and prayer everywhere in the world, with their abjectness, their flatteries, their cajoleries, their placations, their briberies, their promises and vows to pay *quid pro quo*, and their coercive rites, all intended to procure the satisfaction of needs and the aversion of dangers alike for the living and for the dead. The paramount concern seems everywhere to be escape from evil, evasion of punishment. Attaining the good, meriting reward, seems secondary. That fears of hell overrule hopes of paradise is indicated not only by the rites and rites of the cults, but by the arguments of the theologians, the poets and the philosophers as well, from Plato and Aristophanes and Euripides to the latest voice of Papist or Fundamentalist doctrine. Alive and dead, man is beset with evil, and confronts disaster. His existence is a never-to-be reconciled war with this evil, in its unending diversifications of corruption unto damnation. Indeed, insofar as each man is heir to Adam, he is evil in himself, in himself a vessel of Original Sin, of the same substance as Satan, the power of pride, disobedience, alienation, rebellion, diversification personified, detaching itself from the Oneness of the One, All-knowing, All-doing God, al-

ways and everywhere the same. Thus mankind are the very essence of evil, evil as spiritual substance, the everlasting enemy of good, yet the image of God. This is a predicament constituted by the relationships between Absolute Self and Other, One and Many, now transposed into terms of Good and Evil, God and Devil. It has caused a succession of dialectical relief-expeditions, each argumentation recognizing that its alternatives have failed, and adding in its turn to the cumulus of mystifications. Only when good and evil are no longer imagined as absolute substances, powers or persons, when they are recognized as changing relations between existences struggling to survive among other existences, is the predicament liquidated. Then neither the total One, nor its component Many, is in and by itself Good or Evil. Then good and evil are recognized as appraisals which each existence makes of the others in terms of their consequences to its own survival and growth. This is how Spinoza sees them in the configurations of his *Deus sive Natura*.

Now the believers who continue deists or theists continue also to use "God" as meaning the aggregate of all the forces which prosper their own survival and growth; but allow "Devil" to fade away from their faith and creeds. So the modernized portion of mankind do not believe in The Devil. But for the unmodernized, what is called "the problem of evil" persists unsolved. It is a problem created by the belief in a good God who knows everything, creates everything, sustains everything and loves everything. It follows, then, that nothing can exist save by the will of this omnipotent, omniscient, loving creator; that the good God must have created all the evils also; that his love must embrace them as well as the goods; that evil is itself a necessary part of the total goodness which is God. Believers must then accept with gratitude whatever evil lot God's good grace in its infinite and loving wisdom allots them: not reasoning why, but declaring *Thy will, not mine, be done*. They must concede the goodness under Providence of that which to them is evil; they must acknowledge its right to be equally free and

safe with that which to them is good. But to do this is the same as to naturalize good and evil, to abandon the belief that they are inalterable substances, to recognize that they are changing relations, to acknowledge that as such they sometimes have been, and always can be, so shifted as to render the freedom and safety of each believer the equal interest of all. Of course such a working over of faith acknowledges the divinity of other gods than one's own; it abandons "atheism," "godless" as terms of hate and aggression. It looks to the conduct not the creeds of believers. And it confederates the particularistic denominations of sacerdotalism with all others into the general religion of secularism. It establishes Secularism as doing God's will on the Earth of the Many as it be done in the Heaven of the One. Secularism is Love, washed clean of mystery and envisioned as a doctrine and discipline of changing human relations.

For the *mystery* of God's love is but the confusion of feeling and the frustration of reason which harden into the belief that love, hate, good, and evil are inalterable substances forever at war with another. Of course no peace can be won by believers in this warfare. Their faith bans any natural, earthly, *live and let live, live and help live*. If these relationships hold on earth at all, it must be because they have been miraculously transposed from heaven. Yet they hold on earth, as air and food and drink hold, and day in, day out are similarly craved and sought and grow and spread, in small configurations or large. As such they are installations by reason, not mystical interventions by grace. In the conspectus of the reliable knowledge we call science, both the war of all against all which the relational patterns of *live and let live, live and help live* subvert toward peace, and all the religious creeds which signalize the original condition and the craving to better it, rest on common experience. This is, that men are born into a world not made for them, that life is a struggle to live, and that the struggling is somehow alike a self-creation of the persons men and women make themselves into, and a re-creation of the world they create themselves in. Experience

leads to such pairings as man and nature, nature and nurture, heredity and environment, thoughts and things; and to the belief that cultures are these pairs interacting in a sort of cybernetic reciprocity and homeostatic balance continuing and diversifying from person to person and generation to generation.

20

On Some Meanings of Love

“LOVE” IS OUR preferred name for the force and figure of this process of supporting and reproducing life, from the reflex animal struggle for survival, to the theologian’s reflection upon this struggle transposing it to an otherworldly salvation by a God who is love. Spinoza’s insight into the dynamics of that diversification has become the representative monistic secularist one. He explained love and self-preservation in terms of one another, and brought self-preservation to its high point as *amor intellectus dei*. By elaborating animal drive into rational will, by harmonizing faiths competing in blind isolation into a reciprocally enlightening intellection, he dissolved the slavery of the passions into the liberty of intellectual love. So, he could dispense with the irreconcilable duplexity of the two which derives from Plato, and is the stuff of the mystery cultivated by the theologians (with their two loves corresponding to their two truths) and the poets (with their earthly love and their heavenly love each the nullification of the other). Seeing that reason is insight of the causal nexus whereto whatever exists so belongs that it makes one part of an infinitude of parts in an ongoing whole whose wholeness is this nexus, Spinoza recognized that faiths without this insight are blind passions always at war. He believed that if they came to this insight they would come from war to peace, from intolerance and persecution to reciprocal support; in becoming thus rational, they would become enlightened and free, and thus at once lovers and loved. Brought to the uttermost of inclusiveness, the event is the causal nexus itself, one infinite ongoing action at once mind, matter, and everything else conceivable and inconceivable—*Deus sive Natura, Natura Naturans*.

Writers such as Condorcet, Jefferson, Comte, Darwin, Kropotkin, have devised their own arrangements of the relationships involved in Nature's *live and let live, live and help live*. Some set them in "the laws of Nature and of Nature's God." Others, bearing in mind Occam's razor, started from the actualities of loving and not-loving which compose the daily round of men and women and children anywhere. Since Freud, a tendency may be mounting to rationalize the Christian image of man's psychosomatic being by means of a mechanistic scheme of Id, Ego, Superego, and to think the human person as an unstable balance of these conflicting energies, each itself a resultant of the reciprocal impact of the basic trends of our institutional life, one making for love, the other making for death. We are a tension of both: Eros, libido, the energy of organic expansion, multiplication, growth; Death, the energy of contraction, inertia, dissipation. In the main love holds the death instinct in check, directing it outward as aggression against some Other. As activity this fusion may become Sadism—the sadism of Torquemada and Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor. As passivity it may become masochism—the masochism of the martyrs whose blood is the seed of the church. For we first encounter this Other—ultimately God—in the father, childhood's all-giving, all-withholding power which renders the father's desires, an authority we must obey if our own powerless hopes are to be realized and our fears quieted. What he likes is thus good because he likes it. What he dislikes is bad because he dislikes it. Father's likes and dislikes work as commandments. For us to like something different is transgression. The conflict between father's commandments and our preferences is as a feeling of guilt. Our diversity is a futile aggression against preponderant power. Turned back upon the self, it becomes conviction of sin. This is why the holiest of saints feels himself to be the guiltiest of sinners, why his holiness is measurable by the weight of the penance he imposes on himself. Freud argues that all civilization lives upon this dynamic of love and fear, with fear

damming up and reversing our will to transgress, or turning it back upon the Self so as to convert it into conviction of sin, feelings of guilt, cravings to undergo penance, and thereby to come clean in such wise that the all-powerful lover may not withhold his love and the self not fall back into the inorganic quietude wherewith life becomes death. The Lover may be equated not only to an actual father, but to a man's country, his total environment, his God as environment of the environment. With all, he struggles for survival, on the giving and withholding of all he depends.

Hardly anybody outside the Freudian enclaves is likely to accept without many reservations this way of understanding love as the dynamics of letting live, helping live. The psychological constructs are too many and their interplay too inferential. They are fictions devised to explain myths. Even in patriarchal cultures, where *patria potestas* operates intensively, the initiating situations are the simple animal ones and the human development is far less manifolded. The primal love any mammal ever experiences is mother-love, not father-love. In most species the male figures as the Other, the outsider, against whom the female defends her young. Her love of them is the mood and attitude concentrating diverse activities of tendance—feeding, warming, sheltering, protecting against dangers from weather and predation, readying the self-help and self defense that detach the child utterly from the mother to go its own way at its own risk. This love does not discriminate between its young: the teats are offered equally to all—clever and stupid, weak and strong, little and big, good and bad, bright-hued or dim. Indeed, there may occur some greater strengthening of the weak, to correct the imbalance produced by the strength of the strong. The entire function of this mother-love seems to be casting out fear, making its cherished objects independent of the cherishing, bringing them to strength and equal liberty. At bottom it is the same for *genus humanum*.

And it might be that an organic monition of this mothering love animates the directives of the nineteenth chapter of Leviticus, and the fifth chapter of Matthew, and the Sermon on the Mount. It might be the endeavor to enact it that sustains the communion of the New Testament churches:¹ "Now there was but one heart and soul among the multitudes of believers; not one of them considered anything his personal property, they shared all they had with one another. There was not a needy person among them, for those who owned land or houses would sell them and bring the proceeds of the sale, laying the money before the feet of the apostles; it was then distributed according to each individual's need." What remembrance of what other love than mother-love is the Apostle Paul invoking as he writes to bring peace among his quarrelsome Corinthians? Of this love he tells them, it "is very patient, very kind . . . knows no jealousy . . . makes no parade, gives itself no airs, is never rude, never selfish, never irritated, never resentful . . . never glad when others go wrong . . . gladdened by goodness, always slow to expose, always eager to believe the best, always hopeful, always patient. Love never disappears." Of the three, faith, hope and love, "the greatest of all is love."

So Paul the Apostle, the despiser and belittler of women.

Certain mystics of the Christian enclaves renew, each choosing according to his own singularity, from the extended variations of mother-love, an attitude and action of loving. Dante's guide in *Paradiso*, St. Bernard, focussed on one significant trait as he discourses on *Canticles*, envisioning love as a harmony or correspondence of two wills, not alike, not equal, but not the less united in love. "For love knows not reverence, love takes its name from loving, not from honoring. Let that one who is frightened, or astonished, or awed or admiring be satisfied with honoring. The lover suffers none of these feelings. Love is filled

¹ Acts 4, 32-35.

with itself, and wins over and changes all other moods in any soul it has come to." The more orthodox theologians continued to call this *caritas* charity, and designated it as a condescending, rather than a cherishing love, transmitting the love, wherewith the Grace of God saves us to eternal life, even for the enemy, to say nothing of souls in purgatory, though not in hell, or of the choirs of the blessed in heaven. It is this theologian's love that Brunner said is possible only to God, impossible to man.

Mankind, however, has erected upon that primal biopsychic foundation a diversity of associative structures whose bonds are the forms of kinship which cultural anthropologists study. These link the generations in one grouping and not another; they enchannel the mating drive in the direction of one clan or family or tribe and divert it from others; they set up relational prescriptions and taboos. (An instance is the British agitation about the deceased wife's sister.) These are carried over as the creedal provisions of the churches to meet the psychosomatic crises of birth, puberty, mating, marriage, divorce, remarriage, birth-control and the like. Puberty, of females especially, is often signalized by marriage-like ceremonies among certain Christians: the nubile initiates are clothed in wedding garments to become in spirit so many more of the millions of brides of Christ. Many groups take notice of the puberty of males by stressing rituals of circumcision or subincision far beyond the other sufferings wherewith the "rites du passage" initiate boys into manhood and join them to the hunters and warriors—manhood being attested by the appearance of the pubic pilations, propensities and powers of love.

The experience of this love in no way resembles the experience of mother-love, nor has patriarchal marriage any intrinsic bearing on it, since that is more a ceremony of taking possession of a property than a wooing and winning of another person, such as the poets, from Homer to Keats and Shelley, blow up into romantic love. Although modernity does tend to transpose marriage into a partnership of equals, the West's religions tra-

ditionally keep it a sacramental covenant whereto the female party publicly vows to "love, honor and obey" the male party. The Orient has its own modes of the same terms of relationship. Family-economies which implement it establish the male as lord and master, whom the female and her children, if any, must honor and obey, love or no love. Indeed, in relation to husband and father, love stands as the synonym of honor-and-obey, even as they stand synonymous with the orthodox love of God. Woman's position in the New Testament, her status with respect to priestly hierarchies—Romanist, Greek, Lutheran, Episcopalian and other—the denial to her of the priestly vocation, are extensions of her status in the patriarchal family. Official and orthodox theologies of love, again, project into the empyrean the patriarchal identification of loving with obeying-and-honoring.

Whether or not its *terminus ad quem* be marriage, the way of a man with a maid is the enduring prototype of the love which the poets celebrate, the theologians sanctify and the philosophers transvalue. The sacred may be the perfection of the profane, as Plato and the poets discourse of it, or the antithesis of the profane as the theologians argue it. But in both categories this loving looks to the needs and desires of the Self, not the freedom and safety of the Other. It adores the Other as a means of gratification and release, not as an end-in-herself. It belongs with feeding, hunting and fighting, in the spirit as in the flesh. The successful lover woos and wins. His wooing combines traits of the chase and of the duel, his winning traits of the disarming and subjection, as of a foe, or the reduction of a quarry to a food. (Significantly, poets sometimes image God the Son as the Hound of Heaven and all believers regularly consume the Host as the bread of the soul.) Wooing is a pursuit which flatters, ingratiates, importunates, strikes out; it pays court with gallantries and gifts and promises; it fights off rivals and would annul their competition. So far as the wooer can, he walls in the lady he has marked for his own from the searching, the seeking, the solicitations of rival suitors. There are cultures where winning

requires combat and capture; cultures where purchase assures victory. Modernizations of these modes of wooing and winning are many, not always shame-faced, nor with the male always the hunter, the battler or the buyer. But consummation of victory, however won, is always "possession," when, having caught and conquered his quarry, the lover, like the victorious drone in the nuptial flight of the bees, surmounts and fastens upon her to quench his orgasmic ardor in her flesh. Somatically, orgasmic possession is brief as courtship is long, its ecstasy is rare, the urge to it is a tide that biologists and physicians, social scientists, and nowadays openly, priests, explore; it is followed by alienation, even rejection. When the excretory function of the congress of the sexes has been served, all passion spent, the relaxed quietude of a somatic balance may set in or the exaltation of love may be inverted into the depression of exhausted lust. In either case a withdrawal from the Other to the Self follows; and sometimes withdrawal becomes passive alienation, sometimes active rejection.

From these last flow the hatreds of sex as sin and the misprision of woman; from the exaltation the identification of God as Love. For in the psyche the memory of possession and its ecstasy may work diversely. It may shape character toward nymphomania and its inversion; it may translate it into the seeker of beauty absolute whom Plato imagines; it may channel it in those practices of the mystic that lead to such absorption in a divine image as Dante delineates in the final Canto of the *Divina Commedia*; it may impel toward an imageless presence which is nevertheless Love itself that the mystics celebrate. Common to all these directives seems to be a tension of restlessness and dissatisfaction which projects itself in the compensatory ideal of possession without alienation, without rejection; everlasting possession in everlasting ecstasy. Although it is interpreted as the liquidation of the Lover through absorption in his Beloved or the nullification of the Self through identification with God, the clear and distinct idea of its character, its causes

and its consequences, presents the solipsist, the *ne plus ultra* of selfishness, the ultimate Egotism abolishing all Otherness.

The biopsychic prototype of a Love which acts to conserve, to multiply, to vary, to strengthen and enhance Otherness instead of nullifying Otherness is to be observed in the mother-child relation. Motherhood is known with a certainty that fatherhood can never attain. Motherhood is always an event in experience; fatherhood is always an act of faith supporting itself on inference from other experiences. Patriarchal societies consequently maintain many devices to vindicate "father-right." It is such societies and their churches that condemn as bastard a child with a doubtful or unknown father; that judge its mother as a "bad woman" and cast her out. Yet the greater tradition in which such societies are deviants cherishes goddesses whose offspring are without paternity, who are themselves virgins and mothers, whose conception and parturition are parthenogenetic. Their powers are powers of provision and tendance, they see to it that the earth and all that dwell thereon shall bring forth, increase and multiply; that those who believe in them shall have life more abundant. They are nourishers and comforters, counsellors, intercessors and protectors from the righteous wrath and inexorable justice of God the Father. Their concretion in the Roman Catholic pantheon is the Virgin Mary since 451 by decree of the Council of Chalcedon, "Mother of God" and both, as Dante calls her, the mother and daughter of her son. Since the Jesuit Counter-Reformation the Roman version of the Christian cultus of God the Son, incarnate in the wafer, daily plays a fixed role in the "bloodless sacrifice" of the Mass, while the functional relevancy of God the Father appears to be decreasing and that of the Virgin Mother increasing. "Co-Redeemer of the Human Race" and "Mediatrice of all the Graces," her apparitions are multiplied, her last miraculous one being to some Portuguese peasant children, and according to some of his spokesmen, to the current Pope. The ikon of this apparition, as "Our Lady of Fatima," is being shown and worshipped wher-

ever priests of the cult can manage it. Since Pope Pius IX it has been a dogma binding upon all the faithful that not only her divine Son but the Virgin herself was immaculately conceived. Pius XII recently added the dogma of the Assumption of the Virgin: "We pronounce, declare and define to be a dogma revealed by God, that the Immaculate Mother of God, Mary, ever virgin, when the course of her life on earth was finished was taken up body and soul into heaven."

21 Virgin Mother and Celibate Fathers

A SIMILAR TENSION in the appraisal of the maternal and paternal dispositions is manifest in the attributed genders of the actual church and its sacerdotal hierarchies. For as an establishment whose role and record historians explore and social scientists analyze, the Roman Catholic church is a sacerdotal empire. The centre is the sovereign and independent state known as Vatican City. Its government is a hierarchical autocracy which some may qualify as fascist, other as communist, most as theocratic. Its rule extends to colonies of priestly and monastic clergy, called "the teaching church," settled everywhere on the globe, and to spheres of command and influence made up of the Catholic laymen, called the "believing church" on whom "the teaching church" impose, maintain and exercise authority. The Vatican has treaties with many other states—notably Spain, Portugal, the Latin Americas, France—that give it a tax-free monopoly or superior privileges in religion and education. Its agents, the clergy, vowed to celibacy, are all called "Father," and their absolute and infallible ruler, the Pope, is called the "Father of Fathers," "the Holy Father." The organization whose functionaries these "fathers" are, and whose wealth and power their functions nourish, is called "Holy Mother Church." The priestly stake in the retention and recruitment of believers is the exercise of the Holy Mother's "maternal love," and is more largely preoccupied with their sexuality than any other cult's "cure of souls." No dogma regarding the virginity of Holy Mother Church has yet been pronounced. But it is of record that the celibate Fathers who are her godly sons love her with a jealous love which demands the liquidation of all her rivals to the end that she may have sole possession of believing mankind.

22

Mother-Love as Secularist Faith in Open Society

NOW WHAT THIS analysis indicates is that faith in God as Love, is faith in a love whose original is certain mother-love, not uncertain father-love, nor love of a man for a maid, nor of a husband for his spouse. Mother-love cherishes by liberating, helps by enabling self-help, rules by leading to self-rule. Mother-love does not discriminate between its different children in laboring to make provision that all shall have equal liberty and equal safety: all—the females of the species as well as its males; its tillers, its wood-hewers, its water-drawers, its machine-workers, its salesmen, its traders in goods or money, its penmen, swordsmen, artists, scientists; its priests, its politicians, its orthodox, heretics and dissidents; its inventors, explorers and custom-lovers. This love labors to maintain for the spokesmen of all diversities of creed and conduct the right to seek freely, without fear or favor, the assent of others, in the open forum of ideas and of interests, on their own merits, at their own risk. This love labors to assure and cultivate that free enterprise in things of the spirit without which there can be no free enterprise in anything; to make and keep the different equal by their reciprocal insurance of their equality, and thus to give each a stake in living as a good neighbor to any, anywhere on the globe.

For it is on these terms of good neighborliness that the practices of *live and let live*, *live and help live*, can develop efficacy. If the slogan “fatherhood of God and brotherhood of man” means anything in anybody’s daily life, this is what it means: the persistent labor to replace the isolationism and the warfare that close one group in and shut others out, by the Open Society that offers equal hospitality to every person, every thing, every thought, every art, every science, every industry, every

company and communion—even such whose doctrine and discipline design a closed society and who may endeavor to subvert the Open Society which had welcomed them, into a society closed to all that may differ from their own design: Yes, even such receive the hospitality of the Open Society so long as the openness can safeguard itself against their subversion. For it is precisely this openness which signifies God's love of man in man's conduct toward man; which lives on as the organization of liberty, as democracy become a way of life—an ongoing orchestration of interests that includes all, shuts out none, is identified with none, and because identified with none, can safeguard the equal liberty of each against encroachment by any.

In our United States certain vital safeguards are centered in the Amendments to the Constitution, especially the First and the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. They mark the historic constancy of the faith in equal liberty which excludes any and every identification of the national whole with a particular part of it, any and every support of whatever special interest, be it a church or any other corporation, or any individual. The Supreme Court has frequently reconfirmed this law of the common life. The founders of the Republic affirmed and enforced it, whenever something arose challenging it. Notable was the challenge of the aggression of the Barbary pirates, resistance to which came to victory in a treaty with the Tripolitan regencies. The first three of the Republic's presidents—Washington, John Adams and Jefferson—were spokesmen for its terms and their enforcement. Among the terms was the avowal of Article XI: "As the government of the United States is not in any sense founded on the Christian religion; as it has in itself no character of enmity against the laws, religion or tranquility of Musselmen; and as the said States never have entered into any way or act of hostility against any Mahomitan nation, it is declared by the parties that no pretext arising from religious opinion shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries."

Against this commitment by treaty to a people different in many ways from the American people, must be set of course, such asseverations as, in August of 1947, President Truman, anxious about the peace of the world, made in a communication to the current Pope: "Your Holiness, this is a Christian nation"; "an enduring peace can be built only upon Christian principles"—wilfully ignoring that in the United Nations were representatives of more than half mankind also desirous of enduring peace, but referring it to other than "Christian principles"; unconsciously repressing the ominous fact that the necessary Other party to any such peace would be the "godless Communists" in whose own religion "Christian principles" are of the Devil, are the principles generating all the evil that could be wrought by "man's inhumanity to man."

The cited terms of the treaty with Tripoli follow, as anxiety-ridden Mr. Truman's expressions do not, from those self-evident truths which the holders of diverse creeds who signed the Declaration of Independence united to lay before mankind as their common faith—the faith for the support of which they had pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor. However worded, its import in works is, that free enterprise, in the realm of the mind or the realm of matter, can never be anything else than the equal right of any human venture or investment to make good its claims and win its way on its own merits; unpenalized by handicaps, unadvantaged by special privilege. If and as the religious societies of the land, each with its characteristic creed and associative rule, confederate with one another, and with all the nation's multitudinous other organizations of interest, for the purpose of insuring and enlarging this freedom of freedoms, they in their turn establish it as their common faith, different from each, defender of all. Its substance then becomes the actual security of every inhabitant of the land in exercising at his own risk his personal freedom of enterprise in belief, thought and work. Its evidence then becomes the confederation of the diverse and diversifying multitudes of people's

interests into an organization at once inclusive and open, into a polity whose ways and works render self-evident that brotherhood of men all different, and all equal as different, which follows indefeasibly from the fatherhood of God who is love and whose love is the mother-love which plays no favorites, but cherishes, liberates, and by means of this open union of the diverse brings to self-rule the minds and hearts of all the members of the union. This is the kind of divine fatherhood and human brotherhood manifesting "the laws of nature and of nature's God," which Jefferson's religion envisioned. He wrote to Hopkinson in 1789: "I am not a federalist because I never submitted the whole system of my opinions to the creed of any party of men whatever, in religion, in philosophy, in politics, or in anything else, where I was capable of thinking for myself. Such an addiction is the last degradation of a free and moral agent. If I could not go to heaven but with a party, I would no go there at all."¹ This is but a new confirmation of the common faith for which he wrote the words of July 4, 1776.

¹ Compare the physician and poet Oliver Wendell Holmes in *The Professor at the Breakfast Table*: "To think of trying to waterproof the American mind against the questions that Heaven rains down upon it shows a misapprehension of our new condition. If to question everything be unlawful and dangerous we had better undeclare our independence at once; for what the Declaration means is the right to question everything, even the truth of its own fundamental propositions." As Abelard demonstrated, arguing against the Anselmian theology in *Sic et Non*: "If belief and judgment are to require deliberate choice, if assent is not to be blind necessity, we possess the right of dissent as well as assent. What right is exercised in saying *Yes* to a proposition when there is no right to say *No* to it?" Abelard recognized what has been basic to the continuity of civilization from its beginnings: (1) the importance of the alternative and (2) of deliberation to accepting or rejecting it. The American Idea adds, as Jefferson advised young Peter Carr: "Your own reason is the only oracle given you by heaven, and you are answerable not for the rightness as the upright-

Our own generation's name for this common faith is Secularism.

ness of the decision." Of course, *Sic et Non* is a forbidden book and the Jesuits perhaps don't read it. This may be why some Jesuit writers argue that the First Amendment is theological by implication, obliging Americans to believe that all churches are simply voluntary societies between which God chooses no favorites. This, it is contended, "canonizes liberal Protestant ecclesiology in an extreme form and anathematizes as unAmerican all dissenters." Nothing is said about such dissenters as Fascists and Communists, whose totalitarian authoritarianism repeats that of the Romanists; nor whether among the anathematized are such dissenters as deists, agnostics, Christian Scientists, Mormons, Judaists, Mohammedans, Buddhists, Taoists, Confucians, Brahmanists, Catholic Modernists and other Protestants, all of whom Romanism anathematizes. The point is made with the purpose of rationalizing the claim of the hierarchical "teaching church" in the United States to the same privileged position it holds in autocracies and dictatorships. Not to concede it is to reduce Roman Catholics to "second class citizens" and thus to insure "freedom from religion." The candid student will recognize in this disingenuous special plea another version of the traditional papist dialectic: *You must either assure to me the special privileges which God has given me and which you deny me, or you must deny your principles.* As if the maintenance of equal liberty called also for submission to every aggression against it, because the aggression is launched unhindered and justified by referring it to divine authority.

23

The Secularist Spirit in the Struggle for Open Society in America

SECULARISM IS THE catholicity of religions developing the *unum in pluribus*. Where it prevails as the atmosphere and is established as the frame of reference of particularist communions, they flourish. For where they are safeguarded by the secularist spirit, the mobility of freedom obtains. Believers may without fear or penalty choose to turn from one arrangement of faith and works to another or to none, as their hopes impel and their consciences decide. One faith may derive from another as a descendant from an ancestor or a mutant from an original, but in the religion of democracy, each stands, in its integral singularity, an alternative to the others and none a heresy from any. The rise of new cults with variant doctrines and disciplines, the resurgence of old, their accessions and losses of believers tend first and last to be functions of the cycles of fear and hope, prosperity and depression, war and peace, compounding an ongoing political and cultural economy. Upon those rhythms intrinsic to the aggregate social process, priests and politicians and others concurrently project apparatus designed to avert losses, facilitate and multiply accessions, and otherwise multiply the personal bases of support and the prestige and prosperity of the supported: they compete with one another in doing better the job of reassuring the fearful, promising the hopeful, and establishing certainty in the uncertain regarding overthrow of the misfortune of the life that is and winning the wagers on the life to come. With Secularism each endeavors to persuade, not compel, everybody else to bet their lives on his faith and not another's.

Currently there appears something like a consensus among critics, prophets and apostles, who agree upon little else, that

today's free societies are in the grip of an anxiety which grows a rich psychological market for these diverse salvations. Some writers speak of the age's "new failure of nerve"—I have often done so myself—others of "the age of anxiety."

The occasions to which numbers traditionally refer the anxiety and failure are democracy, science and industry, often lumped together as "materialism." Nowadays these are concentrated and transformed into the figure of an overweening power menacing all freedoms—the Soviets with their "godless Communism." For sure haven of refuge from that kingdom of evils, for infallible remedy for that nerve-failure and anxiety, most churchmen and some not-churchmen urge pressingly "belief in God"—of course "God" as their faith, and not another's, defines "God." The record shows that all sorts and conditions of Americans, at least, have been seeking the advertised remedy in greater numbers than ever. Churchmen of all sects correlatively point with pride to great increases in church membership, and some fundamentalist ones vaunt their own competitive virtues on the ground that persons in the public eye are becoming their converts. Whatever fellowship those may find when they are dead, the ones they commit themselves to while they are alive tend to be, when native tyrannous growths of the libertarian soil, worshipping some image of a xenophobic closed society as a revealed dogma, and asserting the dogma as the will of God and its enactment as the sole duty of the patriot. They are usually a communion far surer of their hatreds than their loves. In this regard many fundamentalist sects, the Daughters of the American Revolution and the correlative Sons, the Ku Klux Klan, some trade unions, various veterans' organizations and the like, are of the same psychological derivation. Situations that arouse the likes of them from chronic attitude to acute activity are frequent in the nation's story. If they are Protestant, and invoke the Bible for authority, they use the Word of God to justify the indignities and cruelties of whites to darker peoples because they are darker, the reduction of persons of other denominations

to second-class citizens because they are other; they condemn and would destroy the public schools because they teach the American Idea as it is communicated in the works of the Founding Fathers and the history of the nation, and do not teach it as the rationalization of the exclusive prerogatives and privileges these authoritarian missionaries of the counter-idea, a closed society, want it to be. If they advocate State-Rights, they do not mean that equality in self-support and self-help for everybody which constitutes the American idea of free enterprise; they mean by State-Rights preventing the nation from interfering with any of their local privileges and prerogatives on behalf of this equality of enterprise.

In the usage of all these groups, "Godless" comes to mean whoever does not believe in their interests and commit himself to their advancement and defense; "Godly" whoever does so, and at home symbolizes his commitment by attending church regularly, conducting himself correctly in public and reciting undeviatingly the correct hatreds in the correct manner. Somehow each such godly man comes to hold his own church and only his own church an extension of the Savior's incarnation, and thus the sole present vessel of salvation requiring the extirpation of all competitors. That in the main this godliness is a produce for the home market only is a familiar tale repeating itself in every large city. So is the recurrent event that vessels of it who in Congress become the most enthusiastic inquisitors into the dangers from aliens and sedition immanent in liberty, not infrequently turn out also to be models for Dr. Samuel Johnson's definition of patriotism.

Some of these invidious communions of hatred are perennial. They are as old as the nation itself. Others belong to the flotsam and jetsam of the stream of national life and disappear with their occasions. On the record, though many have threatened, none has ever succeeded in subverting the American people's loyalty to the American Idea. Among the perennial ones have been the racism and knownothingism, changing in form

and attack but not in principle with the changing occasion. But the perennial and the passing communions of hatred, both the fear-born and the power-hungry, have alike been countered by communions of love dedicated to one proposition or another of the American Idea: the slavery men by the Abolitionists, the Know-nothings and other Xenophobiacs by those who believed, with Theodore Parker, that America must always be "the Asylum of Humanity." Bartholdi's Liberty Enlightening the World from New York Harbor and Emma Lazarus' *Colossus*, the poem celebrating the statue, became accepted symbols of this faith. Even the Know-Nothing Party made little of restricting immigration. Spokesmen such as S. F. B. Morse concerned themselves for more with the mentality that a religious authoritarianism produces; utter libertarians such as Henry Thoreau could express himself in terms of sharp distaste for the ways and works of the "shanty Irish."

But the general attitude was that of *The Colossus*, getting no small reenforcement from the needs of free enterprisers, conquering the wilderness, for cheap and plentiful labor. That it *was* labor, transposed the vertical differences between native and immigrant into horizontal differences between master and servants and thrust toward desuetude Americans' working faith in the parity of the different. The notion spread that the immigrant Otherness was the otherness of an intrinsic inferiority grounded on heredity only, not environment. Among the nativists there were numbers of Abolitionists to whom the sequelae of the Civil War brought only a feeling of cause lost and a hope blasted. Instead of a new birth of freedom, they saw the land being taken over by a ruthless native plutocracy exploiting a superstitious proletariat of foreigners. With Francis Parkman they saw the processes of politics as a defeat of democracy. Many suffered something like a failure of nerve. Unlike Orestes Brownson, whose unstable mind finally found a close in Romanism that he nevertheless endeavored to conform to his personal vision, these despairing ones took to Roman Catholi-

cism submissively. Their flight from freedom to authoritarianism was total. In a certain sense, Henry Adams' opposition of the Virgin and the Dynamo truly united in one image their diverse conflicts.

In due course, these were compensated by an idea of a free society of equals, who were so because they owned the same ancestors and inherited the same qualities of mind and heart. This imagined sameness—native born, of English stock—defined the boundaries of a would-be closed society. Its safety and growth required exclusion of the different: in practice, selective immigration. Just before the turn of the century restricting immigration began to be an ever more compelling issue of the political economy. Trades-unions as well as "patriotic" societies came to insist that they had a stake in it. Thus, "Americanization," was invested with a new meaning. As conceived by the Founding Fathers it is a person's conviction of faith in the American Idea and his commitment in works to the American way of the teamplay of the different in equal liberty—a conviction and commitment publicly avowed by the oath of allegiance in the ritual of naturalization. The ritual is tantamount to a citizen-novice pledging of his life, his fortune and his sacred honor for the support of his declaration. But now it was interpreted to mean conceding the claims, serving the interests and reverencing the superiorities of a soi-disant "native" élite.

Of course this meaning of "Americanization" did not long go unchallenged. The authentic American Idea, which had been largely taken for granted, became once more a fighting faith with a conscious program of works whose most effective missionary became the American public school. Its work was reenforced not only by true believers speaking for the immigrant miscellany, but by "native" philanthropists, publicists, industrialists, educators and social workers, whose noblest figure was perhaps Jane Addams. There had been a time when Karl Marx was a foreign correspondent of the *New York Tribune*. There had been a time when the nation's doors were equally open to

immigrants of all faiths, the few whose gospels of salvation were some singularity of Protestantism, Judaism, Socialism or Anarchism as well as the great multitudes whose gospels of salvation were Roman or Orthodox Catholicism. Now again the issue was joined in many dimensions of the national life, violently and not unbloodily in the struggle of employees to be treated by their employers not as merely "tools with life in them."

The American Idea, the American Way, often too slowly, painfully, indirectly, and without the goodwill of many who had it by inheritance and not conviction and conversion, tended to reorder them all in a new configuration shaped to the dynamics of equal liberty. American minds could freely consider and freely choose between alternative doctrines and disciplines, all envisioned as strengthening, not enfeebling the works and ways of the Open Society America struggled in fact to be. Citizens as incommensurably diverse as Joseph Altgeld, Theodore Roosevelt, Eugene Debs, Woodrow Wilson, Louis Brandeis, Al Smith, Frank Murphy, Henry Stimson and Norman Thomas all exemplify the ongoing process of free communication, conviction, conversion and reconversion, which is the spontaneous procedure in the arts and sciences, and must needs be an achieved habit in religion and politics. With all its inner resistances and discrepancies and contradictions, the *One* constituted by this union of the mobile, multitudinous *Many*, this *unum in pluribus*, was a prosperous organization of liberty and abundance at home and power abroad, continually growing. And it was, because it was Secularist.

24

The Communist Evangel in the Subversion of Secularism

WHEN, IN 1917, the Russian Revolution seemed about to initiate the idea of equal liberty as the faith and the democratic process as the works of a new way of life for the peoples of Russia, many Americans, including the War President of the United States, were ready to accept the event as one more stage in the forward march of freedom on the globe. Everywhere in the world the Bolshevik seizure of power heightened generous youth's idealization of that new turn in the affairs of mankind, to the heart's desire so like the American Revolution idealized by generous European youth whose avatar was the Marquis de La Fayette. Romantic American John Reed called the event "Ten Days that Shook the World." He soon died in Russia. Max Eastman left there in a recoil of feeling that ended in the same dogmatism with doctrines in reverse. Ostensibly realistic British Beatrice and Sidney Webb interpreted the Bolshevik professions of the 1930's, brought together in a "constitution," as a true account of practices producing equal liberty. Even politically sophisticated conservatives and liberals deplored the Great Powers' instant excommunication of the revolutionary Bolshevik government of the Russias from the fellowship of sovereign and independent states; there are some who hold this to be the original sin of prejudice from which all the world's woes have since been flowing. They similarly deplored—and also resisted—the sabotage of the League of Nations and its agreements by the high contracting parties who had covenanted them. Non-recognition, excommunication, constituted a wall of separation, maintained by the Western states, between their peoples and the peoples of Russia, thus confirming the imaginative idealization

of the Soviets. The Soviets simply could do no wrong, and if wrong they did, it was a tragic inevitable means to the predestined end of a society of plenty, peace and freedom where the State has withered away and the free development of each has become the condition for the free development of all. What end could better justify any means?

Everywhere in the world, and particularly in those lands where Romanism was the religion, and despotism the political custom, men and women convinced of Communism and joining the Communist Party, committed themselves to this faith with its works. They committed themselves as utterly as persons convinced of Romanism commit themselves *ad maiorem Dei gloriam* upon joining the company of Jesus by swearing—so the founder of this company, the sanctified Ignatius Loyola wrote in a letter on this subject—"perfect obedience and abnegation of . . . will and judgment" to the will of the Pope and the Jesuit superiors even *ad peccatum*. The doctrine which the conjurants avowed, in time justified assassination, gave to logical discourse casuistry and probabilism, developed a dialectic that *could* affirm that black is white, and permitted to conduct parallel expedencies and opportunisms which are to be employed, of course, as superiors command for the welfare of the Hierarchical Church and the greater glory of the God whose sole earthly surrogate the Church is. So with Communists. Few, if any, of the first converts had an opportunity to verify the projective Communism of their generous hopes by observing communist practices. Even reports of personages whom the youth of the 20's and 30's trusted, such as Bertrand Russell, produced few reconversions from their new-found faith. The global economic depression of the '30s, joined to the inhibition of free communication between the Soviets and the freer societies, further confirmed the romantic image of Communist peace, freedom and plenty. Faith felt that dictatorship of the proletariat was an economy where unemployment was unknown, where capitalist competitive slavery had been ended forever, where

a proletarian culture was growing for the enlightenment and salvation of the world. Stalinist Russia "building Socialism" was mankind's hope and mankind's healing. While elsewhere conversion to Communism was a reaction from hardship or oppression, in Russia the institutionalization of doctrine and discipline into rigid orthodoxies came to rapid completion. The creed was soon brought to the fixity of absolutist religion; the ikons of Eastern Orthodoxy were ousted to make place for those of the apostles and saints of the Communist cult much as the pre-Christian originals had been ousted and replaced with the Slavo-Byzantine pantheons; Communist myths were offered for credence over Christian ones; Communist theology was unified, and shaped into an ever ready casuistry, rationalizing the Kremlin's every change of line.

Meanwhile in America citizens of all sorts and conditions, native and naturalized, took Communism as a gospel of reassurance and salvation from the hunger, the fears and anxieties which they blamed the American Idea for. Among them were of course such later penitents as Max Eastman, Alice Smedley, Whittaker Chambers, Louis Budenz, Elizabeth Bentley, Anna Louise Strong. For a time pilgrimages of selected faithful were guided to Moscow like Catholics to Rome, and returned confirmed in faith, feeling as Lincoln Steffens is reputed to have said, "I have seen the future and it works." Meantime the converts had organized the American Communist Party, aided by cash and counsel from Holy Russia of the Soviets. Duly they announced that Communism was but Twentieth Century Americanism, and set up their own hierarchical teaching church with authoritarian power over the rank and file of their believing church, and obediently took the place assigned to them in the armies of international Communism whose infallible seat is the Kremlin.

At the Kremlin, the struggle for the exclusive possession of power took a characteristic course. The original Communist revelation in the Scriptures of Marx and Engels became a primal

“deposit of faith” reshaped to fit the contingencies of the struggle for power into Leninism, again into Lenino-Stalinism and finally into absolute Stalinism. The apostles of the primitive communistic gospel known as Old Bolsheviks, were in various ways silenced and liquidated—Trotzky by expulsion and assassination, Radek, Plekhanov and their fellowship by inquisition, trial and torture and auto-da-fe in the Stalinist manner. A secret Inquisition was instituted ever to spy out heresy, deviation, disobedience, and, as policy required, to fabricate them where they did not exist. The sciences, the arts, the traditional cults were subjected to an arbitrary and captious censorship which required undeviating conformation to the orthodox party line, however that altered direction and shape. Failure to conform was a mortal sin for which pardon might be had only as it was publicly confessed, repented and expiated. Forbidden books were seized and burned. The Calendar of Communist Saints ordained to replace the Christian one had also to conform to the party line, listing and canonizing new heroes and dropping old ones as the infallible central power gave its infallible nod. Five year and four year plans were announced to the world and their over-completion in words and numbers was a foregone conclusion in no way related to their actual performance in fact. The surest result of attempting them was the progressive reduction to slavery of millions of the Russian workers and peasants, the starvation and death of other millions, and the perennial fall of all Russians’ standard of living except that of the commissarial hierarchy. Year in, year out, Soviet profession and Soviet practice diverged ever more, until they became fantastically antithetical. But year in, year out, the theologians of the Communist faith—called theoreticians—so worked the casuistry of the dogmas of their faith that its doctrinal unanimity remained intact, and the old names were kept for the new facts inverting old meanings: *dictatorship of the proletariat, classless society, democracy, liberty, equality, fraternity, international* mean the opposite in Sovietese from what they so

long mean in free societies. The usage came to be called "Aesopian language." George Orwell in his *1984* calls it newspeak. It was a terminal point in a developing practice of which another phase was the change of diplomatic discourse from the courteous candor of Maxim Litvinov to the mannerless, vituperative falsifications of Andrei Vishinsky. Orwell's design for Utopia carries out the implications of the Stalinist practice to their logical totalitarian end.

Converts from other societies, pilgrims to Communist Holy Russia's new and pleasant land, finding it unbearably worse than the old unpleasantnesses of America or England or France, sometimes got back home to tell of their harsh disillusionments. Friendly men of art like André Gide, men of science like the biologist Muller, men of wisdom like John Dewey, publicists like Louis Fischer, educators like George Counts, who journeyed hoping to bless, returned home to deplore and denounce, even to curse, the totalitarian despotism with its hierarchies of horrors and hypocrisies by which the "people's democracy" is imposed on the people. Disillusioned journalists wrote painfully detailed narratives of what they observed in Utopia.

But neither the confessions of revenants nor the sorrow or indignation of visitors could any longer cause the true believers' faith in their compensatory sacred image to falter or obedience to its party hierarchy to fail. Faith felt those denudations were all capitalist lies, libellous inventions due to the malicious bourgeois ideology. The companies of Stalin would accept martyrdom and death rather than abandon their evidence of things hoped for, their substance of things unseen. They knew, with that religious certainty which no doubt could touch, that they were workers and soldiers of the total destiny already instant in the Dialectic of Matter and that the Dialectic was carrying them infallibly out of today's hell of classes and competitive slavery, toward tomorrow's heaven of classless free society. No matter what defeats they suffered in the class war, that victorious classless society of free cooperation was infallibly at hand,

although like heaven, it can never be today and must always be tomorrow. They, guided by the Kremlin, were also "building socialism," which never is, but always is about to be.

So they gladly follow the party line however it may twist and wherever it may lead, in a spirit of early Christian devotion seeking place according to their abilities and skills in every walk of life that may be diverted by thought and act toward the greater glory of the Communist consummation, to make America communist.

Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany, the masters of Hirohito in Japan and China deepened history's blood-dark background of the bright image of Communist salvation. Fascist hatred of the Soviets and the Soviet Idea evoked a greater fervor of love for its mask of plenty, peace and freedom, while the spokesmen of the inhuman despotism that wore the mask gave it a semblance of living flesh by their calls to a "united front" against Fascist and Nazi abominations, and by their exhortations on the rostrum of the League of Nations to the protection of the weak from the strong and to safeguard world peace.

Doubt came to those true believers who had no present stake of place or prestige or power in the ranks of the Communist communions outside Russia with the callous, bloody exploitation of and betrayal of the Spanish Republic for Soviet ends. That betrayal restored to such sacrificial devotees as George Orwell the ability to distinguish between the mask and the face behind it. Those in whom vision could be restored, recovered it completely when Stalin made himself a warm partner of Hitler and his theoreticians then reappraised Fascist vice into Communist virtue. The obscenity of that betrayal forced upon men and women serving the church of their faith with unshakable devotion once more a momentous option. Some rejected the Soviet doctrine and discipline for a counter-authoritarianism. Some chose freedom. Habit and fear held most to their party loyalty from which conflict and uncertainty were removed when

Hitler's own treachery to his new ally forced Stalin to ask the Western powers for help. The utter defeat of Hitler, joined to a naive faith among Americans in the honor and humanity of Stalinite might and the sincerity of its professions, enabled Stalin to launch his imperialist cold war upon the Western peoples, defrauding, befooling and subduing those he could, blocking and frustrating those he could not, using the United Nations as an instrument of aggression, most of all against the United States, now in his theology the arch Adversary of the Soviet salvation.

Among the American people, this course of events came to a climax in a sentiment wherein were mingled the feelings of surprised betrayal, righteous anger and uncertainty about the future. They learned that their easy trust was exploited against them, their generosity made into a cause of suspicion and ill will, their labors for global peace converted into the costly burdens of a cold war in Europe and hot wars in Asia; their efforts at free communication stopped by an Iron Curtain. They heard the most intimate agencies of government charged with sheltering disloyalty, their schools, their arts, their sciences denounced as having been infiltrated by American foes of the American Idea, undermining the nation's security, balking its faith. The sentiment became the anxious mood of the decade, held in force by an image of the Adversary abroad, a fantasy of the traitor at home which men without any care for the American Idea and the American people knew how to exploit to their own advantage and to that of other anti-secularist, anti-democratic cults.

The agitations of those sinister ones on rostrums and pulpits accented the anxiety-born ignoring of the people's heightened wellbeing, the immense power of the nation's economy, culture and might, the responsibilities of global leadership so suddenly fallen upon its unready shoulders. They displaced the courage of strength illumined by understanding with the timidi- ties of weakness darkened by fear. They talked nonsense to the

American people and were believed, as if obviating an illusory danger could dispose of the real one. That the communist threat at home is puny and weak is blotted out by the image of Soviet power, gargantuan, implacable, bent on destruction, who takes for his instrument this negligible American communist. Because of Stalin, that one is not negligible. As Chancellor Heald of New York University recently remarked to the New York Chamber of Commerce, repeating the perennial observation: "A member of the Communist Party is not a free agent, intellectually or politically. He is not the same as any other person expressing an unconventional opinion. He cannot claim academic freedom [one should add, nor any other] because he has forsaken the claim to academic freedom. He is restricted to a line of thinking and action dictated by a foreign power." Wherever he be, he is by faith and by works the religious foe of Secularism. In choosing Communism he has forsworn his freedom to choose or tolerate anything else; he has committed himself utterly to a totalitarian religion teaching that freedom is obedience and right is the will of the Superior. In choosing Communism he has chosen slavery for his mind and hands; he has replaced the spirit's free mobility with lock-stepping doctrine and discipline. Now a missionary of a totalitarian Communism unscrupulously grasping at empire, the American Communist is the front-man of an authoritarian monism that implacably hunts down and destroys the pluralism and rationalism of the Secularist faith. Surely he should be searched out and made forever helpless to collaborate in that murder of freedom. And should not also his like, whatever be the authority surrendered to, unless the authority be so rich and powerful that the police-power of freedom is reluctant to challenge it and contain it?

The confessions and accusations of the penitents who had become aware that their God had failed them, fed and deepened the nation's anxiety. Some, like Arthur Koestler, returned to the fields of freedom. Others like Ignazio Silone, Louis

Budenz, Elizabeth Bentley, had taken refuge from the red authoritarianism of the left in the black authoritarianism of the right, from the rites and rites of Communism in the rites and rites of Romanism. Psychologically, this may have been a change for better company and greater comfort but not change at all of attitude and relationships to Superiors. With them and Whittaker Chambers no parallel obtains. As he tells of it, his was a live, forced and momentous option between the station, prestige, comfort and security that went with silence and the poverty, denigration and danger of public confession. His choice was between the bright predestination of Dialectical Materialism shaping history and the dark providence of an Unknown God, acting on his psyche by the Quaker "inner light." Chambers' conversion as he tells of it, seems to have been a true revolution of the spirit, a turn of his entire being in an act of faith that he freely bet his life on, and knew it.

Where totalitarianisms obtain, such bets are suicide. Only in democratic societies whose Secularism is the collective guarantee that everyone may safely believe, change his belief and speak his beliefs to whomsoever would listen, could Chambers, or anybody else, make the bet and have a chance of not losing it.

25

Totalitarian Religions at War for the Minds of Men

AFTER RUSSIA, THE European lands where the Communist faith wins the most converts in proportion to the population, where the Communist Parties exert the greatest powers, are lands where Roman or other Catholicisms are the traditional religions. On those soils the dominant churches had been religious monopolies, monoliths of authoritarianism. Their supreme authority had been exercised from Rome on the claim of universal dominion. The relations of church and state had been such that either could use the other as an instrument of policy, and on occasion disputed which should use which. Education had been in the power of "the teaching church"; the clergy had been an occupational class with privileges denied other occupations. Custom and tradition supported keeping persons of different religion a caste apart and penalizing them for being different. In countries like Austria, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, subversion from some degree of constitutionalism to the personal authoritarianism of fascist and communist dictatorship was psychologically easier, inasmuch as it involved only a change, partial or entire, of authoritarian creeds, not of authoritarian attitudes and practices. The powers of government continued *not* to derive from the consent of the governed; only the governors and their names were different: they were all dictatorships of the proletariat by dukes, fuhrers, caudillos, commissars, vozhdz instead of emperors, kings, dukes, cardinals, metropolitans and popes. Totalitarian cults had little persuasive force in countries where churches are congregational and not hierarchical, where judgment is private and the relation between a man and his God direct and

personal. Fascist and communist factions arose in Great Britain, in the Scandinavian countries, in Holland, in New Zealand and in Australia; but they never reached the numbers nor the influence that might threaten an overturn.

By and large, this was the case also with the Nazi- and Fascist-minded factions of the United States—their fuhrer was the depression-exploiting Detroit radio priest Charles Coughlin—which Hitler aspired to use as his Fifth Column among the American people; and it has been no less the case with the American Communist Party wherewith Stalin endeavored to work at sabotage and subversion. American Communists have never reached numbers, whether in party members or fellow-travellers, nor have their party-hierarchy ever by themselves reached power in any way proportionate to the fear their image aroused. The realities behind the fearful image are the uncovered secret ways whereby Communists gave effect to their commitment to the Kremlin as obedient arm of its cold war of lies, theft, espionage and murder against America and the American Idea. The effective counter in the war is of course cold truth, hot, ever-growing might and impartial justice. The successful use of these has been shrouded in the heavy fog of feeling maliciously blown up into the communazi mood and method known as McCarthyism. On the record, however, this may be but a current case of the succession of such sicknesses of the spirit which have flared up and washed out since the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798.¹

¹ This Act presents a certain analogy with the Smith Act of our day. Its history is worth recalling. It was adopted when war with revolutionary France appeared imminent. At home there was a background of paid propaganda by foreign writers expressing themselves in violent and scurrilous terms against the country whose hospitality they were abusing. There had been the XYZ incident. The Federalist party then in power undertook, therefore, a program of defense, purgation and punishment. It passed a Naturalization Act which changed the period of residence required for would-be

That in the present crisis of faith and loyalty, precedent might not be a guide follows from very significant changes in the religio-cultural climate of the Western World. One is the war of religions inherent in the complete or partial communion of most of the Catholic countries of Europe. This is the war levied by the cohorts of an upstart totalitarian communion fighting to impose its exclusive authority upon all the world's

citizens from five to fourteen years. It adopted the Enemy Alien Act which gave the president arbitrary discretion to arrest, to imprison, to banish, foreign foes on American soil. It adopted the Alien Act which gave the government power to expel persons regarded as plotters or as otherwise a danger to the country. It limited the term of the Act, however, to only two years. In addition, the Federalist congress passed the Sedition Act which forbade conspiracy and incitements, insults to officials of the American Government, the instilling of hatred, giving aid to foreign powers. Conviction was to carry a fine of \$2000 and two years in jail. But the defendants were given a chance to prove the untruth of the charges. This Act was to be in force for three years.

It turned out, however, that the party in power applied the Act not to the foreigners against whom it was ostensibly directed, but to the party in opposition—the Republicans, whose leaders were Jefferson and Madison. The record indicates that fair trials were rare, the judges and the juries being affected not only by the climate of opinion, but by their party allegiance. Nevertheless, there were no deportations and only twenty-five arrests, fifteen indictments and ten convictions. Among the reactions against these manifestations of party aggression channeling political hysteria were the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1799 passed under the leadership of Jefferson and Madison. These declared the Alien and Sedition Acts to be unconstitutional and asserted the right of the states to nullify any unconstitutional act by Congress. In the elections of the following year, the Federalists were defeated. And in the period between 1840 and 1850, the Congress voted to repay the fines collected from those who had been convicted under the Act.

There had been no recurrence of anything similar until the first World War. Both the War of 1812 and the Civil War were fought without any resort to practices that tended to violate the Bill of Rights, nor was the Second World War so fought. It is in the

peoples, against a much older totalitarianism, whose powers and pretensions strike deeper roots in folkways and mores. Their war is first and last a war for possession of men's minds, for as both well knew, unless the mind is possessed no other property can be securely held. If the Papacy could achieve a Concordat with Stalin such as it made with Mussolini, with Hitler, with Salazar, with Franco, it would do so.

In point of fact there had been endeavors in that direction. According to Louis Fischer's *The Soviet in World Affairs*, Stalin had made proposals to the Pope of the time in the early years of the Bolshevik revolution, when the Soviets were still unrecognized by the major Western powers. In 1922 the Jesuit, Edmund Walsh, went to Moscow to treat with Chicherin. A year later, Chicherin, the King of Italy and a high functionary of the Roman Church met and talked on the Italian cruiser *Dante Alighieri*. Two years later Chicherin and the present Pope, then Cardinal Pacelli, conferred in Germany. Jordansky, the secretary-general of the Jesuits, also figured in the negotiations! But the Vatican, Fischer indicated, had replied on only three of twelve proposals by the Kremlin. In the interval Fascism had come to seem "the wave of the future," negotiations

period of the cold war with the Communists that history appears to be repeating itself with far more critical challenges than even during World War I to the American Idea and its implementation by the American way of life.

In the circumstances it eases anxiety over current dangers to the American Idea to recall Jefferson's words to T. Lomax in March of 1799: "The atrocious proceedings of France [that time's equivalent of today's Communist Russia] toward this country, has well nigh destroyed its liberties. The Anglomen and monarchs [that time's equivalent of today's Republicans and mccarthyst 'nation-ists'] had so artfully confounded the cause of France with that of freedom that both went down in the same scale." It helps to remember that in 1800 the American people demonstrated that they could not long be fooled by the confounders and brought the cause of freedom to lasting victory.

broke off, and an implacable warfare of the creeds followed. Now that fascisms and nazisms are in apparent permanent eclipse and the Soviets stand as the most gargantuan totalitarian despotism in history, there are feelers from the Vatican side. Thus, if Count della Torre (editor of the *Osservatore Romano*, which is the Vatican's equivalent of Moscow's *Pravda*), stated the terms correctly in the *United Nations Magazine* of October 1949, an acceptable Concordat would guarantee to Catholicism in Communist Russia sovereign rights and privileges such as the Papacy would of course refuse to the Politburo or any other rule or communion wherever it had the power to do so. Each hierarchy insists that it is right and that everybody else is wrong; that it must have its way because it is right, and that the rest must give way because they are wrong; the right is infallible. But in view of the strength of Communist factions in post-Fascist Poland, Italy and France, even a certain kinship with Communism was expediently suggested. "Communism," it was said on May 7 or 8 of 1949, "does not run counter to the nature of Christian doctrine as strongly as Capitalism"; "capitalism is a cancer, at least as much a sin against nature as artificial birth control"; Communism, "shorn of its atheism, would be less unchristian than capitalism."²

This is in no way inconsistent with Catholic and Nazi Fritz von Papen's remarks on the occasion of Hitler's concordat with the Vatican: "The Third Reich is the first power in the world not only to recognize but to translate into practice the high principles of the Papacy. . . . Nazism is the Christian counter-movement against the spirit of 1789 . . . We stand at the

² This recalls Hitler's remark to Rauschning (*The Voice of Destruction*, 1940) "There is more that binds us to Bolshevism than separates us from it. . . . I have always made allowance for this circumstance and have given orders that former Communists shall be admitted to the Party at once."

beginning of the Christian Revolution." It has since become Communazi.

Communists of whom the Red Dean of Canterbury is representative are not perhaps so violent against "the Spirit of 1789," but they can and do insist that "shorn of atheism," Communism is not merely "less unchristian" but far more Christian than capitalism—and, for that matter, than Roman Catholicism. For they assimilate hierarchical Catholicism to equally hierarchical Fascism and Nazism, which, to them, self-defined anti-Fascists, are the utter negation of tomorrow's classless society where the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all. In their vocabulary of anathemas "fascist," even more than "capitalist," means the same total evil that "communist" now means in the vocabulary of the Papal empire.

On the record, atheism is but a contingent step of the communist dialectic and not a necessary principle. Trinitarian theologians have at one time or another endeavored to rationalize the Trinity by means of the same hegelian triad that Communists use to rationalize the course of human events and to assure themselves that they are predestined to move to the Utopian consummation which their Communist faith affirms. For Communism, as for all the Western religions save Secularism, the dynamic of the Dialectic Providence consummates itself in the negation of all other faiths.

Like their foes, Communists appraise other faiths as drags on mankind's progress toward Utopia; their epithet is "opiate of the people," deadening them to their own spiritual and physical well-being. So Communist Action organizes "Societies of the Godless"; their prophets and pundits religiously stress that their Communism is "Scientific Socialism"; that it is "atheistic," "materialistic." In this context, however, "scientific" has about the same significance as "science" in "Christian Science." Communist "atheism" is functionally as supernatural as the "theism" its *aficionados* oppose and communist "matter" behaves in the same way as the "spirit" they substitute it for. Matter as the

natural sciences know it is not dialectical, nor are its laws dialectic. Dialectic is one mode of thought among others, not the total law of nature. Matter is an orderly sequence of cause and consequence, not a rule of self-negation. Science that is reliable starts as faith in the free mind searching and seeking in an open field. It is a method without creed; an art of inquiry and experiment looking to consequences which can be expressed as hypotheses, theories or laws ever open to be altered or to be abandoned for alternatives that can do better the same job of explanation, prediction and control. Soviet "science" starts with a creed which encloses all fields. The record shows that inquiry seeks, not discovery, but the argument of a foregone conclusion, the rationalization of a dogma already asserted to be infallibly true. Failure to do this, advocacy of any sort of unorthodox alternative, be it in mathematics, the sciences of matter, of life, or of society is denounced as heresy and the heretic is punished. Only those findings are allowed to be true that are consistent with today's infallible rendering of Dialectical Materialism by the Kremlin authorities. And however the renderings may vary, certain traits they always share. These are the assurance that the laws of nature and of nature's Dialectic as revealed by Marx and interpreted by Lenin and Stalin are on the side of the Communists; that the class war which is their manifestation must end infallibly in the overthrow of the total evil whose parts are Capitalism, Godliness and Fascism; that the classless society will thereupon ensue, heaven upon earth; that the one and only high priest and infallible interpreter of the deposit of marxist faith and dialectically predestined builder of Utopia is the *Vozhd* Comrade Stalin, thank you, Comrade Stalin.³

³ Since this was written, Stalin died and no new *Vozhd* has yet schemed and killed his way to the viceregency of the Dialectic of Matter in the affairs of men and thus to the power of infallible revelation of its ways with the universe.

If the present Czars of Russia had from the beginning emulated the earlier stock and had been tartuffian enough to stick to the traditional names for their values, "Godless," "Atheist" would not have been weapons so easy to turn against them. Their atheism and godlessness would then have been recognized to mean what this usually means—worship of different gods. The warfare between them and the Romanists would then have been recognized for what such warfare always is, a battle for power and rule between infallibilities using all the devices of force and fraud which the record shows to characterize such warfare wherever it arises in the world, for God's sake, requiring loyalty from everyone, rendering it to no one. Despotisms alike in religion and in political economy, they cannot admit difference and self-rule of the different in either order of human affairs. If they are primarily theocracies, they use the State and the other modes of human association as instruments of imperial policy. If they are primarily politico-economic establishments, they so use the churches. Where either exercises prepotent power, the variant exists on sufferance, not as of right; he is tolerated but not protected under the law; where either exists as a minority interest, it asserts its existence as a right and demands the equal protection of the laws. Russia and the "satellite" countries, Spain and many of the South American "republics" equally illustrate the totalitarian's intolerance where he holds power; the pretenses and practices of the Catholic and Communist hierarchies in the United States and other free countries equally exemplify the totalitarian's demand for equal liberty and for equal protection of the laws where he does not hold prepotent power. They would have their cake and eat it, too.

26

"Make America Catholic," Extirpate Secularist Heresy

NOT SO LONG ago the Kremlin had found it expedient and profitable to cut itself off from the "United Front" against Fascism which its emissaries had begged and bullied men of goodwill everywhere to form. It saw greater profit in a communazi front with Hitler. In return for being allowed its will in Poland and the Baltic countries, it pronounced as worthy what it had hitherto denounced as abomination. When the worth reverted to abomination with Hitler's turning upon Stalin, his communist identical twin, this Nazi treachery evoked a new outcry for a "united front," an alliance in war against a common foe victory over whom should emerge in a worldwide lasting peace. But victory brought the Kremlin's democratic allies only another betrayal. Now Communist aggression pushes together toward a common defense societies as unlike as the United States and Spain and Jugoslavia, churches as antipodal as the Unitarians and the Catholic, the congregational and the hierarchical. These commensurations of incommensurables are produced by hatred pressing from without—not love joining together from within. They are not the expansions of reciprocal friendliness. They are the compressions of common enmities. Let the foe be overthrown and what assurance is there short of the democratic spirit and the Securalist faith, that ally will not march against ally in a restored and heightened access of imperialist ambition ascribed to the will of God?

This is a vital question for believers in America and in the American Idea to explore. The United States, let it be recalled, was a new thing upon the earth—from the beginning a truly Open Society, a union of the diverse and diversifying Many

covenanting to maintain a Federal Republic whose citizens may freely come together from all the regions, all the cults and all the cultures upon the earth, assuring to one another equal liberty and equal safety under the law of the covenant. Let it be recalled that among their companies and communions have always figured structures of varying numbers and power whose principle is authoritarian and hierarchical, and whose organizational goal is totalitarian. Let it be recalled that of these, the most numerous were the miscellany of Roman Catholics from all Europe. First welcomed, so Tocqueville noted, as equals in rights and freedoms under the law, the church for which their priests claimed the believer's exclusive allegiance caused members of groups whose principle of organization is private judgment and the consent of the governed, recurrent anxiety. From Morse's day on, Americans believing in America as an Open Society came ever and again to feel deep insecurity regarding the impact of hierarchical authoritarianism on that Openness, and to suspect the intentions and program of the soi-disant sacerdotal depositaries of authority from God. At times these Americans became seriously alarmed. As thoughtful members of the believing Church have many times observed, their alarm cannot be assuaged by outcries of "bigotry," "atheism," "godless," "know-nothingism," "Blanchardism" and by smearing libels on Secularism. Its causes and conditions must be impartially explored, understood, and removed by democratic action, not words whether vituperative or conciliatory. What has come of Tocqueville's observations and Morse's alarm with the passage of time?

Inspection of the record confirms what logical analysis makes manifest; that, as the militant Romanist Hilaire Belloc declares, "the Catholic church is in its root principle at issue with the civic definition of both freedom and authority . . . the culture of the United States is from its original religion and by its momentum and whole tradition opposed to the Catholic Church." This is what had forced itself upon Samuel F. B. Morse during

his long residence in Europe. He recognized that the root principle of Romanism was both imperialist and totalitarian, that it postulates a Closed Society with everybody obedient to the hierarchical authority of the clergy. His conviction was further confirmed by the Metternichian project to make America Catholic; by papal pronouncements; by the defeat of the Conciliar Party within the teaching church itself in its resistance to papal autocracy and infallibility, to say nothing of the dogma of the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mother of God; by the publication of Pio Nono's Syllabus of Modern Errors and their utter condemnation, *ex cathedra*.

The Syllabus, attached to Pope Pius' Encyclical, *Quanta Cura*, lists eighty such errors. The Pope introduced the list as follows: "By Our Apostolic Authority, we reprobate, proscribe and condemn the evil opinions and doctrines, all and singular, severally mentioned in this letter, and will and command that all children of the Catholic Church hold them in every respect as reprobated, proscribed and condemned." Catholics thus are compelled to believe the opposite of the forbidden errors. They must believe that Protestantism is neither Christian nor as pleasing to God as Catholicism (iv); that reason is not autonomous and that the method of science cannot "arrive at true knowledge" about Christianity; (3 and 4); that no man is free to believe as his conscience decides and his reason confirms (15); that people outside the Roman Catholic Church cannot be saved (12); that the Roman church is absolutely independent and sovereign (19, 20); and the dogmatic judge of its own truth and uniqueness (21); that it may use force and own property (24, 26); that its canon law must, in all cases of conflict, overrule civil law (42); that education must be under the authority of the hierarchy (47); that church and state ought never to be separated, that no Catholic country may permit any public worship other than Catholic (77, 78); that the Roman Pontiff cannot and ought not "reconcile and harmonize himself with progress, with liberalism and with modern civilization."

Papal encyclical after encyclical has since but reasserted these pretensions and demands in one form or another. Leo XIII, Pius X, Benedict XIV, Pius XI, up to the present pope, in their pronouncements repeated, each, his predecessors' claims to absolute and infallible power holding precedence over all other authority. For a Pope, when at last elected after an indeterminate number of ballots by cardinals voting according to the changeable inspiration of the Holy Ghost, which often requires scores of ballots before it makes up its mind, changes from a more or less normal human individual into a superman endowed with supernatural authority over all mankind. The vote transforms him into the one and only representative of God on earth, vicar of Christ, Father of Fathers, whom not to obey and serve either directly or in the person of the meanest of his delegates, is mortal sin, meriting eternal death. Since most of the disbelieving, disobedient billions of earth's inhabitant's do not know or do not mind their Roman Catholic danger, and have not yet been compelled to heed it, the God of the Roman hierarchy commands that they should be temporized with or cajoled until they can be compelled. Always and everywhere the teaching church must establish and insure its supremacy over the believing church. That latter includes everybody. In Catholic truth the unconverted, the heretics, the infidels, the agnostics, the atheists can no more be out of the church than freedom of religion can be freedom from God. They can only disobey and sin and merit the punishment which the Church will mete out in this world where it has the power and which its God of Love has ordained from eternity in the world to come.

Implementing this doctrine has results in an ongoing struggle of truly religious Roman Catholics against the clerical interest for their independence and freedom as Catholic members of the community of mankind. The struggle, as has already been noted, is the confrontation of Romanist clericalism with Roman Catholic secularism. It is a part of the history of American culture as well as European. De Tocqueville studied and inter-

preted one phase of it. The frictions of the diverse folkways which the simple men and women of Roman Catholic faith brought from their varied cultural enclaves in Europe were automatically mollified by the new climate of freedom they were to live in. At first this confused and frightened them. So far as they could, they endeavored to preserve the old faith and the old worship in the new homeland, each according to its singularity. They had to pay a high price for this customary consolation since the American way keeps a church a voluntary society that must meet its own costs, with the members of the society the owners of its real and "personal" property and responsible for its corporate debts under the law. They learned the responsibility. Like non-Catholic congregations, they chose their own boards of trustees who managed church properties, built and maintained parochial schools and worked out their faith as true but free believers. For a long time, as de Tocqueville noted, the clergy acquiesced. But soon, being ordered, the clergy undertook therefore to expropriate the laity as a duty to God, and to terminate their new freedom. The struggle took on an ethnic character because most priests were English-speaking Irish whose Hibernianism Roman Catholics from the continent very much resented. All the dread engines of priestcraft were brought into play—including interdict and excommunication—to impose No. 1518 of the Canon Law that "The Roman Pontiff is the supreme administrator and dispenser of all the goods and properties of the church." The struggle ended with complete victory for clericalism. By 1884 the Americanization of church government among Roman Catholics ceased.¹

Demand for cheap labor among native American entrepreneurs, exploiting peasant hunger for bread, who were more than content that it was accompanied by little or no hunger for spiritual and intellectual freedom, brought miscellaneous millions to the American scene. There, physical exploitation and social

¹ See Isaac Hecker: *The Church and the Age*, 1887.

exclusion and spiritual *laissez faire* kept Roman Catholicism a familiar bond of union and a promise of salvation which tended to overrule and conform the cultural diversities to the cultist homogeneity of rite and rote, whose efficacious ministers could be only the priests of the one divinely authorized teaching church.

The last, in the shelter of the First Amendment and the rule of separation of State and Church, expanded untrammelled. The power and influence of the Roman sacerdotal establishment grew in proportion as the numbers of obedient believers multiplied, and their dependence on political bases of Catholic allegiance became more manifold. By 1895, Leo XIII could remark in the encyclical, *Longinqua Oceani*, addressed to the American hierarchy: "Thanks are due to the equity of the laws which obtain in America and to the customs of the well-ordered Republic. For the church among you, unopposed by the Constitution and government of your nation, fettered by no hostile legislation, protected against violence by the common laws and impartiality of the tribunals, is free to live and act without hindrance. Yet, though all this is true, it would be very erroneous to draw the conclusion that in America is to be sought the type of the most desirable status of the Church, or that it would be universally lawful or expedient for State and Church to be, as in America, dissevered and divorced. The fact that Catholicity is with you in good condition, nay, is even enjoying a prosperous growth, is by all means to be attributed to the fecundity with which God has endowed His Church, in virtue of which, unless men and circumstances interfere, she spontaneously expands and propagates herself; but she would bring forth more abundant fruits if, in addition to liberty, she enjoyed the favor of the laws and the patronage of public authority." ²

² The late Dr. Joseph Goebbels observed: "It will always remain the best joke made by the democratic system that it provides its deadly enemies with the means of destroying it."

Five years earlier, in the Encyclical *Sapientiae Christianae* this same pope had reasserted that "Christians" are obliged to submit to hierarchical authority not alone in creedal matters, but simply "allow themselves to be ruled and directed by authority and leadership of bishops, and above all of the Apostolic See."

On the record, the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the United States have, at least since 1895, been engaged exactly as Samuel Morse charged they were engaged, in annulling the "divorce" of church and state, in manoeuvring for the teaching church "the favor of the laws and the patronage of public authority" in education,³ in regulations governing marriage and divorce and planned parenthood, in rules of child-adoption, in the decision of what books Americans should read, what plays and motion pictures they should see, what holidays they should observe, whom they should listen to, for whom they should vote. So the late Monsignor John A. Ryan—neither a Jesuit nor even a regular but a secular priest—declared in 1922 in his work, *The State and the Church* and repeated in other words in his *Catholic Principles of Politics* . . . "constitutions can be changed, and the non-Catholic sects may decline to such a point that the political proscription of them may become feasible and expedient. What

³ Mrs. Eugene Meyer, speaking before the N.E.A. in Detroit, July 1952, cited President Theodore Roosevelt as declaring in 1900 regarding the sectarian pretensions to school control: "We could suffer no national calamity more far-reaching in its effects than would be implied in the abandonment of our system of nonsectarian schools; and it is a very unfortunate thing for any man, or any body of men, to be identified with opposition thereto—it is not really a question of sects at all; it is merely an illustration of the survival or importation here of the utterly un-American and thoroughly Old World idea of the subordination of the laymen to the priest. The fight is not one between creeds; it is an issue between intelligent American laymen of every faith on the one hand, and ambitious, foolish or misguided supporters of a worn out system of clerical government on the other. Our public schools are here to stay."

protection would they then have against a Catholic State? The latter could logically tolerate only such religious activities as were confined to the members of the dissenting groups. It could not permit them to carry on general propaganda, nor accord their organization certain privileges that had formerly been extended to all religious corporations, for example, exemption from taxation." Clerics recently have sought to obscure the clear intention of these words, but the infallible deliverance from which they follow has not been changed.

American citizens of the Roman Catholic denomination are now so numerous that the American princes of that Church, speaking collectively as the National Catholic Welfare Conference, can feel safe in their sacerdotal capacity to denounce as unconstitutional decisions of the Supreme Court which obstruct their bid "for the favor of the laws and the patronage of public authority."

In something more than a hundred years free immigration and church-ordained reproduction have increased the nation's 600,000 Romanists to more than 30,000,000—making the denomination the most numerous in the land. At midcentury the hierarchy's 12 sees with their 12 bishops has been increased to 23 archdiocese, with 4 cardinals, 24 archbishops, 156 bishops; its 401 churches with 341 priests are now 15,533 churches with 43,889 priests, it now counts 398 publications as against 7 or 8 one hundred years ago; the hundreds of children in parochial schools are now millions, and the 10 colleges then are about 250 now. Property holdings of course correspond. Is America not being made Catholic?

To this end, again, the hierarchy demands that all modes of activity which Americans who believe in Roman Catholicism undertake should submit to be "ruled and directed" by sacerdotal authority. In Europe as in the United States, the humanitarian impulse released by the democratic faith, expressed itself in the programs of many voluntary societies of which those of English Christian Socialists are among the more notable and

moving. It became a part of that moral and intellectual rebirth of religion within the entire Romanist establishment which soon was denounced, cut off and shut out as Modernism and stigmatized as "the synthesis of all the heresies." The Pope who took this action was Pius X; the heresy of works in the modern meaning figures in the Encyclical of denunciation, excommunication and discipline, *Pascendi Gregis*, the "The principle of the Americanists, that the active virtues are more important than the passive, and are to be encouraged in practice."

Since the democratic idea in the spirit of the age nevertheless continued to make for voluntary activity by Catholic believers, this pope's successor found it expedient in the course of time to regiment free Roman Catholic lay activities into directed and ruled Catholic Action.

"Catholic Action" said Pius XI, "is an integrating and integral part of the sacerdotal ministry." Its difference from activity by Roman Catholics was pointed up in November 1935 by the bishops of the American National Catholic Welfare Conference. Whatever the hierarchical level, Catholic Action exists only when there is a directing episcopal commission. By papal definition "the participation of the laity in the apostolate of the hierarchy," Catholic Action has to be a participation of obedience and service to the hierarchy and its purposes, a mobilization of the believing church as an arm of the teaching church in every dimension of social life. Thus the learned professions, the policemen, the firemen, the veterans, the trades unions, the actors, the artists, the journalists, the women, the youth and so on endlessly, have each their self-segregated *Roman Catholic* organizations, every one of them with a priest for counsel and direction, whose relation to the group is like that of the political commissar's in Soviet military and labor organizations. The *gleichschaltung* and subordination aimed at is total.

Much of the laity's apostolate consists in imposing the creed and enforcing the prescriptions and taboos of Roman church rule. Examples are the activities of the Knights of Columbus, of Catholic War Veterans, of the Legion of Decency. The last protects the priesthood from being portrayed realistically, or laughed at on the screen, and endeavors to prevent clerical rules concerning other people's ways and works from being disregarded. They are the final police enforcing the motion picture production code devised by a Jesuit. Catholic Action naturally appears wherever papal authority reaches. In October 1951 it held an international congress at Rome in order—as the president of the Italian Catholic Action, who called the Congress, told the delegates—to “serve militant Catholics the world over with their leaders' experiences and information” pooled for the purpose of making other people Catholic. Seventy four countries sent about one thousand lay delegates. At an audience with the Pope, one from the Argentine suggested that it would be good for Catholic Action if the “emancipation of the laity” from control of the clergy could be arranged. Pius XII replied that this had a “rather an unpleasant sound.” Since “the lay apostolate must be a prolongation of the arm of the hierarchy, . . . it must be subject to the direction of ecclesiastical authority. It is self-evident that the apostolate of the laity is subordinate to the ecclesiastical hierarchy; for the hierarchy is of Divine institution; the apostolate cannot then be independent in regard to it. To think otherwise would be to undermine the very rock whereon Christ has built His church.” To confine the church to “purely religious” questions is a “noxious tendency.” It holds “in countries where the Church is forced to cloister herself, but it cannot be allowed where circumstances call for a religious apostolate of political action. This action is political in the highest sense, meaning nothing else than collaboration for the good of the State.”⁴

⁴ See Religious News Service Reports, Mondays October 8, October 15, 1951. Some listeners could have recalled Dante's verse

In the context of such continuing totalitarian intention and authoritarian practice, the statement of Alfred E. Smith when he was the Democratic Party's candidate for the presidency of the United States, seems a radically modernistic liquidation of the authoritarian requirement which the papacy makes the rock on which it builds Christ's Roman Catholic church and a reversion to the freedom that Tocqueville took note of. "I believe," Franklin Roosevelt's Happy Warrior wrote in the issue of the *Atlantic Monthly* for May, 1927; "I believe in absolute freedom of conscience for all and in an equality of all churches before the law as a matter of right and not as a matter of favor." This is an honest statement of a brave and honest American, affirmed as a professing Catholic. Mr. Smith made it in reply to a challenge by the late Charles Marshall, an attorney who had become disturbed by intrigues of the hierarchy looking to American intervention in Mexico on behalf of sacerdotal properties and powers which the very patient Mexican people had found no longer sufferable. It was reported that Governor Smith had made this anti-clericalist statement with the advice and consent of the hierarchy.

Nevertheless, the American people were not yet ready to trust even such a Romanist as Al Smith in the presidency. The record of the hierarchical church was too painfully against him. Then the hierarchy's anti-democratic role in the war of the Spanish Republic against its totalitarian and clericalist foes, and in relation to Europe's Fascists and Nazis, in no way diminished the anxiety of free American non-Catholics and of American Catholics who agreed with Governor Smith, about the hierarchical Roman Catholic clergy's purposes in America. Every so often candid enough statements of the consummation they wish and work for get into the press. One such is the following from the pen of the Jesuit editor of that order's journal *America* in December 1930: "The old Protestant culture is about at the

in the Sixteenth Canto of the *Purgatorio*: The church of Rome, mixing two governments that ill assort hath missed her footing, fallen into the mire, and there herself her burden much defiled.

end of its rope. The first settlers of our country established this distinctly Protestant culture, being chiefly from Protestant countries, so that our history from the beginning of the republic has been predominantly non-Catholic. It has given the complexion to the country, entered our legislation, sociology and economics, is the basis of our commerce and industry and, in fact, has formed a great part of the American people. For 150 years the Protestant element was strongest, and we admit it.

"This Christian culture is a wave receding, and we Catholics are living in a most important day, with one culture vanishing, another gaining strength. Why can't we raise a tidal wave that will bring Catholic culture into the United States? Why can't we make the United States Catholic in legislation, Catholic in justice, aims and ideals? We are the greatest numerically in the country, strong and growing in the arts and education. We are now ready to expand. Now is the time to organize and strike hard to put the Catholic idea before all."

And "organize and strike hard" the Romanist teaching church did. Since this was published in a New York newspaper the blows have been multiplying. Putting the "Catholic idea" includes the use of insult and smear against all those who do not see eye to eye with the Roman clericals on matters of "faith and morals." This reached one high point of good manners and sportsmanship when Francis Spellman, Cardinal Archbishop of the Archdiocese of New York, denounced Eleanor Roosevelt as an "unAmerican mother" because she had a different view from his about Federal aid to parochial schools; another prince of the Roman church condemned her because he had heard she had different views than his about "immortality." During the Spanish Civil War Americans with anything good to say about the Spanish Republic were prevented from speaking wherever possible; devout Catholic Spanish spokesmen for the Republic were persecuted; showing motion pictures which presented its cause sympathetically was often blocked. The demand to support Franco's tyranny over the

proud suffering faithful Spanish people is unremitting, in spite of the Caudillo's differences with the Spanish cardinals, who are more Roman Catholic, because less politic, than their pope.⁵ On the issues of religious instruction in the public schools and contributions for the support of the priest-owned parochial schools by the public treasury and the constitutional principle of the separation of church and state, decisions of the Supreme Court unwelcome to the Roman hierarchy were declared by them unconstitutional, while on the proposal to appoint an ambassador to the Vatican it was made explicit that the Roman Catholic establishment is a state as well as a church and entitled to the powers, immunities and privileges of both the earthly and heavenly sovereignties.

In its self-proclaimed role as the guardian and teacher of the one true faith, the Roman hierarchical teaching church decrees that it is right and good that non-Romanists should reject their own faiths and commit themselves to Roman Catholicism but that it is wrong and fraught with eternal death for a Roman Catholic to reject that creed and commit himself to the truth of a different faith. The former is virtue and the way to Paradise; the latter is mortal sin and its wages are Hell forever. Those to whose consciences equity and fairplay are a duty as well as a right have long demonstrated that if it is right and good for a non-Roman Catholic to choose Roman Catholicism, it can not be less right and good for a Roman Catholic to reject Roman Catholicism. They point out that the clericalism which wars against this principle is tyrannous totalitarianism, arrogating to itself dominion and privileges which it refuses to all other religions. Its pretensions round up and fence in all Roman

⁵ Since this was written the Vatican has confirmed their claims, though not by official action, as "unexceptional." The confirmation does not sit well with at least one American Jesuit. See the *New York Times*, July 23, 1953. Analogous divergence is of record over excommunicated priest Feeney's defense of the dogma that there is no salvation outside the church.

Catholic communicants so as to prevent their communion with any other faith. It ordains and enforces a religious *apartheid* on the claim *Deus vult*. It reaches into all the privacies of the personal life, which to keep undiscovered to a priestly confessor is sin punishable with immortal pains and penalties. It determines marriage, divorce, sexual intimacy, procreation; and it requires that a child shall be brought to birth though the birth brings death to the mother. It insists that a dying person be kept alive although death is near at hand and every breath drawn is drawn in pain and torture unspeakable and he wants to die. It asserts a sort of property right in the persons of children, legitimate or illegitimate, either of whose parents is a Roman Catholic or who have been baptized by a Roman priest, and insists on Roman Catholic custody of them, lay or secular, via adoption or institutionalization, even though the parents choose or responsible officials judge, otherwise. Although under the law of the land, parents have the right to send their children to a public or any other than a priest-ruled parochial school, the law of the church abrogates this right. For a lay Roman Catholic there can be no freedom from clerical interest and rule so long as he lives, if the Roman hierarchy can prevent it. Such a freedom is asserted to be the same as that deadly "freedom from God."

Calling attention to these purposes, practices and their rationalizations, deliberating their character and consequences in fact and in idea, are denounced as bigotry. Persons who have the temerity so to query or to propose different modes of association between priests and people, between sacerdotal hierarchy and national government, modes more harmonious with the patterns and practices of democratic society and the principle of equal liberty, are pilloried with angry insults as atheist, as enemies of religion, as totalitarians, as advocates of "monolithic" society, as "unAmerican," and worse.

To psychologists, the unrestrained passion which all this evinces presents a typical picture of the reaction-pattern that follows the public exposure of a motivation which the reactor

endeavors to keep hidden. Many appraise it as one of the manifold mutations of "witch-hunting." In this instance, the motivation is what S. F. B. Morse designated as the conspiracy against American liberties; it is the undertaking, in the name of democracy, to subvert freedom of religion to religious subjection under the sacerdotal rule of the Roman Catholic hierarchy and its subordinates. The equation of religion with Romanism alone, of the idea of God with Roman Catholic dogma, of faith and morals with the Roman Catholic creed and code, are among the evidences to the undertaking. The virulence against Secularism follows from this purpose, since Secularism postulates the reciprocal guarantee by all religions of the equal freedom of each religion; since Secularism affirms the equal brotherhood of different believers in different religions as necessarily following from the impartial fatherhood of God.

The sacerdotal totalitarianism is logically absolute.⁶ The hierarchical Roman Church aims to make itself in practice what it claims to be in principle—a completely Closed Society whose doors open inward for willing and unwilling entrants, but which has no outward door even for heretics, unbelievers, and deniers.

⁶ In a sermon delivered at Riverside Church, New York, on Reformation Sunday, 1952, the pastor, Dr. Robert J. McCracken declared: "Roman Catholicism is engaged in ceaseless, surreptitious pressure to obtain a position of preference and control in the New World. Nor can there be much doubt as to the success attending its efforts. It has an astonishing hold over the machinery of American life—the press, the radio, the films, the whole field of public relations. It is constantly bringing its weight to bear on local, state and national officials, on the political machines which rule many of our cities, on labor unions, social welfare agencies, teachers' organizations. Its clearly avowed purpose is to make America Catholic." Excerpts from this sermon were printed in *The Churchman* for November 1, 1952.

The latter are merely guilty of crimes against the Perfect Society which the hierarchy say their Roman Catholic church is by God's will. They are traitors to that Society whose rebellion its rulers will punish on earth if they can and for which the ruler of the Roman heaven has provided the Roman hell.

27

The Will of God as the Americanization of Romanism

TO REPEAT: A major practical consequence of the theory and practice of their religion by the Roman priesthood is to make Roman Catholicism in religion what racism is in politics and proletarianism in economics; it is a strategy of segregation and religious *apartheid* alike in countries where Roman Catholics are a majority and in countries where they are a minority. It sets up a wall of separation between church and church even more impenetrable than the wall between church and state which it is endeavoring to shatter. This wall between church and church is an instrument of maintaining a caste system among the religions of the world, with the Roman Catholic clergy as the topmost caste. The wall between church and state is the instrument of equal liberty of churches and of the equal safety of each from the aggression of any. As we have seen, the tactic which serves the sacerdotal strategy varies from land to land and culture to culture. It includes withdrawals and flankings, concessions here, aggressions there, resistance elsewhere. But the diversity of tactics is postulated on the unity of strategy, whose enduring purpose is, to render the Sacerdotal State a global empire, and to lift the papal claim to supreme authority over mankind from supernaturalist pretension to naturalist performance, from Otherworldly faith to Thisworldly fact.

On the record, it is not the rote and rite, the creeds, the feasts, fasts and sacraments of the Roman cult that alarms Americans loyal to the American Idea, and moves to utterance the Moses, the Marshalls, the Blanshards, the McCrackens and other Protestants and the deeply religious anti-clerical Catholics such as the late Thomas Sugrue or Lawrence Fernsworth. It is clericalism.

It is the totalitarianism and authoritarianism of the sacerdotal caste, with its unfailing aggression against all that is diverse and will not yield its integrity of conscience. Of course, both the totalitarianism and authoritarianism are referred to "God," and the supremacy of the Roman Catholic clergy and no other over mankind is ascribed to God's mandate, passed on from the Apostle Peter, making Roman Catholicism the world's one and only true theocracy.

But the record discloses nothing in the original "deposit of faith" which requires that theocracy should be a hierarchic dictatorship and not a democratic republic; nothing in the One God's essence or his grace, even as orthodox theologians expound them, requires that the One God shall not reveal himself without sacerdotal aid and manipulation, directly to the faith of each and every one of his human creatures, and to each as differently as each reports. On the contrary, there is much in the Gospels and in the sayings of Jesus, and in the mystics' experiences, and in the theologians' discourses, even as in all the other of mankind's religious expressions which means that an infinite, omnipotent and omniscient One can and must thus diversely reveal itself or else forfeit the fullness—perfection is the theological word—of being which the prevailing idea of divinity necessitates. With a God who is a perfect being whose substance is love there cannot be a freedom of religion which is not equally everybody's. That sort of freedom of religion is not a freedom for anybody. But the freedom of religion which the One God of Love ordains is in logic and in historic fact the freedom which Secularism insures and sustains and cannot be anything else. Secularism is the will of God.

Now, by acknowledging this principle of equal freedom and equal safety for different faiths, the hierarchical Romanist teaching church could, as Leo XIII noted, continue to grow and prosper. But to grow and prosper as a good neighbor and not as a ruthless and greedy colonizer and trader. Instead of intriguing to make America Roman Catholic, the clerics would loyally con-

cern themselves with once more releasing—*vide* Tocqueville—the process which had been making Romanism American. They could do this like the American in the Philippines, by not only giving up their own domination, but also by helping their parishioners of the believing church to religious self-rule. They could release the process of Americanization which de Tocqueville had observed and which their sacerdotalism had arrested. They could restore to the faithful the rights and freedoms clericalism had deprived them of, guide them back into the ownership and care of their churches and schools, the choosing of preachers and teachers, and the use of methods of inquiry and reflection, not assent and repetition, on questions of faith. They could acknowledge that other forms of human association are God-given no less than churches. They could render them the respect and consideration they demand for churches. They could concede that church governments, like all governments, are means “to secure these ends” be they averting evil or getting good on earth or in heaven—and that their vocation is not to exercise authority but to render service.

In place of their false isolationist pluralism, which is but an expedient sophistry of absolutist monolithic organizations each aiming at imperial dominion over the others, the Roman Catholic clergy loyal also to democracy could share and help develop the true pluralism of the democratic process. They could install the free intercommunication characterizing the arts and sciences, which so unites all that each is the more freely and abundantly itself than it could be in any other way. This pluralism in the *de facto* pluralism which Secularism starts from. The sole God that the Secularist faith could postulate, hence, would be a One-of-All and an All-as-One. The divine unity would be an associative unity. It could not be a one substance disclosed and manifest, but must needs be a union intended and hoped for, whose Godhood is in truth *Deus Absconditus* precisely because One, and one as mankind’s ineluctable diversity of fluid, altering faiths, working toward a free consensus. The Hidden

God's experiential warrant would thus occur as the Love-without-Hate which certain theologies designate as the inward substance of the divine. Working toward consensus would be this Love in act, therefore become self-evident, the pledge here and now of the unknown good beyond experience that men's hopes are turned to.

As fact of record, as event of history, this love does exist in the form of a communion of the diverse faiths which figure in some individual's personal history, in some society's free collaboration with other societies. The experience of such formations, once perceived, can be abstracted, idealized, and treated as a continuing directive for the free diversities of the human enterprise. Some of the prophets of Israel, some of the sages of Hellas did just so, pointing a way how every man of every faith might live together with every other man of every other faith as a good neighbor. Their meanings became arguments of faith—not experiences but symbolic extrapolations of experience whose singularity is, to be the ever-unclosed process of the self-orchestration of mankind, replete with arrests and subversions and frustrations, yet increasingly comprehensive and abundant. Traditional religions grope toward what is here in view when they speak of the will of a God who alone is love-without-hate. In practice "will" so meant is the reciprocal upkeep of those religions in their irreducible singularities, and the incarnation *by* those religions of the divine Will's orchestral unity. Their recurrent metaphor for this circular relationship is "the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of Man." True, an operational faith in such a divine father and such a human brotherhood is not disclosed by the history of sacerdotal cults or the tales of their creeds and codes. The divine love they celebrate appears to be an exclusive and jealous love; the human brotherhood they exemplify is a brotherhood only of the like, shutting out and condemning the unlike. Toward the latter they direct hate, not love, and their life-plans, whether *qua* churches of this world or *qua* the Heaven or Hell of their Otherworld re-

quire that hatred of the unlike should take precedence even over love of the like. Christian crusades, Mohammedan Jihads, Judaist persecutions, Buddhist and other Holy Wars, symbolize them aptly enough. As an elderly Baptist is said to have retorted to her Methodist neighbor at a Methodist revival meeting: "You go to hell; I don't belong to your Church."

BY NOW IT should be apparent why neither clerics nor laymen talking about God know, or can know, *what* they are talking about. The *what* which the most sophisticated of theologians or the simplest of believers does know consists of prepared objects such as bread and wine, and of images and symbols built, sculptured, painted, written, printed, spoken or chanted, which the faithful see, hear, touch, smell, taste or swallow, or otherwise react to with devout attention. Those sensible things figure in their experience as surrogates for some X not sense and beyond experience. That which they stand for is believed to be of another world than themselves, a world they can only mean, point to, and guide toward, but can never be, never enter, never bring the believer face to face with. This Otherworld is whatever the words "divinity" or "spirit" or their equivalents stands for. The signs and symbols which mean it must remain forever solely its signs and symbols—even as the miracle of the Eucharist. When, as is universally done, they are taken to *be* what they can only mean, those who do not so take them call them idols and appraise commerce with them as mortal sin, fraught with death. The record shows the cults of every culture and every age denouncing the worship of other communions than their own as idolatry while they reverence the images and symbols of their own as the personal presence of the living Gods.

If the distinction is invidious, and a function of the war of all faiths with all, the absorption of that which a sign means into that which the sign is, is natural enough; for in any person's experience, the seen is the original of the unseen, the patent the precedent of the potential, the known the prophecy of the unknown, so that for the believer, a visible image does

serve as the authentic disclosure of the Hidden God of his salvation. The record shows also how often, how diversely, the seen, the patent, and the known fail to effect the salvation the believer craves, how this failure creates doubt of their powers and reliability. Under doubt, the latter become abstracted and segregated from the former. For the visible vessels and instruments of salvation are expendable; while the invisible power that saves, which is not, may work by any other visible means. It is hence declared to be out of this world, beyond seeing and impervious to orderly knowing, from nature hidden, to nature supersensible and supernatural—in a word, sacred, its manifestation miracle, its operation providence. Then, the visible image, the shrine, the altar, the naturally present and perceived are taken for but the impotent passage between the endangered believer and his invisible saving power—the means whose meaning is God.

This way of taking them is the actuality pointed to by St. Paul's calling faith the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. No religion can do without this substance and evidence—that is, without the images, the signs, the symbols, the rites and the rites. Few, even the most abstract and "atheistical," do without an idol of some sort—be it a doctrine or a name, a book or a relic, an animal or a plant or a place or a person. The idols perceived are the present help in time of trouble assuring the still unseen future salvation from trouble. The idols are knowledge-of-acquaintance. Each and every one of them has an individuality specific to its communion and community and sacred to the requirements of its faithful who jealously treat all others as strangers and competitors. For example: God's Virgin Mother is livingly present as a multitude of local figures with local habitations, names and worships, and local powers; Jerusalem's holiness is challenged by Rome's, Rome's by Mecca's, and so on, to the multitude of shrines of healing and redemption with their competitive claims; the Jew's Holy Bible is a word of God which the Bibles of the Romanists

and Protestants rival and whose meanings they reciprocally challenge; the Socialists, the Stalinists, the Titoists, and the other denominations of the Marxist faith read *Das Kapital* with irreducibly opposed meanings. So with the sacred books of the East; so with the words and vessels of all cults everywhere—they are direct perceptions, knowledge-of-acquaintance, used as communications about that which is forever beyond acquaintance save for the mystic, to whom the God of his acquaintance is by the very fact of his being such, not subject to the qualifications wherein knowledge about him would consist. For the mystic perception is perception of the Absolute without relations, while knowledge-about is entirely of relations.

And what else but relational are the theologies, the philosophies, the creeds or the codes that tell about God and the will of God in clear, distinct definitions and in precise directives? So telling, they deny themselves acquaintance with divinity; in the mystic's sight they halt, forever profane, outside of the experience which has pierced the mysterious heart of the fane, and consumed in the Absolute, has surpassed all the externalities of knowledge-about it.

Revelations, creeds or dogmas, disciplines or codes, always only allegories and symbols, are, then, stuffs of faith, not disclosures of fact. Belief's substantive and transitive immediacies, they serve the faithful as the present media of the future consequences they desire and design and would encompass—consequences which fear flees and hope seeks, for salvation from the panics of insufficiency, the agonies of helplessness, the tensions and anxieties of conflict within or aggression without. When efficacious, these stuffs of the world's faiths, irreducibly diverse as they are, consummate in the feelings of release and reassured confidence which are everywhere the experience of salvation.

Both the experience and the miseries it liquidates—the common denominator of the liquidated is "conviction of sin"—tend, even among the most various individuals and groups, to flow together and to pool into a common mood and attitude. The

creeds and codes which the miseries project and the experience consequentially justifies, tend to harden, to become mutually impenetrable and repellant, even as the feelings they come from and the feelings that come from them, stream on and spread out. The rites and rites of a cult become fixed patterns, unaltering forms of utterance and performance precisely repeated at each invocation of the God, never unviolently altered. Worshipers know what they are, how they use them, what they use them for. They do not know what they use them on. They do know that they use them for present help and future salvation, to secure an unmaking of the evils they fear, a making of the goods they crave. The forms are to them, hence, necessary antecedents of the release and confidence which testify that the miraculous hidden power always and everywhere beyond man's knowing, has granted what was prayed for, and that the grace of salvation has been accomplished. Faith can but point toward it, cannot possess it. Saving power is forever mysterious power, forever *Deus Absconditus*.

Now because it is *saving* power, it is assimilated to the one beneficent energy every person will have experienced and directly known, at least as a young child—the cherishing, redeeming providence of the loving mother. The Hidden God is declared to be One and the Same with Disclosed Love—love as the influx of that Other strength, casting out fear, overcoming evil, transfiguring guilt and anxiety into freedom and safety. Love is disclosure and disclosure is faith accomplishing itself in works;¹ *Deus Absconditus* is still no *What* that can ever be brought to light as articulate form always and everywhere the same. The visible gods are instant gods. They have no sequential presence; like Plato's ideas, or Euclid's geometric forms, they are eternal

¹ In our new global consciousness, the synonym for works is "technical assistance." But missionaries learned long ago that medical aid, reading and writing and other arts are the moral incarnations of theological love. In this Albert Schweitzer is a classical model.

and universal, no more first than last, and therefore forever last. Whereas the invisible god has never a last presence, always only a latest one: *Deus Absconditus* can be absconditus alone as ongoing process whose sequence may leave behind, but never stops in, unmoving form. His revelations answer the question *How?* perhaps the question *What for?* but not the question *What?* They consist of transitive patterns of operation, not of an intransitive articulation of being or a fixed order of values.

The histories of both philosophy and theology report gropings toward the difference: Modernly, it had received a signal personal articulation from Bergson, with his exaltation of Time over Eternity, and durational freedom over instant necessity, an exaltation ambiguous however, and insecure, that he is said to have repudiated before his death. LeRoy and La Berthonniere have rung changes on it; Gabriel Marcel's personal existentialism impatterns it. This man of letters, a convert to Roman Catholicism, could not follow the cult's prescribed Thomist line, with its infallible deliverances of *What* God is. Marcel found that he could not feel secure in the actual relationship with other human beings even when they were trust and love and the like. His heart required a continuous guarantee of these discontinuous relationships, and he postulated this guarantee as his relationship to God. That was the rock of his salvation, God envisioned as the everlasting *Thou* which impartially supports the existent *I that I am* and the existent *You that You are*. Being everybody's ground, including the Godless', the One divinity is no subject that man's senses or man's reason brings man knowledge-about. Things may be such subjects; we may reason out their existence, and assign them conditions and occasions. But not God. We can but appreciate that ineffable presence, speak ever *to* it, but never *about* it. To cognoscenti in this field, analogies will suggest themselves with communications about God by such writers as Matthew Arnold, Arthur Eddington, Mordecai Kaplan, Reinhold Niebuhr and above all, Martin Buber, whose rather turgid *Ich und Du* presents striking

similarities. Needless to say, this view of God has been condemned by the Thomist God's vicar in Rome.

A basic heresy of the view is, perhaps, that it does not render its due to the evil of Otherness. In organized religions of salvation evil is paramount; their hatred of evil counts far more toward salvation than their love of good. And how should it not, when operationally, almost the all of love is rescue from the here-and-now of the world, the flesh and the devil? The priestly cure of souls is a craft directed far less to the cultivation of virtue than the weeding of vice and sin by means of sacerdotal operations designed to influence supernatural power over both. Its *What for* is, more truly, to escape paying the wages of sin than to reap the rewards of virtue. Could it very well be otherwise in a world no more made for *genus humanum* than for any other species struggling for existence? What generation does not undergo experiences wherein pleasure seems to come as but a passage from pain, and euphoria to rise as but agony ebbing? What generation does not bring forth some cult of religion, some school of philosophy, which seizes on such undergoings, hypostatizes them into principles, institutes them as the measure of all values, rendering virtue but the inhibition of vice, good but the overcoming of evil, salvation but the frustration of sin? Such reversions come to fulfilment in consciousness only if the beaten foe is also present and the impotence of his Otherness is patent. The victor's safety and happiness can be *that* safety and happiness only as the vanquished's helpless misery is a present necessary part of it. Even when the state of salvation is innocent, without *schadenfreude* and suffused with pity, the misery of the Other heightens it. Recall Lucretius, in *De Rerum Natura*:

Sweet it is, when on the great sea the winds are buffeting the waters, to gaze from the land on another's great struggles; not because it is pleasure or joy that anyone should be distressed, but because it is sweet to perceive from what misfortunes you yourself are free. Sweet is it, too, to behold

great contests of war in full array over the plains, when you have no part in the danger. But nothing is more gladdening than to dwell in the calm high places, firmly embattled on the heights by the teaching of the wise whence you can look down on others, and see them wandering hither and thither, going astray as they seek the way of life, in strife matching their wits or rival claims of birth, struggling night and day by surpassing effort to rise up to the height of power and gain possession of the world. Ah, miserable minds of men, blind hearts, in what darkness of life, in what great dangers ye spend this little span of years!²

Alongside this pitying happiness on earth we may put the pitiless happiness of the saints in heaven, with their eternal *schadenfreude*. That ideal became the criterion of blessedness after the cults of the ancient world which had learned deeply to fear the capricious and arbitrary shifts of imperial Rome's rapacious police power, began to suffuse this fear with a ruthless hatred of one another. Then, what had started as a "failure of nerve" among the Graeco-Roman élite, grew into the schizophrenia of an entire civilization. In time, what had been a free collocation of diversities, attuned to Roman might and more or less orchestrated to Roman law, split into an Otherworldly and a Thisworldly mentality, a City of God and a City of the World, each with characteristic doctrines concerning divinity and humanity and human destiny, with characteristic disciplines of tools and technique of imaging, symbolizing, in rite and rote, in order to achieve wellbeing or to insure salvation, and each with characteristic hate-driven appraisals of the other. Each looked on the other with its doctrines and disciplines, as the living evil, which the faithful must overthrow and destroy, if they are to attain salvation. There had to be a warfare between the godly upon earth, with heresy even more sinful than infidelity. Spokesmen for the City of God told of the blessedness of

² Book II. Proem. Cyril Bailey's Translation.

the victorious Saints as a sort of Roman triumph consisting in part of the spectacle of the vanquished in their defeat; resurrection must be "unto condemnation" as well as unto salvation. Could heaven be genuinely heaven unless its denizens were also looking down upon the sinners in hell suffering? Tertullian did not think it could, and his line of thought has in no age lacked followers. Heaven was but consummation in blessed vision and victorious contemplation, of the loyal believer's righteous action and glorious warfare on earth—the reward he went to from the earth for serving the Lord by despoiling and enslaving, and maybe destroying, the wicked Other. Read the Rev. Mr. Cotton Mather, "spiritual leader" of Massachusetts Bay Colony, advising Mr. John Higginson:

September 15, 1682

To Ye Aged and Beloved, Mr. John Higginson.

There be now at sea a ship called Welcome, which has on board one hundred or more of the heretics and malignants called Quakers, with W. Penn, who is the chief scamp, at the head of them. The General Court has accordingly given secret orders to Master Malachi Huscott, of the brig Porpoise, to waylay the said Welcome slyly as near the Cape of Cod as may be, and make captive the said Penn and his ungodly crew, so that the Lord may be glorified and not mocked on the soil of this new country with the heathen worship of these people. Much spoil can be made by selling the whole lot to Barbadoes, where slaves fetch good prices in rum and sugar, and we shall not only do the Lord great service by punishing the wicked, but we shall make great good for His Minister and people.

Yours in the bowels of Christ
Cotton Mather³

³ Cited in Edward Corsi's *Paths to the New World* (Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith) see also Mather's *A Christian and his Calling*—2 brief discourses.

Recall the oft-cited expression given this sentiment by Jonathan Edwards, a dedicated and devout man of God whose actions were more humane than his vision, his conduct than his theology. "The sight of hell torments," he declared, "will exalt the happiness of the saints forever. It will not only make them more sensible of the greatness and freeness of the grace of God in their happiness; but it will really make their happiness the greater, as it will make them more sensible of their own happiness; it will give them a more lively relish of it . . ."

And how could it not? Their wills, being at last eternally unanimous with God's will by God's eternally loving grace, share the divine happiness of vision which must also lovingly comprehend the sufferings of sinners, equally ordained from eternity, as inward to the eternal good. Here discourse of reason confirms convictions of faith; hate must consummate Love, since this Love cannot be love unless hate consummate it. Value-systems taking this stance toward Otherness for their principle are universal and endemic. They are the occasions of appraisals of religion as "merciless, irrational dogmatism which has borrowed the language of brotherly love."

If Konstantin Brunner was speaking from the insight of acquaintance when he suggested that mankind is incapable of love-without-hate, that only God is capable of it, he must have meant by "God" a divinity that Western theologians have rarely if ever enlarged upon. On the record, theology predominantly points to a certain innateness in people's treating difference as wickedness, as sin, as evil, and fearing it, shutting it out, extirpating it. It may be that this is a disposition of Man's original nature; that this, and not Adam's preferring Eve's apple to obeying God's commandment, is the Original Sin. The speculation is, of course, an ax of heresy laid to the very root of dogma; but it has an extensive empirical base—namely the attitude toward Otherness manifest in natural and naturalistic religions even as in revealed and supernaturalistic. Almost three quarters of a century have passed since William James

first began deploring the dogmatism of men of science, and since his day spokesmen for one or another of the competing cults have deprecated or denounced science as "the false messiah," "a sacred cow," or "Scientism."

"The ideal of every science," James had written, "is that of a closed and completed system of truth. The charm of most sciences to their more passive disciples consists in their appearing, in fact, to wear just this ideal form. Each one of our various *ologies* seems to offer a definite head of classification for every possible phenomenon of the sort which it professes to cover; and so far from free is most men's fancy, that, when a consistent and organized scheme of this sort has been comprehended and assimilated, a different scheme is unimaginable. No alternative whether to whole or parts can any longer be conceived as possible. Phenomena unclassifiable within the system are therefore paradoxical absurdities, and must be held untrue."⁴

That this stance has been traditional to the religious mind need not be argued. And there is enough in the history of the sciences to make evident that the scientific mind is as unexempt as the religious from taking to a "merciless, irrational dogmatism" which speaks however the language of "scientific truth" instead of "brotherly love." It would seem that any systematized scientific expression may be transvalued into a religious doctrine by an act of faith which so commits the believer that he bets his life on it. When, in addition, the act of faith is an act of closure, sealing off variation and rejecting the challenge of competing alternatives as criminal or foolish, it thereby translates the article of faith from only the latest formation of an ongoing process to the final form which ends the going—the final substance of hope, the terminal attestation of the invisible, owning no beyond and enduring no Other. So a tool of inquiry

⁴ In *The Will to Believe*. What Psychical Research Has Accomplished, p. 300 ff.

gets hypostatized into the disclosure of the *What* which seeking inquiry can never find. Closure and termination freeze inquiry into assertion, petrify hypothesis into dogma, reducing the sought to the tools of seeking.

Now this, in the frame of reference of Secularism, is to practice an idolatry of the instrument, to render *aficionados* of such hypostases no less idol-worshipers than their like among supernaturalists, and no less disposed to the war of the faiths whereof these idolizations are both the initiatives and the armaments. Naturalistic denominations and cults, even as the supernaturalistic, then take hatred of the unlike, to be more reliably than love of the like, the right manifestation of their devotion to that saving power, whatever be the name they call it by.

THOSE WHO LOOK for the meanings of the terms of religion or of science in all the uses to which people put them, will find mostly ambiguities and contradictions. But they will also observe that the *hows* of the uses have a consistency lacking to their *whats*. However conflicting and dubious the latter, the former is clear and distinct: it is to assure to the user his survival and growth, and his definitions of the assuring *whats* are his instruments. Philosophers' demonstrations of ideas of divinity, theologians' determinations of godhead, or scientists' postulations regarding value and existence get sanctioned for orthodoxy or condemned for heresy as they express, symbolize, confirm and advance the interests of the relevant cult above any other.

Every dogma appears to be subject to such determinations. So, the validity of any definition of God is its value to the defining power. Its *what* is expendable, while its *how* and its *what for* are indispensable. For example, that God as defined by Thomism and not God as defined by Augustinism is kept the prescriptive divinity of the hierarchical church of Rome is no moral or logical consequence from the intrinsic superiority of the first over the second. Both are articles of faith which no living person can ever verify or falsify by confrontation with *what* the definitions define. But Augustinian divinity is viable as Thomist is not, and churches as diverse as the Presbyterian, the Congregationalist, the Methodist and even the Quaker and the Unitarian can adapt it to their singularities of rote and rite. The Thomist idea of God, on the other hand, is today a more serviceable *ancilla ecclesiae*, a far apter sanction and rationalizer than the Augustinian, of the hierarchical power structure of the Roman Catholic establishment and of its pretensions to

global authority as the sole agency of human salvation. The Kremlin's chosen *whats* in physics, in biology and in the sciences of man, its rejections of relativity, of genetics, of western sociology as infidelity to the dogma of dialectical materialism, have a similar significance. Indeed, the ultimate saving power revered by any society, its *de jure* godhead, is *de facto* the configuration of ways, works and intentions whereof it consists and wherewith it labors and fights for its existence.

Among the religious societies which candidly acknowledge this fact, and whose design for living builds upon it, are today's Humanists. Their creed and code is often mistaken for Secularism, sometimes justifiably. But by first intention Humanists are not Secularists, and although anti-clerical, could also be anti-Secularist. Humanism is a much older term than Secularism and has conveyed a great many more varied and conflicting meanings, each a singular pattern of preferences, interests and ambitions with their correlative revulsions. Some contemporary Humanisms tend to idolize one or another form of naturalism, and to vindicate their love of humanity by condemning other lovers of humanity whose idols are supernaturalist. Among them would be supernaturalist Humanists, such as the first of the fellowships called by that name. Those earliest Humanists had no care for naturalism. They were greatly curious men and women of acute sensibility who took supernaturalism for granted, but found freedom from the authoritarian disputations about divinity, by Christian churchmen and schoolastics, in the perceptive utterances about humanity by the poets and philosophers of Greece and Rome. They called those utterances the humanities and cultivated them as means of self-fulfillment and links of fellowship. They appraised their authors as authentic thinkers and creators and discarded the schoolmen as merely inaccurate quoters and repeaters of those originals. In the course of time, the flood of Renaissance *sprezzatura*, with its intellectual eagerness and imaginative fertility, subsided, and its ebb became the repetitive routine and imagi-

native sterility of the grammar-bound pedants who enforced the *regimen studiorum* of the new Jesuit colleges. The courts, the market-places, the workshops turned aside from Cicero and Horace and Plato and the Aristotle of the Athenians to cultivate the deliverances of Bacon and Descartes and Galileo and Copernicus and Harvey concerning the method and matter of knowledge, the meaning of faith and the nature of man and of the world he lives in. The "humanities" lost their allure at the dynamic frontiers of the intellectual life and found domicile at its dead centre—in the academies which made them the representative curriculum wherewith indifferent but often sadistic teachers gave unwilling pupils the runaround called liberal education.

At the vital frontiers, the classical ideal of man was faced by another—the Enlightenment's ideal of the natural man; the argument of the moderns as against the ancients was transposed into a battle of the books which churchman Jonathan Swift interpreted in a satirical poem by that name. In effect, however, the illuminati of the Eighteenth Century renovated the old forms with new meanings drawn from the new understanding. They identified classicism with naturalism, and the hero of the humanities with "the child of nature" perfected from their idea of the North American Indian. Eighteenth Century neo-classicism is Renaissance Humanism transfigured by the Enlightenment's Newtonian egalitarianism. Its poets and philosophers, even indeed its more adventurous theologians, saw themselves as citizens of Thisworld and called themselves cosmopolitans. Benjamin Franklin spoke for them all when he wrote: "God grant that not only the love of liberty but a thorough knowledge of the rights of man, may pervade all the nations of the earth, so that a philosopher may set his foot anywhere on its surface and say 'This is my country.'"

That philosophy took still another turn when the Newtonian regrounding of the humanities was supplemented by the romantic, and the heart was promoted over the head to be the

organ of discernment and understanding. The change transmuted the idea of nature: the eternal mechanism working through laws always and everywhere the same became an undying universal life, godhead itself.¹ The humanities of Alexander Pope's transpositions of the classics became the Helen and Euphorion of Goethe's *Faust*. But efficacious energies of the change flowed from the Democratic Revolution whose spokesmen in America and France employed the figures of classical antiquity as ikons and symbols of the autonomous natural man with his inborn natural rights. Voltaire, Rousseau, Condorcet, Franklin, Jefferson, Paine, each in his own style, voiced the consensus that the traditional hierarchies of power and privilege, identified with differences of birth, sex, faith, class and occupation, were contrary to nature and violations of her laws; that according to nature all diversities of persons were equal as diverse. Their faith in equality made them republicans in political action as well as cosmopolitans in philosophical outlook.

Adherents to this faith were humanists with a new intention, humanists who had become science-minded without ceasing to be supernaturalist; deistic humanists, to whom the humanities were instruments of equal liberty under God and not evidences of unequal election by God. Their faith attests the transformation which modernity was effecting in the Humanist Idea: a recession of traditional Humanism from the arts, the sciences, the industry and the political philosophy of the new age. By the middle of the nineteenth century Humanism had received a new look and a new function. The look was religious, the function, to integrate the entire past of Western man in one comprehensive creed and code and worship in a Religion of Humanity, by Humanity, for Humanity.

The author of this new Humanism was August Comte, a notable mathematician of Romanist derivation, scientific educa-

¹ Cf. Goethe: "Die Gottheit ist wirksam in Lebendigen, aber nicht im Toten; sie ist im Werdenden und sich Verwandelnden, aber nicht im Gewordenen und Erstarrten."

tion and revolutionary intention. He designed his system in order to replace what he found to be the merely doubtful certainties of the dogmas of the teaching church with the surer certainties of the *positive* knowledge which, within the limits of man's capacity, scientific method secures and humane sentiment employs, in order to achieve an understanding more comprehensive and a life more abundant for the *genus humanum*. Individuals, Comte reasoned, are really abstractions. The concrete and the real in any personal history reside in the network of relationships between the persons, present and past, near and far, wherein they live and move and have their beings. It is this network of passion and action that sustains the wholly human, the sole self-contained and self-containing organism—Humanity, progressing in “the filiation of the ages,” from the phase represented by fetichism and myth, through the phases represented by theology and metaphysics, to the final phase of the positive sciences and the industrial arts, in their order of combination from the simplest to the most complex. At this phase Humanity is discerned as the one *Grand Etre*, the religions of mankind are replaced by the Religion of Humanity, which brings man's head and man's heart to the “one true unity of life.” Humanity is the true God, the divine Whole that every one of its individual parts must learn to love and obey with a total faith.

Teaching the doctrine and discipline of the faith would be the vocation of a hierarchy of Positivist élite, “a philosophical priesthood,” whose instruction would come from the positive sciences of nature and man. Their Bible would be a viable “Positivist library for the nineteenth century,” made up of works of poetry and fiction, science, history, philosophy and religion, which Comte chose as apt to the propagation of the faith. (This is an early list of “great books” which bears comparison with all later ones.) The believers' daily life was to be arranged according to two calendars dividing the year into thirteen months of twenty-eight days each. One, Comte worked out as a flexible, concrete, historical partition of the year; the other as a fixed,

abstract, social sequence. He intended each to signalize the progress of Humanity and to recall and reverence the great men and women who served this progress best. There was also to be, on the first day of the year, a Festival of Humanity, celebrating all the anonymous like today's Unknown Soldiers, who had served the Grand Etre but left no remembrance. Finally, there were to be nine "social sacraments" "consecrating all the phases of the private life by connecting each with the public life."

A Positivist Society was organized in Paris in 1848; another soon followed in London and groups were gathered here and there over the world. In due course, they combined into an International Positivist Society and the cult of Humanity added one more to the multitude of diverse religions of salvation. It presented a significant contrast to Holyoake's Secularist communion, whose faith interpreted both theism and atheism according to their *de facto* bearings on the improvement of the human condition, and looking to "truth for authority, not authority for truth," labored to substitute for the idea of the "usefulness of piety" which is basic to traditional religion, "the piety of usefulness" which the rule of self-help requires; "we are not infidels" Holyoake, whom churchmen had caused to be jailed for blasphemy, explained in his journal, *The Reasoner*, "we are not infidels if that term implies rejection of Christian truth, since all we reject is Christian error." John Stuart Mill expressed himself favorably to this Secularism of Holyoake's, with its conviction that a science which can work out the conditions of human health can also work out the conditions of human happiness. Mill shared Holyoake's humanitarian protest against the inhumanity of man to man in the name of a god who is love, which the latter's Secularist gospel embodied. He also shared the Comteist appreciation of the positive character of scientific knowledge and of the primacy of human well-being in the scale of values. But with Holyoake, he rejected authority and hierarchy as the assurance of this primacy, and found both godliness and godlessness significant only through their operative relations to

this primacy. However, Mill's own word for its principle was "utilitarianism," and this has become a term of philosophic usage while "Secularism" continued to serve as a name for anti-clericalism rather than for Holyoake's religion. It never attained the vogue of Comte's "Humanity." This word, signifying the positivist sentiment, without its sacerdotalizing impedimenta, became a part of the enduring vocabulary of the times. As Sir Henry Maine summed it up in 1875: "The notion of what for want of a better phrase I must call a moral brotherhood of the whole human race had been gaining ground during the whole course of history and we have now a large abstract term answering to this notion—Humanity." The trend was to make Humanity the moral equivalent for God.

Now, perhaps not strangely, as the humanist sentiment flowered, the interest in the humanities withered. Poets and philosophers found light and leading elsewhere. As images and symbols of man's nature and vindicators of man's hope, the humanities became ever more the conventional disciplines of the conventional liberal education, little else than schoolmen's matters and media. Every so often, one of the latter, such as Matthew Arnold, took them for true measures of life's values by whose sweetness and light the entire struggling new republican world of science, industry, art, and religion became a formation bitter, dark, ominous of disaster, even if the claim were true that its qualities followed from the laws of nature and of nature's God. Many other voices besides Arnold's, far more traditional, far more dogmatic, repristinated the idea of a Humanism vindicating authority, hierarchy, doctrine and discipline, and excommunicating liberty, equality, fraternity and the hazards of free inquiry and the plastic reason. In the fanes of this Humanism, the romantic temper was scorned as the temper of disorder, science was pilloried as mere "scientism," the modern spirit was deplored as the spirit of corruption and chaos, the Humanism which comprehended all the diverse religions of Humanity was denounced as a mere humanitarianism subversive

of the authentic humanist spirit. That true Humanism, it was declared, required that the money-changers of "materialism" be purged from the temples of the nation's faith, that the people be brought back to the God of the fathers—the eternal unmoved mover, infinitely calm, whom the generations can learn to believe in and reverence only through the cultivation of the humanities, and the discipline they impart. Authentic American voices of this soi-disant Humanism of authority were Paul Elmer More and Irving Babbitt. Their direct following has been small but loud, disposed to fascism in politics, clerical as well as non-clerical sacramentalism in religion, Thomism in philosophy. Their reverberations have been loudest, naturally enough, in the arcana of the schoolmen, and their most telling voice has been a youthful university president, now fighting the battle of freedom of the mind against McCarthyism. As a generation earlier among the English, whose propensities Lord Beaconsfield had dramitized in *Lothair*, the logic of their passion directed them toward popery; if the divinity they invoked owned any kinship with Love, piety toward it was to be expressed by hatred toward believers in different gods.

Naturally, this Humanism of the authoritarians only challenged, it did not liquidate the Humanism of the religion of Humanity. The latter underwent autogenous mutations. Its Comteist expression was but one dramatic aspect of the mounting and spreading of a new outlook upon human nature and human destiny. The articles of faith of Comte's *Catechism of Positive Religion* were contingent singularities which of themselves had little or no repercussion in the United States. The efficacious transformers were the newer findings of the sciences of nature and man—the new psychology and anthropology, sociology, economics and the other social sciences, all asking why religion is, and how it works in and on the human condition. By means of their answers philosophers of religion and theologians of the cults constructed the new perspectives in which they set the dogmatic creeds and codes of the tradition. Thus "God

and the Church" were variously transvalued and redefined. In the Roman Catholic establishment such innovations—unlike the new dogmas of the infallibility of the pope, the immaculate conception and the assumption of God's Virgin Mother (all instruments of sacerdotal policy, in the struggle for power of which Catholic Lord Acton took such monitory note)—were denounced and forbidden by the hierarchy as hateful modern heresies, and impenitent innovators were excommunicated. Among Protestants and Judaists the innovations called forth widespread, bitter controversy that subsided, leaving some of the disputants full of hate and irreconcilably combative, but none powerful enough to excommunicate or interdict the variant.

Amid those cults, in consequence, communication was not cut off; no Iron Curtain was let down to shut out the innovators. In due course, communication became informed toleration. Toleration induced a disposition to drop irreconcilable issues and to seek consensus and cooperation on reconcilable ones, and this tended to mollify the remaining exacerbations. As the record of the National Council of the Churches of Christ makes apparent, emphasis shifted from religion as inalterable creed and code to religion as a way of life for people who, however irreducibly different from one another, must live together as neighbors, and would like to live together as good neighbors.

Where events take this course the Humanism of a religion of Humanity tends to become a consciously defined as well as an instinctively applied measure of value. The trend toward redefinition may be noted in studies as diverse as Edward Scribner Ames' *The Psychology of Religious Experience* and H. G. Wells' *God The Invisible King*; in the formation of such communions as Felix Adler's Society for Ethical Culture, or John Holmes' Community Church, or Stephen Wise's Free Synagogue; in the altering creed of the Unitarian churches; in the disposition, among the baptized of all denominations whose religious will-to-believe the findings of the sciences had loosed from the creeds

of their churches, to cleave to religion and discard creed and church.

Numbers of the last now joined with many unbaptized into a new communion, calling their common belief Scientific Humanism. A generation ago, a group of notables of this communion endeavored to set forth their views in a series of propositions concerning man, nature, and man's destiny.² They did not call their statement a creed; they called it a Manifesto of "a developing point of view." But it is a creed, like other creeds of other cultsurer, more dynamic, in its denials than its affirmations. The latter are to the effect that the Universe is One Eternal, Determinate Existence whose inalterable laws the sciences of nature discern and define; that man is a result of the necessary causation of these laws, and that he survives and progresses as he gains in his knowledge of them, and can more successfully apply them in every aspect of the human enterprise. The denials reject all supernatural or metaphysical guarantees of human values, all "creation," and the indeterminism and freedom which creation as distinguished from necessary connexion would require. Nevertheless "man is at last aware that he alone is responsible for the realization of his dreams, that he has within himself the power for its achievement. He must set intelligence and will to the task."

There are other unconscious paradoxes in the Manifesto, of the kind that one can find from the days of Zeno the Stoic on, and that are the perennials of the mind's endeavor to rationalize the heart's hopes and the heart's fears in struggling mankind's appeasements of fate or fortune or both. But the Manifesto is a confession of faith and not a summation of fact, and as such it appears to have signalized a consensus among the individuals and groups who gathered into the American Humanist Association. Of course such a confession works as a centre of dispersal

² *A Humanist Manifesto* published in "The New Humanist," May-June 1933.

as well as of conjunction. Humanist denominations are now apparent who are more united through a common enmity than through their common aspirations. In 1952, at a congress in Amsterdam, they joined with other Humanist groups and with Ethical Culture Societies to form an International Humanist and Ethical Union. This was the occasion for the exposition of a strategic alternative creed. The deviser of this creed is Julian Huxley. He calls it *Evolutionary Humanism*.³ As against the Manifesto's redefinition of nature and man's destiny *sub specie aeternitatis* this creed redefines them *sub specie evolutionis*. Bodily change, the first Secretary General of UNESCO told the assembled true believers, has reached its limit; man's present physical form is his final form. He is not only the latest but the last and the "highest" biological type, evolution's topmost turn. But this does not mean that evolution is no more. It means only that it continues by a new technique and operates in a new form. The form is humanity, the technique is culture. Biological heredity is superseded by social heredity and mankind changes itself and its environment in, with, and by means of its culture. Through culture man makes himself and remakes his world: its formations decide his conscious envisionment, planning and guiding of natural and social change. They are the devices of humanity acting as the "cosmic agent" of evolution, carrying on where nature leaves off. Evolutionary Humanism would be the gospel of this revision of the human enterprise. If a legion of dedicated missionaries were to spread it, they could convert the miscellany of mankind to a common faith and a single rule in the light of which eugenical quality of life would take precedence over animal numbers of the living, variation from a chosen norm would be regulated, and the cosmic oneness of human life with all else that lives be validated. The apostolic instruments of conversion would be science, pure and applied,

³ For an earlier, but metaphysical, expression of this intention, see Max Scheler: *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*.

pointed toward that "cosmic unity," which perhaps the mystic attains in his ineffable experience.

Against ideas and interests who are not for Oneness thus envisioned, true believers would need to practice a degree of aggression. The human condition permits no alternative, so fundamental to existence is the struggle for it. True, no system "can give all the answers." But it is also true that "complete tolerance can lead to failure of social cohesion, to intellectual and moral chaos, to easy-going acceptance instead of directed effort. It can lead to all kinds of anti-social beliefs . . . Objectively there is no such thing as complete tolerance . . . We need to know the optimum degree of tolerance and something of the practical ways in which to operate it and the various necessary limitations upon it."

Here, now, is a Humanism, postulating the method of science (somewhat restricted) and the theory of evolution, and appraising man in the spirit of traditional theism, with its requirement of hate for the godless as the disclosure of love for the god of love. The more conventional Scientific Humanisms regard man as having happened in a universe no more made for him than for any other of its teeming infinitudes of existences, and no more precious or significant than any other to the universal economy. Evolutionary Humanism restores man, as the perfected animal, to the apex of the biological "hierarchy," and also establishes him as the unique agent of evolution now continuing through his associations and cultures. The restoration and establishment re-vindicate the unique importance wherewith the Christian tradition had endowed the *genus humanum* when it made mankind the object of everlasting rivalry between the forces of Heaven and the forces of Hell and subordinated the cosmos to an ethic as anthropocentric as ptolemaic astronomy was geocentric. Evolutionary Humanism continues, while it transubstantiates, the man-centred value-systems of the religions of tradition also by postulating unity as against union, and justifying authority by coercion instead of by consensus reached through inquiry and

experiment. In lieu of freedom for whatever is not itself a wilful foe of freedom, it would shut out and cut off dissent uncomfortable to its own grammar of assent.

In the perspectives of its history and diversifications, Humanism is a singular term for a plurality of Humanisms. Each can be identified by a characteristic denominational singularity of creed and code which is employed at once to enclose the communicants of the new communion and to keep out and excommunicate communions with different rules. That is, each works as a boundary binding together the communicants within, walling off the unbelievers without. Now, boundaries, where simply the outer skin of natural formations, serve also another natural function: they are doors of passage as well as walls of separation, and they facilitate a continuing osmosis from outside in and inside out which helps support the life inside. But man-made boundaries are all too often designed entirely to inhibit the osmotic function, or else to permit certain types of passage outward, and few or none inward. According to the dominant faith within, they are worked as barriers against goods, people, ideas and ideals coming from without, and as ramparts from which to march against the outer world from within. The marchers may be missionaries of religion, commercial travellers, fifth columns, and at last armies. All talk *to* but none *with* the invaded neighbor. The formations are countless, and the image of the Iron Curtain is an apt symbol for them all.

Since Humanism and Humanity have become synonyms of a highest good, other creeds have taken them up for the sake of whatever additional favor using them might bring their propaganda. There have even been occasions when spokesmen for Communism as well as Catholicism have proclaimed that their version of Humanism is *the* true one even as their versions of Democracy and of Progress are *the* true ones. All such are, of course, a far cry from the explicit philosophic Humanism of such cheerful systems as F. C. S. Schiller's or the implicit one in J. P. Sartre's bleak existentialism. The first has so far escaped the

hypostasis into a creed and the idolization by a cult which appears to be the lot of the second, whose apostles have been crying up its rightness—without regard to its uprightness—and crying down the like claim of others. The consequence has been to precipitate it into one more dusty way toward an authoritarian absolutist design of faith and works, dissent from which is treachery, falsehood, and unpardonable sin. Yet it is of the essence of the Humanist point of view that each dissenter perforce looks upon his own version of the faith as the one reliable configuration of feeling, fact and vision into a life-plan on whose salvation he can bet his life.

And this, obviously, is why the naturalistic systems cannot but be brothers under the skin of the supernaturalistic, the humanistic of the theistic, the communistic, and the rest. Each appears as the formation of a self-contained and self-containing *what*, struggling against diversification within and Otherness without, in the desperate faith that only thus can it bring about the salvation which the word "God" so eminently signalizes. Some prefer not to say "God," saying instead "Democracy," others "Science," others "Beauty," others "Dialectical Materialism," others "Humanism," and so on. Each of those words somewhat ambiguously denotes a *what* whereto the believer entrusts his existence. His act of faith establishes the object of his trust as the god of his salvation, and decides the creed and code of his "religion." The values which "religion" is the sign of do not follow from those *whats*; for they are only coordinates of the intensity and range of the believer's faith. When he bets his life, his wager is his religion, the creed and code which impattern it and the social structures which place his bet serve in and of themselves as the substance of whatever he hopes for, as the evidence of the invisible he could die to see. Practically, those appearances are all the reality that reality evinces; practically, the church is the God, and to serve God becomes identical with doing even more than the believer is able, for the greater power

and glory of the *de facto* establishment, its custodians and its functionaries, that make up the actual church.

For as operative power, what else can divinity come to except the ambitions, the possessions, the plans, the strivings and the doctrines and disciplines by which the companions of the faith advance their church's struggle for existence? Recall the esoteric humanism of the Fourth Gospel: "No one has at any time seen God. The Only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father—he has revealed him." That is to say, "the Father who is in secret" is disclosed to the Son, who is the Father making himself visible: "he who has seen me has seen the Father." Thus Christ is God as Man, God became flesh and walking on earth; while as Christ, man is God *qua* the light and the way to himself in his role of Deus Absconditus—"the real and the living way; no one comes to the Father except by means of me."

But what else again, as the historians tell the tale, claims to be the true immediate means of coming to the Father if not some church, any church, pretending to the exclusive power of salvation and to the monopoly of privilege which power would enable if it were as is claimed? For example, Roman clericalism, pretending that a claim is the same as a right, avers that the organizations, doctrine and discipline which are its vehicles of power, constitute a "perfect society," perfect as the heavenly Father is perfect, and the sole expression of God's will to other men. That is, Roman clericalism avers that the Roman church and only the Roman church is the divine disclosure of *Deus Absconditus*. To believe them, is then in fact to bet one's life and destiny upon the providence of the sacerdotal establishment, its creed and its code; to disbelieve, is to be guilty of heresy, blasphemy, infidelity, and to merit in its degree the whip, the poison, or the pyre.

Now this *de facto* relationship of an invisible God with a visible communion is not singular to Roman Catholicism. It pervades almost any communion of faith, theistic or humanistic. And it is a circular relationship, like that between the idea of

a person's character and his actual conduct: the character prophesies and projects the conduct, the conduct validates the character. Similarly, the god is declared to command the concrete attitudes and actions which convey the beliefs of the believers; the beliefs impart the force and form of visible efficacy to the invisible power of the god. When the divine singularities attesting the globe's multitudinous fellowships of faith are considered together, John Dewey's denotation of the word *god* becomes fitting. He would give the name 'God,' he declares in *A Common Faith*, to "the active relation between the ideal and the actual," the actual being the facts of behavior, the ideal, the pretensions of creed and code. In the guise of churches and other organizations of religion, the pretensions would be functions of the organizational facts, the facts would be the forces which the pretensions idealized; while theology would be the dialectic of those pretensions, the elucidation of God and his will. But in terms of any private life, God would be "the active relation" between the life's rejected present and desired future, its deficiencies and its fulfillments. His substance and evidence would be either the believer's private judgment ordaining him into his private priesthood, or the religious society which holds his allegiance. The relationship is as definitive in Humanisms and Naturalisms as in Theisms and Deisms and other supernaturalisms.

On the record, nothing in this homeostatic organization of interests looks toward the attitude and actions which signalize the good neighbor. In the Secularist outlook, a neighbor is good who recognizes the indefeasible differences from himself of those next to him and around him, who understands and accepts them as his peers⁴ and readily exchanges with them the spiritual

⁴ Cf. Thomas Paine: *On First Principles of Government*. "Rights are not gifts from one man to another, nor from one class of men to another . . . It is impossible to discover any origin of rights otherwise than in the origin of man; it consequently follows that rights appertain to man in right of his existence, and must

hospitality of peers. Goodness lives in this free trade in ideas, things and services animated by sympathy, sustained by insight and grounded on faith. Wherever this relationship moves into reciprocity it builds up such a union of the different that each party to the union can grow toward its own unique fulfillment more freely and safely and certainly than by itself alone. Dewey's meaning of the word 'God,' which is an adaptation of Edward Ames's and his like, could obviously be applied to the relation between this ideal of the union of the different and the actual relationships between the different. It has been so applied, together with others, in the present exploration of the political economy of religious belief. The idea of union, not unity, has on different occasions occurred as a proposition in philosophy but never as the article of a fighting faith, nor has it even been brought from attitude to action by any communions laboring solely to verify faith in fact. Degrees of it have been actualized whenever numbers of different communions so join together as to render their association the joint insurance to their severalty of their individual liberty and safety. The common term for such insurance, "collective security," signalizes what the growing faith of mankind holds to be the one reliable way of ending the war of the faiths and of guaranteeing their peace. The less common term is Secularism.

Secularism, unlike Humanism, makes no choice between the *whats* of the world's religions. It accepts their diversity at face value, on the principle of hospitality to whatever itself is not inhospitable. This means that Secularism is concerned essentially with the *how* of religions, with *how* faiths that are different from one another, indefeasibly and incommensurably

therefore be equal to every man. The principle of an equality of rights is clear and simple. Every man can understand it, and it is by simple understanding his rights that he learns his duties; for where the rights of men are equal, every man must finally see the necessity of protecting the rights of others as the most effectual security for his own."

different, can live together with one another. Secularism takes for its business the relations between faiths, not the creeds they assert. It is indeed a term of relation, which intends such an alteration of actual attitudes of human beings towards their incommensurabilities and differences as to bring them to a free union in common and commensurable works. The critical aspects of the Secularist idea are denoted by the words *free* and *union*. Secularism postulates an ethic of equal liberty and of union as collective guarantee of equal liberty. History records many but unlasting and small-grown instances of it. The most notable and enduring is the relationship between men of science pursuing their inquiries. This is a relationship which fuses into one sustained, unclosed and unclosable adventure the competition of inquirers for discovery and the cooperation between inquirers which insures that each shall have the help of his competitors in keeping his inquiry free to pursue truth and to discard error. In point of fact this is also the most fertile and satisfactory relationship among business enterprises and religious establishments. Competition is assured only as competitors cooperate in assuring it; cooperation is attained only as cooperators aim at equal freedom to compete. And this is why the conduct of life in the Secularist spirit can more reliably than any other exemplify love-without-hate. Here is an instance of the unconscious working of this spirit.

Shu Shung-Ho was the South Korean houseboy who took care of our tent which, besides myself, was occupied by two Protestant and two Catholic chaplains. Shung-Ho was an intelligent, industrious and artistic lad of seventeen, very adept at painting, a voracious reader in both Korean and English and a superb listener. One rainy afternoon as we found ourselves alone in the tent, he said:

"You ver' strange Priest."

"Why," I asked, taken aback.

"You no try make me Christian."

"I'm not a Christian, I'm a Jew."

"Why you no try make me a Jew, then?"

"Why, Shung-Ho," I said, "I like you just the way you are."

The boy reflected for several moments, then said: "You know, Father, you first priest say that to me. You first man no try change me. I ver' happy, I like ver' much."⁵

This Rabbi was a Secularist in addition to being a Judaist precisely because, while a devout Judaist, he was reverent of a personal faith not his own, honored its integrity and was desirous of working with it as it was, not seeking to change it. He was applying the ethic of equal liberty which is the same as the ethic of friendship, of the good will of the good neighbor.

He was also giving effect to the ideal of the American way in religion.

The four chaplains who went down with the troopship *Dorchester* provide another example of the secular spirit in a different context. This troopship was torpedoed on its way to Greenland in February, 1943. More than 600 persons were lost, less than 300 were saved. Concerning the conduct of the chaplains, the Rev. Mr. Daniel Poling wrote in the *LIFE* issue of November 7, 1949 as follows:

"John Washington was a Roman Catholic priest, the son of a mother who gave three sons to her country and who got back only one. Alexander Goode was a rabbi, the son of a rabbi, a husband and father. George Fox, a Methodist preacher, was a decorated veteran of World War I, with a son in World War II. Clark Poling was our son, a graduate of a Quaker preparatory school who put aside pacifism when he discovered that love for his fellow men could be as physically aggressive and forceful as it was when Jesus drove the money changers from the temple.

"These four were en route to Greenland on the troopship *Dorchester* when on February 3, 1943, just after midnight, their vessel was torpedoed. More than 600 men were lost, and

⁵ Chaplain Morris Margolies "A Chaplain in Korea," in *Congress Weekly*, March 9, 1953.

there were less than 300 survivors. Each of the chaplains was awarded the Purple Heart and the Distinguished Service Cross posthumously. The citation of each reads:

For extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an enemy of the United States. On the night of 3rd of February, 1943, a loaded troop transport was torpedoed, without warning, by an enemy submarine in the North Atlantic and began to sink rapidly. In the resulting confusion and darkness some men found themselves without life jackets and others became helpless through fear and the dread of plunging into the freezing water. These four chaplains heroically and calmly moved about the deck, encouraging the men and assisting them to abandon ship. After the available supply of life jackets was exhausted, they gave up their own. They remained aboard ship and went down with it offering words of encouragement and prayers to the last.

"Each of the *Dorchester* chaplains had a dynamic loyalty to his particular faith. To each his vows of ordination were holy, and they were passionately held. Nowhere in America could four men be found more intense in their devotion to their own faiths. But these four become one in service, in sacrifice and dying. Standing shoulder to shoulder, their arms linked and braced against the rail as the waters rose about them, each in the tradition of his faith prayed to God the Father of us all. Each was loyal to himself, but each had found a cause transcending all differences and divisions, even as their deed transcends all debate and arguments."

In secular terms the right word would not be *transcending*. The right word would be *uniting*. The action of these different men with different creeds brings their differences into the team-play of the diverse whereof Secularism consists. They, also, were giving effect to the ideal of the American way in religion.

In the armed forces the ideal is effectuated through the rule that chaplains of all denominations are to be equally available to men of all faiths; if they are not creedally segregated when facing death, why need they be while living life?

30

Coda: The American Way in Religion

TO MANY IT is that conversation in Korea, that cooperation on the Dorchester, which will appear the unique incident, entirely unrepresentative of the prevailing disposition among religionists. Judaism, they will especially point out, long ago ceased to be a missionary faith, and of course its ministers would not seek converts. But, does it follow that abandoning conversion is the same as gladly accepting diversity and liking persons of different faiths just the way they are? That Shu Shung Ho's "Ver' strange priest" was also an American is not unrelated to his Secularist neighborliness, and this valuation of the Gentile faith of the young Korean could well be of the same spirit as George Washington's valuation of the Judaism of the Hebrew Congregation of Newport, Rhode Island. "The citizens of the United States of America," the nation's first President had written them in 1790, "have a right to applaud themselves for having given to mankind examples of an enlarged and liberal policy, a policy worthy of imitation. All possess alike liberties of conscience and immunities of citizenship. It is now no more that toleration is spoken of, as if it were by the indulgence of one class of people that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights. For happily, the Government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance, requires only that they who live under its protection should demean themselves as good citizens, in giving it on all occasions their effectual support."

This was addressed to the adherents of a faith penalized everywhere in the Christian world for that faith, and denied the rights of citizenship and the protection of the laws because they were held permanently guilty of the death of a Savior without

whose death Christian salvation could not have been. Washington, of course, was expressing an intention more than describing an achievement. In a letter to Jefferson during the latter's presidency, Paine gave his own definition of this American intention: "The word, religion, as a word used *en masse*, has no application to a country like America. In Catholic countries it would mean exclusively the religion of the Romish church; with the Jews, the Jewish religion; with the Deists it would mean Deism, with the Turks, Mohametism, & C . . . Now all that we have to do, as a Government with the word religion, in this country, is with the civil rights of it, and not at all with its *creeds*. Instead therefore of using the word religion, as a word *en masse*, as if it meant a creed, it would be better to speak only of its civil rights; *that all denominations of religion are equally protected, that none are dominant, none inferior, that the rights of conscience are equal to every denomination and to every individual and that it is the duty of Government to preserve this equality of conscientious rights*. A man cannot be called a hypocrite for defending the civil rights of religion, but he may be suspected of insincerity in defending its creeds."

Washington and Paine were attributing to the country they helped create the character that Franklin prayed might be achieved by all mankind.¹

This, let it be recalled, is what the Declaration of Independence intended, what the Bill of Rights, the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty and various state constitutions and statutes enacted into law. It is what de Tocqueville found notable and Morse strained to protect, what American education and American legal tradition have more or less labored to implement and to support. It is what the world community affirms and expands and diversifies by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

¹ See above, p. 200.

However, while it is true that this Declaration follows from the Declaration of Independence in, to use Comte's phrase, "the filiation of the ages," it is no less true that the inequities, the inhumanities of man to man, which the two Declarations challenge and combat, also have their filiations, and that the war of despotism and totalitarianism against "liberty and union now and forever" has lost neither force nor scope. However much faith's vision of the latter has formed and consolidated its works, the vision is still far less achievement than aspiration, still far more prophecy than record. Continually, Americans invoking "the American way" are calling upon union to assure liberty as the special privilege of a chosen few, and not as the equal right of the undiscriminated many; Americans, glorifying "free enterprise" are esteeming liberty as their own unrestrained restraint of the enterprise of others, but not union as the collective guarantee of equal freedom of enterprise for everybody.

And so with the enterprises called religion. These, as we have seen, tend far more complacently than any other, to claim an exclusive monopoly of liberty, and to reduce union to everybody's joint support of this claim as the religion's preponderant right. "The favor of the laws" is to be recognized as their just due by God's mandate, and "the American way in religion" should be to render this just due. Obviously, to concede the claim, or any similar one, would be to reduce the American way again to the ways of a world of privileged cults, castes, classes, races and vocations. In religion it would make the American way the same as the way in Spain or Russia or Iraq or Vatican City or any other sovereignty which is a church-state or forcibly maintains a state-church. It would abolish precisely that new relation between a society and its members to which the American Idea gives primacy, and of which the realizing, maintaining and advancing is the American way. For the American way, it cannot be too often said, consists in an ongoing free association on equal terms of all sorts of diverse and competing enterprises, individual and corporative, in order jointly to

assure their several liberties against infringement or abrogation by any. The American way is the method of common action impatterned by a federal union whose function none of the units composing the union can by itself exercise.

This is why the union comes to articulate their common faith and to serve them as their common ground. Indeed, every union of the diverse, on every scale—from that of a marriage to that of the United Nations—is the formation of a new relational structure with new powers, purposes and methods of operation which none of its members can have or use in isolation from one another. By himself alone, each struggles for his own survival and growth against others similarly absorbed, his society is first and last the hobbesian war of all with all, where he must kill or be killed, become victor or victim, freeman or bondsman, master or slave; where peace, hence, is hierarchical power imposed and submission and obedience compelled. It took the mind of Western man more than fifteen generations—from the Renaissance through the Reformation into the Enlightenment—to come to the efficacious perception that those relations between persons were no necessary effect of Nature's laws executing the will of Nature's God. With the same human nature for their working material, the sages of the Enlightenment conceived the alternative relational pattern which the American Idea articulates and the American way enacts. Thomas Paine's observation is here representative: "He that would make his own liberty secure, must guard even his enemy from oppression, for if he violated this duty he establishes a precedent which will reach himself" or conversely: to share in assuring the equal right of the other to his singularity of survival and growth is the precondition of the like assurance for one's own singularity.

As the American Idea, the new relational pattern received the import of a creed; as the American way, it received the specifications of a code, the Declaration of Independence the creed, the Constitution the code, of the faith in Democracy. Those who bet their lives on this creed and code are betting on

the reality and parity of personal uniqueness and on the progressive orchestration of these uniquenesses by means of institutions which embody their united guarantee of their personal and cultural diversities freely to live and grow. Among such believers, the American Idea articulates the love of mankind as a confession of faith; the American way is the persistent endeavor to work out the faith in the formation of a society of peace and freedom. If Secularism is the name for the faith, then Democracy is the name for the works by which the love of mankind is executed as the will of God.

Two relational innovations in these works stand out.

The first has been the separation of Church and State as the most reliable insurance of equal liberty for all faiths and equal security for all churches. One development from this separation has been the growing importance, among all churches, of the social gospel in the climate of opinion due to the democratic intention; another has been the trend from competitive denominational isolationism, to interdenominational and to inter-faith, such as it is, cooperation. A third one has been the formation, from the churches' manifold diversity of the idea of God and his will, of a new single idea comprehending the equal rights of each unit of the multitude. In sum, the acknowledgment that Secularism is the will of God follows from the separation of church and state and is intrinsic to the American way in religion.

The second innovation has been the progressive development of public education in harmony with the principle of separation. As has been noted, sacerdotal vested interests ominously charge that this makes only for irreligion or anti-religion, and that the public schools are godless. But the record shows that the charge is a fiction of the sacerdotal drive for power, that Americans continue the religious people whom de Tocqueville studied, that the denominations and cults recruit more believers

than ever, that public school teachers are prevailingly communicants of diverse communions, that if among public school pupils, creeds are less significant, faith is better informed and conduct more moral than among the pupils of parochial schools.² That in the education of youth which separation intends, and in no small degree achieves, is to have the nation's children grow up readied to join with their fellow citizens of all persuasions and sorts and conditions in the common faith in the American Idea and the common following on the American way. They can be so readied only as they are saved from the isolationism of creedal indoctrination and denominational hatreds, and have learned that loyalty to a whole which is a union of its parts is loyalty to the assurance of the equal liberty and safety of each of the parts; that loyalty to this assurance calls for the reasoned vigilance which is the price of liberty, and the thoughtful curiosity which is the condition of safety.

For this assurance is reason in action, the achievement of the discipline of reason, which is committed to no one of the assuring parties and is alert toward all. It may be that Jefferson had considerations of this sort in mind when he wrote his young ward, Peter Carr: "Question with boldness even the existence of God, for if there be one, he will more approve the homage of reason than the adulation of blindfolded fear . . . You are answerable for the uprightness, not for the rightness of your opinions." What is here postulated is an understanding of reason as an inductive proportioning and adjustment of differents, and not a deductive repetition of sames. Hence a retreat from reason to unreasoning faith would be but to exchange the bold peace for the frightened war of the faiths. For the rule of reason is the peace of the faiths when their com-

² See H. M. Kallen, *The Education of Free Men*, Book II, Chapter 13.

municants live together, each with its singularity of creed and code, as good neighbors. Reason is the cooperative relation between them, the federal union among religions, associating them in equal liberty.

Faith in reason, thus, guarantees the freedom of faith, while isolating creedal indoctrination excommunicates reason. Democracy's schools, in the long period of educational trial and error, found themselves, not quite knowing how or why, acting out this insight, and the vested interests of religion or business or of education itself, who believe their invidious advantages to be thereby threatened, denounce the schools as "godless," "communistic," "materialistic," merely "secular" and so on. Yet, in the light of the American way, do they not project upon the Other their own guilty feelings and desires? Isolated to their excluding creeds, do they not fail the will of the God diversely meant by all the creeds together? The will of God so taken is what Secularism discloses, what the American way endeavors to execute in all enterprises, but particularly in the enterprises of religion. For it is an open way being cleared by all the faiths that pass beyond the frontiers of knowledge. Travellers on it welcome all believers and shut out none until they assume to deny the freedom of the road to believers of a different faith. About one hundred years ago, during a period of defeat for freedom in Europe, Heinrich Heine observed: "If all Europe were to become a prison, America would still be present as a loophole of escape; and God be praised, the loophole is larger than the dungeon itself." This is how a great soldier of human freedom saw the American way from outside looking in. The stormy history of our liberties, however, discloses also what Heine did not see: The inveterate fight to contract the loophole, to close it, to enthrone authority and install hierarchical rule over the minds and hearts of Americans, especially by razing the wall of separation between church and state, and subordinating education to indoctrination. This, Heine's epigoni in Europe now exaggerate. As he overlooked

the schemes and stratagems and aggressions aiming to make the American way a way *from* freedom, they overlook the strain and struggle of freedom's devotees to keep it and extend it as the way *of* freedom which it has, in despite of those who hate and fear freedom, continued to be. Their fight is the substance of their hope, and not to yield gives them their victory.

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